One reason for the Germans’ early success against Soviet defenses was the low level of competence up and down the Soviet chain of command. Lacking trust in his generals (sometimes with good reason), Stalin managed using the techniques with which he was most familiar: strong-armed police measures that instilled fear. Commanders were forced to work under the watchful eye of political commissars and NKVD “special departments.” Disorganization and panic were addressed through executions in front of the ranks, penalty battalions, and anti-retreat units. Stalin’s parallel army of discipline-keepers rushed from crisis to crisis, both at the front and in the rear. As defensive lines collapsed, the enemy advanced, and Stalin lost faith in his commanders, he developed an array of strategies that wound up depriving commanders of flexibility and often increased Red Army casualties.
These heavy-handed and repressive measures probably do not indicate a conscious choice so much as Stalin’s desperation. As strong as his tendency toward violence was, he was certainly aware of the danger inherent in applying it to his own military during a war. He must have grasped that sending troops into battle with guns at their backs was not the ideal way to instill a fighting spirit. He also must have known that on the battlefield it was particularly important to have a single decision maker able to exercise judgment without a political commissar looking over his shoulder. The catastrophes of 1941–1942 clearly showed that unsophisticated and rushed maneuvers combined with pressure from political commissars were not the road to success. Fundamental changes were needed in the way the war was being managed. But when could he introduce these changes? Obviously not while the Red Army was fighting with desperate intensity to hold back the German advance. An opportunity may have presented itself in early 1942, after the Red Army’s first victories. But Stalin’s impatience and his wager on a quick victory only led to further defeat. The lull that set in during the fall of 1942 was used for other purposes, as can be seen in the careful preparations to encircle the Germans in Stalingrad. On the eve of that victory, Stalin finally turned his attention to introducing fundamental changes.
On 9 October 1942, the Politburo passed a resolution to establish full edinonachalie—an ideological buzzword used during forced industrialization to signify a single responsible decision maker—and abolish the institution of the military commissar within the Red Army.127 Former commissars would now become deputy commanders. A directive signed by Stalin that same day granted officers additional privileges and assigned orderlies to the commanders of all army units, all the way down to the platoon level. The duties of these orderlies included “serving the personal everyday needs of commanding officers and carrying out their assignments.”128 In January 1943, shoulder boards, which in 1917 had been abolished as a symbol of the tsarist army, were introduced to Red Army uniforms. The title of marshal was given to some senior commanders. The introduction of edinonachalie, along with privileges, medals, and promotions, was intended to empower the Red Army’s senior officers. The realities of war forced Stalin to show more trust in his military.
After the war’s chaotic first stage, there was a change in Stalin’s interactions with top military command structures, especially the General Staff. “I have to admit,” Vasilevsky later stated, “that at the beginning of the war the General Staff was thrown into a state of disarray and, strictly speaking, you could not say that it was operating normally.… At the beginning of the war Stalin disbanded the General Staff.”129 This disarray meant that a great many decisions were made by Stalin alone, without input from the General Staff. As Vasilevsky described it, things began to change only in September 1942.130 By fall 1943 a regular schedule was established for consultation between Stalin and the General Staff. At the start of his workday, around ten or eleven in the morning, he heard by telephone the General Staff’s first report on the situation at the fronts. Around four or five in the afternoon he heard a report on how things had gone during the first half of the day. Close to midnight, the heads of the General Staff came to him personally with a summary of the day’s events. During these meetings, which took place either at Stalin’s Kremlin office or his dacha, the group would study the situation at the fronts on maps, and directives were adopted to be sent to the field. Other decisions were made as well. Politburo members often took part in these meetings, as did the heads of various military or civilian bodies. In some cases, the heads of the General Staff visited Stalin several times in a day.131 The regularity of these meetings led to better management of the war.
In addition, Stalin had many meetings with other military and civilian leaders. Front commanders were not usually expected to report in person on their assessments and plans, but they were often summoned to Moscow for brief face-to-face meetings. Although Stalin always had the last word, many of these meetings featured a genuine discussion of problems and even debates over large and small questions. A number of memoirs report that as the situation at the fronts improved, meetings grew more businesslike, and the atmosphere became more relaxed and informal. Stalin paced the room as he listened to reports. By remaining on his feet, he lessened the hierarchical divide between him and his military subordinates, who also stood. The vozhd smoked a great deal, but others could also smoke without asking permission. Boxes of papirosas (filterless Russian cigarettes) lay on the table. Members of the top Soviet leadership sat around the table and kept silent until Stalin asked them a question.132 Less inclined to dictate his own terms or interfere in operational decisions, Stalin became noticeably more respectful toward the military leaders as the war continued.
During the second phase of the war, Stalin was not inclined to be hasty in making decisions and usually listened to reports, including upsetting ones, without any sign of irritability, without interrupting, just smoking, pacing, sitting down from time to time, and listening.133
Less and less often he imposed his own solutions to individual questions on Front commanders—attack this way and not that way. Earlier he would impose his way, tell them in what direction and in which specific sector it would be more advantageous to attack or to concentrate forces.… By the end of the war there wasn’t a hint of this.134
Stalin’s new demeanor was largely a result of his growth as a military leader. As the war progressed, he acquired a huge store of both negative and positive experience. “After the Battle of Stalingrad and especially Kursk,” Marshal Vasilevsky wrote, “he rose to the height of strategic leadership. Now Stalin was thinking in terms of modern warfare and grasped all the issues involved in preparing and conducting operations.” This view of Stalin’s new sophistication was shared by many of the military leaders who worked with him during the war.135
Stalin’s focus on the day-to-day details of operations at the fronts allowed him little time to deal with other matters, particularly the economy. Many spheres of socioeconomic life were removed from the dictator’s harsh control as the lines of division among government institutions underwent a spontaneous wartime revision. Under the military dictatorship, at the top of the pyramid was, as always, Stalin, who made decisions either solely or during meetings held either in his Kremlin office or at his dacha. The participants in these meetings included military leaders and the vozhd’s closest comrades. The meetings did not fit into any of the orderly categories of government. Depending on their content, decisions made at these meetings, or solely by Stalin, were drawn up and circulated to those charged with carrying them out in the name of one of the top governmental bodies—the Politburo, the Council of People’s Commissars, the State Defense Committee, or the Supreme Command. Meanwhile, many questions having to do with the day-to-day running of the country, including the wartime economy, were being decided without Stalin’s direct involvement. Molotov, for example, was in charge of the SNK (the Council of People’s Commissars) and regularly presided over the decision-making bodies that basically oversaw all aspects of government not directly tied to military operations.136 In December 1942 a new body was established to oversee the work by industry and the transportation sector to meet the needs of the front: the State Defense Committee’s Operational Bureau.137 Led at first by Molotov, as the war wound down, it was taken over by Beria.138 Members of the Politburo and the State Defense Committee also served on these critical managerial bodies, where they had the authority to resolve important issues quickly. Not all of the resolutions produced by these bodies went to Stalin for approval.