Historians have made a rather thorough study of the reasons for Stalin’s about-face on religion. Of course the former seminary graduate with the unfinished theological education had no intention of returning to the bosom of the church or asking forgiveness for his sins. Needing to strengthen relations with his allies, he had to respond to the concerns of Western public opinion and influential church circles about the plight of believers in the USSR. Furthermore, the liberation of occupied Soviet territories raised the practical question of what to do about the many churches the Germans had built there. The usual Bolshevik approach of shutting them down was impossible. He needed a reconciliation with the church. Religion had to be put under tight control but not destroyed. Far from the bottom of the list of reasons for this change was Stalin’s awareness of the role religion played in uniting the country, in earning the emotional support of the masses, who had endured terrible trials. Soviet values, force-fed into the minds of millions, could not satisfy the spiritual needs of a huge and ancient people. The goal of achieving a universal vision of the path forward turned out to be unattainable. Stalin’s grasp of this reality brought him one step closer to victory.
The entry of the huge Red Army into Germany was a long-awaited and joyous occasion for the Soviet people and the vozhd. The enemy would be finished off in its own den. The time for retribution had come. Such natural and inevitable feelings inspired heroism and self-sacrifice during the war’s final battles, when every Soviet soldier could taste victory and was eager for the final assault. Stalin had every reason to be proud of his army.
One of the Red Army’s most successful operations came in January and February 1945. Taking just three weeks to advance five hundred kilometers from the Vistula to the Oder, the Soviet forces shattered critical Nazi lines of defense. Bridgeheads were created for an offensive against Berlin itself, but several months of bloody battles still lay ahead. The German forces defending their country put up a stubborn resistance and even launched counteroffensives, forcing the Red Army to take heavy casualties. Knowing this, Stalin did not hurry to enter Berlin in February. It would take several weeks to eliminate the threat of German counterattacks against the exposed flanks of the advancing Soviet fronts and to bring in reinforcements. Hard-earned experience had taught him prudence.
The victories of early 1945 had put the Soviet side in a favorable position to negotiate with the Allies on the postwar future. Negotiations first became a practical necessity in late 1944, when the Red Army was advancing through the Balkans and the Western Allies entered France and Italy. In October 1944, Churchill again flew to Moscow to meet with Stalin. The British prime minister raised the question of spheres of influence in Europe, the Balkans in particular. Stalin is unlikely to have been put off by this political cynicism. He agreed that “England should have the right to a decisive voice in Greece,”151 and he was also willing to apportion a Western “share” of influence in Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia. The presence of the Red Army in these countries (unlike in Greece) had brought them under Soviet control. For Stalin, this control was decisive. The question of Poland, high on the list of diplomatic issues Churchill brought to Moscow, was much more contentious. By the time of Churchill’s visit in late 1944, the USSR had broken off relations with the official Polish government, which had spent the war in exile in Britain, and was promoting a Communist alternative. Britain and the United States did what they could to prevent this outcome. On 1 August 1944, as the Red Army approached, the Polish government in exile organized an uprising in Warsaw with the goal of seizing power in the capital before the arrival of Soviet forces and the pro-Soviet government they were bringing with them. The Red Army, for a variety of reasons, stopped its advance, and the Nazis drowned the uprising in blood. This tragic episode became a source of sharp division between Stalin and his allies, who charged him with intentionally holding back aid to the uprising. This charge was largely just, but Stalin, guided by his own reality, had no intention of relenting. The London Poles had not launched the uprising to help him, so why should he help them?
Burdened by different problems but still united by their common foe, the Big Three met outside the Crimean resort city of Yalta in February 1945. This stunningly beautiful corner of the Soviet Union had only recently been liberated from Nazi occupation and lay in ruins. Sparing no effort or expense, in record time the Soviet authorities created a haven amid the destruction, including residences for the three leaders and their large retinues. Particular attention was paid to security. Camouflage covering was set up to protect against enemy air raids and sturdy shelters were built. Crimea, recently roiled by mass arrests and deportations, was subjected to yet another round of purges. “Suspicious elements” were rounded up and taken into custody. A whole army of security personnel was brought to the area. Stalin alone was protected by a force of one hundred operatives and five hundred NKVD troops, plus his usual bodyguards.152
With victory around the corner, the Yalta Conference would have to address a wide range of urgent questions on which the fate of the world hung. At stake were the future of Germany, a redrawing of the map of Europe, and the worldwide balance of power. Generally speaking, the participants’ goals were simple. Although their motives and priorities differed, each of the parties wanted to leave Yalta with as many items on his diplomatic wish list as he could. But as long as the war continued, the Allies had to depend on one another and adjust their aspirations to military and political realities. They compromised on many issues. The zones of occupation in Germany were settled. The guiding principles on which a united nations organization would be founded were outlined. The idea was discussed of the Soviet Union annexing new territories at Poland’s expense (western Ukraine and Belarus), for which Poland would be compensated with German lands to its west. In exchange for a promise to enter into the war with Japan, Stalin extracted an agreement from the Allies that Soviet borders would be shifted outward to encompass new territory in the Far East and that the country’s interests in northern China would be recognized.
But as the contours of a new world took shape, so did the battle lines of the Cold War. It was not possible to reach a real compromise in regard to Poland. Stalin was determined to put this country under the control of his handpicked government, even if that involved making a few concessions on paper. Another contentious issue was the question of reparations from Germany, a point of particular interest for Stalin.
Perhaps even more indicative of the gulf dividing the Allies was the attitude of Soviet state security personnel in Crimea. The hordes of Westerners who descended on Soviet territory were treated as an enemy penetration. The ships used to bring the Allies’ supplies for the conference were surrounded by round-the-clock patrols. Their crews, when given shore leave, were kept under tight NKVD control. “The entire agent apparatus has been instructed and directed to uncover the nature of ties between foreigners and the port’s military personnel and civilians. Female agents who will come into close contact with foreigners have been given particularly careful instructions,” read one report to the NKVD leadership.153 One can only imagine what these instructions were.