The teams of nuclear forensics analysts from the US, Russia and the ITU in Germany had finally managed to agree upon the factual evidence found in the Padova warehouse, but had some major differences of opinion on their interpretation. They all agreed that the findings indicated that kilogram quantities of U-233 were produced by bombarding a mixture of thorium and beryllium oxides by gamma radiation from the stolen medical and industrial sources found in the warehouse. They also conceded that the quality of the product was high and that the level of the bothersome U-232 was below the threshold that would prevent the device from working properly but high enough to impose a safety hazard due to the intense radiation from its thallium-208 decay product. They considered the implications on the health of the employees that may have been exposed to unsafe doses of radiation and concluded that those that had been in close contact with the radiation sources for extended periods might develop symptoms of radiation sickness sooner or later. Their estimates of the expected yield of the device spanned a large range because they did not know the details of the implosion mechanism, but based on the weight of the mock-up model of the core and its diameter, they finally agreed that at the maximum it would probably be similar to the Nagasaki plutonium atomic bomb that was also based on implosion. Namely, something like a device with an explosive power equivalent to 15–20 kiloton of TNT. Imperfect implosion or design artifacts would reduce this yield but it was anyone's guess what the actual explosion would be like. However the most significant finding arose from the particles of organic matter they found in the metal cabinet that was positioned in the corner of the laboratory. Meticulous analysis showed that these originated from a block of a conventional explosive with a unique composition that was found only in nuclear devices made in North Korea. The link between the lab in Padova and North Korea was very disturbing in the minds of the scientists as that could also mean that a tested bomb design was at their disposal.
After getting confirmation that the objective of the Astraea project was to construct an improvised nuclear device, based on U-233 as the fissile core and an implosion type mechanism, David called for a meeting of the international task force. He updated the team on the information he had gathered in Athens, without going into any details about the methods used to obtain it. He repeated his suspicion that the plot of using the device only for blackmail purposes was a clever cover story concocted by the blond man they now knew as Oscar Gunnar Axelsson, or by his more recent alias Olaf Gunther Andersson or Ollie, and about his ties to Islam from the incident in the hospital and from the testimony of some of his friends from the university days in Uppsala. David expressed his fear that the ultimate target may not even be in continental Europe and could be practically in any city or other location to which containers were shipped. The information they got from the Greek engineer, Stavros, and the Golden Dawn operative, Guido, did not get them any closer to finding the device, the intended target or the chief perpetrators. The French member of the ITF, Nicolas, told the team that Interpol had received many calls about seeing a blond man that matched the description and image and all had turned out to be false alarms so that they stopped responding to these calls. He added that with the photo from Agda's cellphone they might have a better chance of finding the blond man known as Ollie. Thomas, the former MI6 operative, said that the search for Dr. Smalley in the UK had not provided any leads, and suspected that he had gone under cover somewhere in Europe. There was no trace of Professor Modena or any of the other people who had worked with him. Eugene and Vassilly had no news and suggested that the task force draw up a contingency plan in case the device left Europe and arrived in their own country.
Andreas Nester Burkhart, the name Ollie now used, did not want to be seen in Stockholm so after his plane landed in Oslo he travelled by bus to Gothenburg in Sweden. Since he intended to join a tour group going on a pilgrimage to the holy places in Israel, he bought the local newspaper, Göteborgs-Posten (Gothenburg Post), looking through the classified ads for a suitable tour group. He found an advertisement of the Israel Christian Tours agency that organized 8-days tours devoted to seeing modern Israel and Holy sites that was scheduled to depart on June 9th. The itinerary included 2 nights in Tel-Aviv, 2 nights in the Galilee in a Kibbutz hotel and 3 nights in Jerusalem. This would give him an opportunity to survey the intended target area in Jerusalem and make preliminary arrangements with Sheik Khalil in Umm al-Fahm, the head of a faction of the radical Islamic movement in Israel, the contact person that Ibn Tutta had specified. Meanwhile he wanted to use the ten days before departure to arrange a new identity and a new passport as he feared that the Andreas Burkhart cover might be compromised soon.
He had to avoid the two groups he was acquainted with. The Muslim community in Gothenburg was quite strong but the mosques were under police surveillance for two opposing reasons. On the one hand the police offered some protection against right-wing extremists that harassed foreigners in general and dark-skinned people, especially Muslim women wearing burkas. On the other hand, the police kept an eye on the leaders of the Muslim community, especially the sheiks in the mosques that served as recruiting agents for volunteers that wanted to join ISIS. Ollie's other connections were with racist nationalists like the group he had joined in Stockholm and these elements were also targeted by the police in order to prevent them from causing trouble.
So Ollie looked for the regular criminals, those that had no political agenda and were willing to do business with whoever paid them. The experience he gained in the seedy quarters of Stockholm served him well and within a couple of days he came across a shady former Estonian, called Kermo, who dealt in bogus passports. After agreeing on the price and delivery date, Kermo did not ask any questions and only requested a recent photograph. Two day later, after 5000 Euros exchanged hands, Ollie received a well used Swedish passport with his photo and the name Hugo Elias Jacobsson, a 35 year old male from Gothenburg, whose profession was listed as an architect. Ollie went to a travel agency and found out that there was still a vacancy for the Israel Christian Tour group. The female travel agent was very pleased that a young man would join the group that usually consisted only of retirees. She told Ollie that there was a single girl in her late twenties who would be thrilled that a handsome young man was also booked on the tour. Ollie saw this as an opportunity to blend in with the group and get through the Israeli passport control without raising suspicion.
Chapter 12
The Swedish tour group arrived at Ben Gurion airport outside Tel Aviv. Ollie, or as he was now called, Hugo, managed to be seated on the flight from Stockholm next to a plain looking girl by the name of Lena who was the only other young person in the group. He had turned on his charm and she was flattered by the attention of this good looking man. When they stood in line at the passport control they were already holding hands and together they approached the border security officer who was seated in her booth. She had been briefed to keep an eye open for a Scandinavian looking single young man and was aware of the fact that pilgrimage groups from Sweden seldom included young men. She looked at the couple and saw a handsome man with a rather plain woman. She saw that their passports were under different names and that the stamps in the passports indicated that they had not travelled together previously. So she went through the usual routine of asking them what the purpose of their visit was and where they intended to stay and for how long. She was satisfied with the answers but still a bit concerned about the couple, so she politely asked them to step aside. They were escorted to a small room and were invited to sit down and wait for the supervisor.