It has been argued by some people that the policy of partition always led to Civil War. It certainly did in India and Cyprus and Palestine and Ireland. This was no bad thing for Britain. It kept them busy and instead of fighting us they fought each other. This meant that it was no longer necessary to have a policy about them.
However, its no use crying over spilt milk. The damage is done now.
See you at 3 pm tomorrow.
Dick
[The following day, after lunch, Bernard Woolley had a meeting with the two wiliest mandarins in Whitehall. They had a frank conversation, in which Woolley learned for the first time how the Foreign Office really works. Fortunately for historians, Sir Humphrey Appleby made a careful note of the meeting and it was preserved amongst his private papers. Thus, for the first time, the general reader can be given an understanding of the Foreign Office approach to world affairs from the 1930s onward Ed.]
I attended the meeting at BWs request, first having had a private word with Dick Wharton. We decided that BW must be initiated into a full understanding of FO working methods.
BW began the meeting, which was technically about St Georges Island, with his problem as he saw it: namely that the PM was completely in the dark. Dick said that this was good, and we began to encourage BW to see this not as a problem but as an opportunity.
This concept did not come easily to BW. He asked if there was anything else the PM did not know -- a truly absurd question. I sometimes wonder about Bernard. Then he asked if there was something that the PM doesnt know about St Georges Island, and Dick correctly explained that the PMs proper course is to ask the Foreign Secretary to inform him of anything he needs to know. Then all that the FO has to do is ensure that the Foreign Secretary does not know the whole story either.
We were getting to the root of BWs problem. He was under the impression that the PM ought to know what is happening.
The basic rule for the safe handling of Foreign Affairs is that it is simply too dangerous to let politicians get involved with diplomacy. Diplomacy is about surviving till the next century -- politics is about surviving till Friday afternoon.
There are 157 independent countries in the world. The FO has dealt with them for years. Theres hardly an MP who knows anything about any of them. Show MPs a map of the world, and many of them would have difficulty finding the Isle of Wight.
Bernard was quite prepared to argue that MPs cannot be so ignorant. So Dick gave him a short quiz:
1. Where is Upper Volta?
2. What is the capital of Chad?
3. What language do they speak in Mali?
4. Who is the President of Peru?
5. What is the national religion of Cameroun?
Bernard scored nought per cent. Dick suggested that he stand for Parliament.
BWs problem is that he has studied too much constitutional history -- or, at least, taken it too much to heart. He was arguing, not very articulately I may say, that if youve got a democracy, shouldnt people, sort of, discuss things a bit?
We agreed that full discussion with the PM was essential. Therefore, Bernard argued, the PM should have the facts. There was the fallacy!
BW needs to understand the following argument clearly:
i) Facts complicate things.
ii) The people dont want them.
iii) All that the press, the people and their elective representatives want to know is Who Are The Goodies? And Who Are The Baddies?
iv) Unfortunately, the interests of Britain usually involve doing deals with people the public think are Baddies.
v) And sometimes British interests mean that we cannot help the Goodies.
vi) Therefore, discussion must be kept inside the Foreign Office. Then it produces one policy for the Foreign Secretary, which represents the FOs considered view, and he can act upon it. QED.
BW was concerned that the FO produces only one considered view, with no options and no alternatives.
In practice, this presents no problem. If pressed, the FO looks at the matter again, and comes up with the same view. If the Foreign Secretary demands options, the FO obliges him by presenting three options, two of which will be (on close examination) exactly the same. The third will, of course, be totally unacceptable, like bombing Warsaw, or invading France.
One further option is occasionally used: encouraging the Foreign Secretary to work out his own policy. The FO then shows him how it will inevitably lead to World War III, perhaps within 48 hours.
BW understood the idea but -- quite properly, since he is a Private Secretary at the moment -- wanted to pursue the discussion from the point of view of the politicians. He remarked the Ministers are primarily concerned about the effect of policy on domestic political opinion. Thats what theyre good at, in fact. And the Foreign Office system does not really allow for this.
He was quite correct. The FO does indeed take a global view. It asks what is best for the world, whereas most Ministers would rather it asked: What is the Daily Mail leader going to say? This would be quite inappropriate for the FO to consider: foreign policy cannot be made by yobbos like Fleet Street editors, backbench MPs and Cabinet Ministers. The job of the FO is to take the right decision, and let others sort out the politics afterwards.
Bernard was also concerned about what happens if the Foreign Secretary still will not accept the FOs advice after all the options have been presented. I explained to him that it is a free country, and the Foreign Secretary can always resign.
The whole basis of our conversation then took an unexpected turn. A Flash Telegram arrived. Dick read it, and informed us that East Yemen are preparing to invade St Georges Island in support of the Marxist guerrillas.
BW thought this was bad news. It is, of course, moderately bad news for the government of St Georges -- but its very good news for the guerrillas.
BW wanted to know, of all things, if it was good news for the islanders. Im afraid he has been a Private Secretary too long -- he is beginning to react like a politician.
Dick suggested, and I agreed, that we could do nothing to help the islanders. If they appeal to us, we shall give them every support short of help. If the Prime Minister insists that we help, then we follow the traditional four-stage strategy, the standard Foreign Office response to any crisis:
Stage One
We say that nothing is going to happen.
Stage Two
We say that something may be going to happen, but we should do nothing about it.
Stage Three
We say that maybe we should do something about it, but theres nothing we can do.
Stage Four
We say that maybe there was something we could have done but its too late now.
[Hackers diary continues Ed.]
April 19th
Dramatic events today. I think Ive had a major triumph.
It all came to a head this afternoon, when that insufferable young man Luke brought the old green box containing Foreign Office telegrams into the Cabinet Room.
Bernard wasnt there, for some reason. Hed left a message that he was at a meeting with Sir Humphrey.
I picked up the first telegram: it said there were troop movements in East Yemen. I looked at Luke. He said that this was not significant.
But, I told Luke, the American Ambassador mentioned something about East Yemen last week.
Really? said Luke with a patronising smile. Im surprised hes heard of it.
I asked Luke why there were troop movements in East Yemen. He said that he presumed that they were just preparing one of their regular raids on West Yemen.
Is there anything for us to worry about?
Nothing at all, he assured me.
I sat back and thought. Then I said to Luke: The American Ambassador talked about St Georges Island as well.