And the people inside?
For the last several weeks McPherson has been whipping the informal Stormbee proposal into formal shape. Going from superblack to white. There are advantages to a white program that McPherson appreciates. Everything’s on the table, the specs are there in the RFP and can’t be changed by some clown in the Air Force who happens to come up with a new idea. And they’re forced by the intense competition to do a thorough job, including tests that are run until every part of the system has been proved to work, under all kinds of circumstances. And that’s good in the long run, as far as McPherson is concerned. He’s been out to White Sands seven times in the last month, working on further tests of the system, and in the tests they discovered, for instance, that if the target tanks were grouped in a mass the laser target designator tended to fix only on the tanks on the perimeter, leaving those in the middle alone. Some work by the programmers and the problem was solved, but if they hadn’t even known about it? Yes, this is the way McPherson likes to work. “Let’s get it right,” he tells his crew almost every day. In fact his programmers call him LGIR behind his back, pronounced “Elgir,” which has led certain music-minded programmers to speak of cello concertos, or to whistle “Pomp and Circumstance” to indicate the boss’s arrival on the scene.…
So, McPherson sits down at his desk and looks at the list of Things To Do that he left the night before. He adds several items that have occurred to him over the night, and on the drive in.
9:00 meet Don F. re Strmbee prop printing
see Lonnie on CO2 laser problems
work Strmb prop introduction
1:30 meeting software group re guidance
call Dahlvin on Strmb power
work Strmb prop
4:00 meet Dan Houston on Ball Lightning
He lifts the phone, punches the button for Don Freiburg. The day begins.
Becoming a white program means that the Stormbee proposal is now part of the mainstream of public military procurement in America. This is a vastly complicated process that contains hundreds of variables, and very few people, if any, understand all the facets of it. Certainly McPherson does not; he concentrates on the part of the process that is important to his work, just as everyone else does. Thus he is an expert in the Air Force’s aerospace technology procurement, and knows little or nothing about other areas. Just learning his own little area is difficult enough.
It begins within the Air Force itself, like so: One of the operating commands, say the Strategic Defense Phase One Group (SDPOG), makes a Statement of Operational Need (SON) with a Mission Element Need Analysis (MENA) to the United States Air Force Headquarters (HQ USAF). If HQ USAF decides that the SON represents a major program, they make a Justification for Major Systems New Start (JMSNS), which is reviewed by the Requirements Assessment Group (RAG), and this review is then submitted to the Secretary of the Air Force (SAF). If SAF decides that the JMSNS represents an Air Force Designated Acquisition Program (AFDAP), he approves the JMSNS, and it becomes an AFJMSNS. The SAF then submits the AFJMSNS as part of the next Air Force Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF). If the SECDEF approves the POM, and thus the AFJMSNS, the HQ USAF prepares and issues a Program Management Directive (PMD), and Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) action is taken. The Concept Exploration Phase (CEP) has begun. In this phase the various Preliminary System Operational Concepts (PSOCs) are explored, and altogether they constitute the Phase Review Package (PRP). From the PRP a System Concept Paper (SCP) is prepared by HQ USAF, and it is again reviewed by the RAG, and by the Air Force Systems Acquisition Review Council (AFSARC), after which it is submitted to the SAF. If the SAF approves the SCP, it is reviewed by the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC), which recommends it to the SECDEF. If the SECDEF approves the SCP—a Milestone I decision—then HQ USAF issues another PMD and the program enters the Validation and Demonstration Phase (VDP).
All clear? Well, it’s at that point that the program first connects with private industry. If the SAF and the SECDEF have agreed that the program must remain top secret, then the program becomes a superblack program and a single contractor or two is contacted by Air Force personnel directly in the Pentagon. At least usually. There are also the ordinary black programs, which are given directly to contractors like the superblacks; a few people in Congress are told about these as well, so they can think that they are in on all the Pentagon’s secrets.
But by far the majority of the programs are so-called white programs, and these require more complicated procedures. During the VDP, HQ USAF begins floating draft Requests For Proposals (RFPs) and Requests For Information (RFIs) to relevant defense contractors, asking for comments. The interested companies respond with technical suggestions based on their evaluations of the RFP, and these become part of the Decision Coordination Process (DCP). Eventually HQ USAF issues a final RFP, which is usually published in Commerce Business Daily. At this point there has already been an important tactical struggle between the interested contractors, as each attempted to get things written into the RFP that only they were competent to do. But now the RFP is out there for anyone to respond to, and the race is on.
Typically companies have ninety days to submit proposals to the Program Manager (PM), who is an Air Force colonel or brigadier general. After submission, the proposal evaluation process begins. Part of it is conducted by the Air Force Test and Evaluation Center (AFTEC), which is part of the Air Force Systems Command (AFSC) based at Andrews AFB; part of it is conducted out of HQ USAF in the Pentagon, or under the PM. From these units and others a Source Selection Evaluation Board (SSEB) is convened, under the command of a Source Selection Authority (SSA), who is usually but not always the PM. The various proposers are brought in and grilled over every detail of their proposals, and when that six-week process is over, the SSEB makes its evaluation, which is then summarized by the SSA, who uses his summary to justify his decision to the people above him. The decision to award the program to a bidder (or to award it to two bidders in a competitive development, or in a so-called leader-follower arrangement) is thus ultimately the SSA’s decision, but he usually follows the recommendations of the SSEB, and he also has to secure the approval of his superiors, up to the SAF or even the SECDEF.
All clear?
But meanwhile, at this point, all Dennis McPherson has to worry about is putting together a proposal that will stand up under the technical testing and budgetary demands that the SSEB will soon be making. Not too many days left; and so it is nearer five-thirty than four when he finally gets free for the first conference with Dan Houston about the Ball Lightning program, which Lemon has vengefully commanded him to work on, in his “spare time” from the Stormbee proposal.
McPherson can still remember perfectly the mistake that got him stuck with this. He was down in LSR’s executive restaurant, walking in with Art Wong, and in response to something Art said, without pausing to think (or look around), he said, “I’m damned glad I don’t have the job you guys do. The whole ballistic defense program is nothing but a black hole for money and effort if you ask me.” And then he turned around and there was Stewart Lemon, standing right there and glaring at him.
And so now he’s assigned to Ball Lightning. Lemon never forgets.