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In view of the potential conscription General Howard felt that it would be better to keep Trident, with all its faults. He urged me to find some method of stopping the Prime Minister from pursuing this unfortunate policy. I explained that, unfortunately, Prime Ministers cannot be stopped. But they can be slowed down. In fact, they almost invariably are -- after a few months most Prime Ministers have more or less ground to a halt.

My idea is to have a quiet word with the American Ambassador. General Howard approved.

[Hackers diary continues Ed.]

January 31st

Today there was good news and bad news. The bad news came first.

In my morning meeting with Humphrey, Bernard and Malcolm we went over the final preparations for my American visit. Malcolm is to make sure that the BBC News and ITN get really good positions on the White House lawn, so that they can get a close two-shot of me and the President.

Ive also told him to ensure that there are good photo opportunities inside the White House as well. Shots of me and the President alone together.

Ive given him a list of all the photo ideas that Ive had: coverage of the start of the talks on the second day, coverage of the President saying goodbye to me, hopefully grasping my elbow with his left hand, the way he did with the West German Chancellor, it looked frightfully chummy.

I wanted him to arrange all of this with our Embassy, but Malcolm felt that it could be difficult. I must say, I dont know what we have all these Embassies for. Any time we need anything important for Britain [i.e. for Hacker Ed.] they always make trouble.

Its not that Im concerned with political advantage or vote winning, or anything like that. Its good for Britain to be seen by the rest of the world as an equal partner of the United States, thats all.

Humphrey was unwilling to discuss the publicity aspects any further. I wondered why. Instead, he showed me the Cabinet agenda.

You didnt need to be Hercule Poirot to see that the agenda had been tampered with. The discussion of the cancellation of Trident was conspicuous by its absence. I questioned Humphrey about this -- after all, as Cabinet Secretary its his job to draw it up.

We were indeed going to discuss Trident, Prime Minister, but I thought perhaps it might be wiser to leave it a little longer. Go into it thoroughly, closer scrutiny, think through the implications, produce some papers, have some inter-departmental discussions, make contingency plans. We are discussing the defence of the realm.

I cant believe that he still thinks these old devices will fool me. I challenged him, and he protested innocence. No, indeed, Prime Minister, but the Cabinet must have all the facts.

I grinned. Thats a novel idea.

He was not amused. Important decisions take time, Prime Minister.

I could see immediately what he was playing at: delaying tactics, the oldest trick in the book. The longer you leave things, the harder it is to get them off the ground.

But then came the bad news. It was a real bombshell. Apparently Humphrey has learned from the American Ambassador -- informally -- that the Americans would be very unhappy if we cancelled Trident unless we ordered another of their nuclear missiles instead.

At first I was defiant about it. After all, I have to think of whats best for Britain. But it seems they claim to have two reasons for their disquiet: the first is that they feel they need our partnership and do not want to carry the nuclear burden alone. This is perfectly reasonable, but as we would still have Polaris they wouldnt be doing so. So the second reason is the real one: the little matter of losing billions of dollars of business and tens of thousands of jobs in the American aerospace industry.

The question is what -- if anything -- I can do about this American opposition to my Grand Design. I told Humphrey that I have no intention of changing my policy. The Americans will have to learn to live with it.

As you wish, Prime Minister, he said, but I thought if we kept your Trident proposal secret until after your American visit, it might save some embarrassment.

I replied sharply that I didnt agree. If there has to be some rough talking, I might has well have it out with the American President when we meet.

He shook his head sadly. Ah, well, thats the point. As you know, the agenda of your meeting must be agreed in advance. You cant just go all the way there for a chat.

Why not?

Well you might not think of anything to say. And, if your Trident proposal were put to the Americans in advance, I understand there would be a slight change of plan.

What change of plan?

You would not be met by the President. You would be entertained by the Vice-President.

I was thunderstruck. The Vice-President? I could hardly believe my ears. I thought he wasnt serious. But he was!

Its absurd. Its ludicrous. Its a total insult. Even Botswana was met by the President. [Botswana had not just cancelled an order for Trident Ed.]

Humphrey tried to put it as nicely as he could. Im sure theyd do it gracefully, Prime Minister. Hed have a diplomatic toothache, like Krushchevs. Or theyd explain that the President had catarrh, or bruised his thumb or something. Fallen asleep, perhaps.

Humphrey knew as well as I that the whole point of the visit to the States was the PR value of being seen meeting the President. I asked him what choices we had. He advised me that in practice I have no choice at all. And that if I want to be entertained by the President I must leave Trident off the agenda.

This is a terrible blow. I have to raise it with the United States sometime. When better than while Im there? But what must be, must be.

There remained the question of whether or not I should raise the Trident question in Cabinet. Humphrey advised me to leave it until my return, in case the discussion leaked to the US Ambassador. He could be right. Clearly someone has been leaking to him already on this subject. I wonder who.

Anyway, Humphrey, I said miserably, a new Prime Minister must show that he has arrived, show that theres a new mind and a firm hand in Number Ten. I must make my mark.

And then Humphrey revealed the good news. It seems that I have accomplished something that none of my predecessors ever accomplished. A cook, no less! Seconded from the Cabinet Office canteen, to do our lunch in the flat when required. Except for weekends and bank holidays, of course.

This was gratifying. A place in the history books. I think that this shows that I have started the way I mean to go on. I am in charge, and the Civil Service can clearly see that there is a new mind and a firm hand in Number Ten.

I told Humphrey that, as far as Tridents concerned, I am not changing my policy and I am not changing my mind. In due course I shall lose it. [Hacker presumably meant that he would lose Trident, not his mind Ed.] But in the meantime I see no harm in postponing the Trident discussion till I return from America, and I gave Humphrey my firm decision to leave Trident off the agenda for tomorrow.

He took it like a lamb. Yes Prime Minister, he replied deferentially.

THE MINISTERIAL BROADCAST

February 6th

I dont remember much about today. I got back from America last night and was in my study first thing this morning after a fairly sleepless night. But I neednt have hurried. I wanted to speak to Humphrey about something but he didnt seem to be around today. Bernard told me there wasnt much happening, and there were no appointments in the diary, so we spent some time reviewing what the papers had said about my American rip, and congratulating ourselves on the success of it. Thats about it, really.

SIR BERNARD WOOLLEY RECALLS [in conversation with the Editors]:

The Prime Ministers recollection of his return from the United States is somewhat clouded by jet-lag, I fear. He was frightfully tired.