He walked to his desk and started to rummage through manila folders.
"There were a number of intercepts, General. Pluto and I were trying to find something interesting."
"And presumably you did?" MacArthur said. There was a hint of annoyance in his voice. This surprised Pickering until he realized that El Supremo was not annoyed at him; he was annoyed because he couldn't instantly find what he was looking for.
"One, Sir, I thought would be of particular interest to you," Pickering said.
MacArthur finally found what he was looking for.
"Ah-ha!" he said triumphantly, and handed a manila folder to Pickering. It was stamped SECRET. "Here you go. Take the time to read it."
He either didn't hear anything I said, or chose not to.
"Aye, aye, Sir."
It was the After-Action that had come in just after one in the morning. He had scanned it, and then gone back to trying to find something of special interest in the MAGIC intercepts.
I better read this carefully. I suspect there'll be an oral exam. El Supremo is in one of his good moods. And that usually triggers a lecture.
=SECRET=
FROM: COM GEN 1ST MAR DIV 2325 25OCT42
SUBJECT: AFTER-ACTION REPORT
TO: COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, PACIFIC, PEARL HARBOR
INFO: SUPREME COMMANDER SWPOA, BRISBANE COMMANDANT, USMC, WASH, DC
1. AT APPROXIMATELY 0030 25OCT42, WITHOUT ARTILLERY OR MORTAR PREPARATION, JAPANESE
FORCES, BELIEVED TO BE THE 29TH INFANTRY REGIMENT, ATTACKED POSITIONS TO THE LEFT CENTER OF 1ST BN, 7TH MARINES (LT COL LEWIS B. PULLER) EAST OF BLOODY RIDGE. THE ATTACK WAS CONTAINED BY 1/7, WITH SMALL ARMS AND MORTAR FIRE ASSISTANCE FROM 2ND BN, 164TH INFANTRY, US ARMY.
A regiment attacking a battalion. Three-to-one odds, right by the book.... And they
were "contained" by Puller's battalion. Chesty Puller is one hell of a Marine.
2. 3RD BN, 164TH INF, USA, THEN IN REGIMENTAL RESERVE ONE (1) MILE EAST OF HENDERSON
FIELD (LT COL ROBERT K. HALL, USA) WAS ORDERED TO REIN FORCE 1/7, IN ANTICIPATION OF CONTINUED, OR AUG MENTED JAPANESE ATTACK.
National Guardsmen. Their enlisted men are older than the Marines-by at least five years. Which means they've probably had more training. But this is the first time they've been in combat.
3. BY AGREEMENT BETWEEN LT COL PULLER AND LT COL HALL, TROOPS OF 3/164 USA WERE DISTRIBUTED IN SMALL DETACHMENTS TO UNITS OF 1/7 RATHER THAN TAKING THEIR OWN POSITION ON LINE. RAIN WAS FALLING HEAVILY AND VISIBILITY WAS POOR. IT WAS IN MANY CASES NECESSARY FOR MARINES TO LEAD USA INFANTRY INTO DEFENSE POSITIONS BY HOLDING THEIR HANDS. THE EMPLACEMENT
OF USA TROOPS WAS ACCOMPLISHED BY 0330 25OCT42.
I wonder how that happened. Was it the force of Chesty Puller's personality that made this Army battalion commander in effect give up his command? Or was he actually wise enough to know that was the thing to do under the circumstances, and to hell with personal dignity and the honor of the Army? I wonder if Chesty would do the same thing if the boot were on the other foot?
4. ALL AVAILABLE 105-MM HOWITZERS OF 11TH MARINES MAINTAINED FIRE UPON ATTACK AREA
THROUGHOUT THIS PERIOD, AUGMENTED BY 37-MM CANNON OF HEAVY WEAPONS COMPANY, 164TH INF USA, FIRING PRIMARILY CANISTER. M COMPANY 7TH MARINES EXPENDED APPROXIMATELY 1,200 ROUNDS 81-MM MORTAR AMMUNITION DURING THE NIGHT.
God, that's a lot of 81mm mortar ammo! Even more when you think that somebody had to carry it from the dump after the on-site supply was exhausted.
5. USA 37-MM CANNISTER FIRE ESPECIALLY EFFECTIVE IN CONTAINING SERIES OF JAPANESE
ATTACKS DURING PERIOD 0100-0700 25OCT42.
Well, that's Vandegrift giving credit where it's due. That's six hours of 37mm cannon fire. I wonder how many rounds?
6. AT APPROXIMATELY 0700 25OCT42, JAPANESE ATTACKS DIMINISHED IN INTENSITY. GREATEST
PENETRATION OF US LINES WAS APPROXIMATELY 150 YARD SALIENT IN LINES OF COMBINED 1/7 AND 3/164 USA, AND SALIENT WAS REDUCED BY APPROXIMATELY 0830.
The best the Japs could do with a regiment in six hours was make a 150-yard dent in our lines; and then they couldn't hold it! But what did that cost us?
7. AT APPROXIMATELY 0830 25OCT42, 3/164 USA BEGAN TO ESTABLISH ITS OWN LINES TO LEFT OF 1/7, ESTABLISHMENT CONTINUING THROUGHOUT MORNING.
Well, the Army battalion commander got command of his battalion back. Did he demand it? Or did Vandegrift decide that it was the best thing to do, tactically? If that's the case, Vandegrift must think the Army commander knows what he's doing. Otherwise, he would have kept the soldiers under Puller's command.
8. HEAVY JAPANESE ARTILLERY FIRE, PROBABLY 150-MM COMMENCED AT 0800 25OCT42 ON BOTH US
LINES AND HENDERSON FIELD. FIRE WAS AT TEN MINUTE INTERVALS AND CONTINUED UNTIL 1100
25OCT42.
Their big guns. We have nothing to counter them. Our 155mm's sailed off with the Navy the day we landed. Goddamn the Navy!
9. HEAVY RAIN RENDERED FIGHTER STRIP NUMBER ONE INOPERABLE, AND RAIN PLUS DAMAGE FROM
JAPANESE HEAVY ARTILLERY RENDERED HENDERSON FIELD RUNWAYS INOPERABLE DURING MORNING. LIMITED US AIR ACTIVITY AFTER 1345.
Well, at least Pick wasn't there!
10. INTENSITY OF JAPANESE AIR ACTIVITY DURING AFTERNOON 25OCT42 SUGGESTED BY ROUGH NOTES
OF LT COL L.C. MERILLAT, FOLLOWING:
1423-CONDITION RED. 16 JAP BOMBERS AT 20000 FT,
FIVE MILES
1430-INTENSE BOMBING OF KUKUM BEACH
1434-1 BOMBER SHOT DOWN, REMAINDER LEAVING
1435-1 BOMBER HAS PORT MOTOR SHOT OUT
1436-2 ZERO SHOT DOWN OVER HENDERSON
1442-ANOTHER JAP FORMATION APPROACHING
1451-1 ZERO SHOT DOWN
1456-HENDERSON STRAFED BY THREE ZEROS
1502-NINE ZEKES BOMB HENDERSON AIRCRAFT
GRAVEYARD
1507-HENDERSON STRAFED BY SIX ZEROS
1516-CONDITION GREEN
Thank God, Pick wasn't there. I wonder where he is.
11. AT APPROXIMATELY 2000 25OCT42, LIGHT (105-MM AND SMALLER) JAPANESE ARTILLERY BAR
RAGE COMMENCED ON NOW SEPARATE POSITIONS OF 1/7 AND 3/164 USA AND CONTINUED INTERMITTENTLY UNTIL 2100.
The standard artillery "softening up" barrage. How the hell did the Japanese move that much ammunition over that terrain? The most one man can carry is one 105mm shell at a time. For that matter, how did they get their cannon in position?