His solution was simple: have another opinion poll done, one that would show that the voters were against bringing back National Service.
I was somewhat naf in those days. I did not understand how the voters could be both for it and against it. Dear old Humphrey showed me how its done.
The secret is that when the Man In The Street is approached by a nice attractive lady with a clipboard he is asked a series of questions. Naturally the Man In The Street wants to make a good impression and doesnt want to make a fool of himself. So the market researcher asks questions designed to elicit consistent answers.
Humphrey demonstrated the system on me. Mr. Woolley, are you worried about the rise in crime among teenagers?
Yes, I said.
Do you think there is a lack of discipline and vigorous training in our Comprehensive Schools?
Yes.
Do you think young people welcome some structure and leadership in their lives?
Yes.
Do they respond to a challenge?
Yes.
Might you be in favour of reintroducing National Service?
Yes.
Well, naturally I said yes. One could hardly have said anything else without looking inconsistent. Then what happens is that the Opinion Poll publishes only the last question and answer.
Of course, the reputable polls didnt conduct themselves like that. But there werent too many of those. Humphrey suggested that we commission a new survey, not for the Party but for the Ministry of Defence. We did so. He invented the questions there and then:
Mr. Woolley, are you worried about the danger of war?
Yes, I said, quite honestly.
Are you unhappy about the growth of armaments?
Yes.
Do you think theres a danger in giving young people guns and teaching them how to kill?
Yes.
Do you think it wrong to force people to take up arms against their will?
Yes.
Would you oppose the reintroduction of National Service?
Id said Yes before Id even realised it, dyou see?
Humphrey was crowing with delight. You see, Bernard, he said to me, youre the perfect Balanced Sample.
Humphrey really had a very fertile mind. It was a pleasure to work closely with him.
He had more suggestions to make. The Prime Minister was planning to make his broadcast in three or four weeks time. The Cabinet Secretary urged me to tell Hacker that he should make the broadcast within the next eleven days.
I thought the Prime Minister might refuse. It was rather soon. Humphrey had foreseen this. He advised me to tell Hacker that I had just learned from the Joint Broadcasting Committee that the Opposition would have a Party Political in eighteen days time, that Hacker was entitled to do his Ministerial first, but that if he didnt the first political broadcast of his Premiership would be given by the Opposition.
I wondered if Humphrey was telling the truth. I challenged him on it. It will be, he said with a smile, if you dont tell him till tomorrow morning.
The reason for bringing Hackers broadcast forward was to outflank him. He would not be able to use it to announce his new policy because within the ensuing eleven days he would have been able to squeeze in only one meeting of the Overseas and Defence Policy Committee -- not enough to clear such a radical change of direction with his Cabinet colleagues.
His colleagues were largely in favour of the policy at that time. But only personally. Only politically. Not officially!
As responsible departmental Ministers their official reaction had to depend on the advice that they received.
[Meetings at Whitehall were invariably minuted. Inter-departmental meetings were no exception. Everything had to be recorded on paper, as a record of what was decided and how it was to be acted upon. There was a wide measure of agreement that this was essential for the continuity of government. One meeting, however, was never minuted: this was the weekly meeting of Permanent Secretaries, which took place in the Cabinet Secretarys office every Wednesday, the day before Cabinet met. This was an informal keeping in touch meeting, with no agenda.
Fortunately for historians, Sir Humphrey did make private notes about some of these meetings, for his own purposes. He guarded them jealously throughout his lifetime. Lady Appleby has been good enough to make these notes available to us, and they include a record of the Permanent Secretaries meeting on the morning of Wednesday 15 February Ed.]
Very useful chin-wag this morning. Among those present were Dick, Norman, Giles and David. [Sir Richard Wharton, Permanent Under-Secretary of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office; Sir Norman Coppitt, Permanent Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Defence; Sir Giles Bretherton, Permanent Under-Secretary of the Department of Education and Science; and Sir David Smith, Permanent Under-Secretary of the Department of Employment Ed.]
We discussed the Prime Ministers so-called Grand Design. We agreed at the outset that the idea of abandoning Trident and Cruise missiles and of increasing conventional forces by means of conscription was both a novel and an imaginative proposal. [From these two adjectives can be seen the depth of the contempt and animosity which those Civil Servants present at the meeting felt for Hackers policy Ed.]
We agreed that as loyal Permanent Secretaries we have a duty to do everything in our power to assist its implementation.
Nonetheless, we suspected that our political masters may perhaps not have thought through all the implications. In view of this we discussed them at length, in order to be able to brief them when the PM raises the question tomorrow in Cabinet Committee.
Dick said that there were problems from the FCO point of view. The Americans simply wont stand for it. Not that British policy is determined by the Americans -- Heaven forbid! -- but in practice, we do know that it is sensible to clear all new initiatives with Washington. Last time we failed to do so the results were unfortunate. [The Suez crisis, 1956 Ed.]
I warned Dick that the Prime Minister might be somewhat hazy about the events at Suez, and therefore this argument might not worry him. Nor will he wish to look as though he is kow-towing to the Americans.
Dick raised one further point: cancelling Trident so early in his Premiership might look like weakness. Appeasement of the Soviets. Lack of courage and resolve. We agreed that this should form the basis of the Foreign Office view. The Prime Minister admires courage, from a safe distance. I enquired if Dick had been stating the views of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Dick was confident that these would be his views by tomorrow.
Norman was particularly concerned about the new policy, since it affects him most closely at the MOD. The Secretary of State for Defence is fairly confused at the moment -- his special problem is that the advice from the Navy, Army and RAF is not always identical. There is underlying harmony, of course, but they have no one on whom to vent their warlike instincts except each other. However, the one thing that unifies the three Services is their implacable opposition to conscription. They have nothing against the young people of this country, but they do not want their skilled professional lite armed forces diluted by riff-raff. British officers are the best leaders of men in NATO. It is true that there are hardly any men to lead, which might be the reason why they lead so well.
I indicated to Norman that the Prime Minister might not take the opposition of the Service Chiefs as the clinching argument.
Norman felt that the argument should be kept simple: Trident is the best and Britain must have the best. This is an argument that could well appeal to the Defence Secretary. He is very simple himself and he will be able to follow it. We agreed that Norman would give him a little coaching.