Thus the argument that Stalin had planned the whole Krestinsky episode is a weak one. What seems more probable is that some such story was put round within the outer circles of the NKVD to account for the lapse. Another theory is that Krestinsky was replaced in the dock by a double or an actor. Observers present felt that it was someone different who appeared in the later phase of the trial. That Krestinsky did not appear to be “the same Krestinsky” after hours of NKVD attention seems natural enough. And recent long accounts in the Soviet press do not make the suggestion, speaking, in fact, of his reaffirming his confession after being “suitably worked over.”52
In any case, Krestinsky’s withdrawal, so dramatic and so cogent in its cornments, barely affected the reception given to the trial by the foreign public. Stalin had won again.
AN EX-PREMIER
Rykov’s examination-in-chief came almost as an anticlimax. It started off mildly, soon coming to the alleged complicity of Yagoda in Rightist activity back in 1929. And now Yagoda, in turn, was questioned and gave one of those half-hearted affirmatives which any objective observer might have interpreted as a negative: “The fact is true, but not as Rykov puts it.”
Rykov, who is said to have been “tortured quite brutally,”53 still managed to inject a tone of irony into some of his remarks.54 He went on to describe the supposed Rightist underground which arose after 1930. He then came to the Ryutin Platform—which, he said, he, Tomsky, Bukharin, Vasily Shmidt, and Uglanov had been responsible for. Ryutin had merely fronted for them, and Yagoda’s protection had saved the main culprits. The Platform
recognized (as far as I remember, and I do remember, for I had a share in editing it) methods of violence in changing the leadership of the Party and of the country—terrorism and uprisings. It was formulated so broadly as to constitute an instruction that measures of violence should be applied in whatever forms might prove to be at our disposa1.55
The Rightists were, he added, a large organization: “it was not a question of a hundred or so people, but of numerous cadres,” so that it was understandable that “the name Ivanov has no place in my memory.”56 A palpable irony about a People’s Commissar and full member of the Central Committee.
When it came to kulak insurrections, Bukharin too was called on, and both Rykov and Bukharin admitted vaguely a connection with one in Siberia. Its location was put to Bukharin, who could not remember if the one given was right. He, too, mentioned the Ryutin Platform: “I have been questioned so many times about the Ryutin Platform….”
Rykov now admitted to forming a terrorist organization headed by his former secretary, Ekaterina Artemenko, which he had instructed “to watch for passing Government automobiles,” without result. He and Bukharin (again questioned) admitted forming another terrorist group, headed by a former Socialist Revolutionary, to assassinate Stalin and Kaganovich, but again without result. But both men were unsatisfactory as to details. Rykov said, “The Centre did not adopt a decision in such-and-such a year to kill such-and-such a member of the Political Bureau or the Government. The Centre took means that would enable such a decision to be put into effect if one were adopted …” at which point he was understandably interrupted by Vyshinsky. Bukharin, asked on whose initiative Semyonov, the Socialist Revolutionary, had acted, said, “I do not remember. Perhaps it was mine. At all events, I do not deny it.”
Rykov involved the Rightists with the supposed plan of 1935 to seize power, with Yenukidze, Yagoda, Peterson, and others, which had also (he said) implicated Tukhachevsky and other generals. “We did not,” he added, “succeed in making a real attempt….” He went on to the connections with fascism, Menshevism, bourgeois nationalism, and other groupings. But as to detail, he again said he could only suspect, not know, what Grinko represented; and when Grinko was now called on, Rykov said, “I do not remember,” when asked if his evidence was correct.
There followed a further three-way exchange between Vyshinsky, Rykov, and Bukharin on the dismemberment of the USSR and defeatism. Bukharin said that he did not take a defeatist line, “but am responsible for this affair.” Rykov broke down and admitted the whole defeatist position on his own behalf and that of all the Rightists, but withdrew a suggestion he had made at the preliminary inquiry, that Bukharin was the man mainly responsible. At this, Vyshinsky openly expressed his annoyance.
After further confession to treasonable actions in Byelorussia, Rykov again rejected the charge of organizing livestock wrecking. He again denied knowledge of Ivanov’s connections with the British. But he also, backed by Krestinsky and Rosengolts, confirmed the participation of Tukhachevsky in the bloc.
Rykov’s testimony was not coherent, and took no perfectly clear line, but he had still contrived to make a number of substantial denials.
Next day, Sharangovich, the Byelorussian First Secretary, was first to be called. After the shifts and evasions of the previous evening, he made an excellent impression on observers sympathetic to the regime, with his frank and total admission of all charges. He had been a Polish spy since 1921, and had become a prominent member of the Byelorussian “national-fascist” organization, whose other members included Goloded, Chervyakov, and most of the Party leaders in the Republic. Rykov and Bukharin were directly involved in their crimes, which had included the formation of three terrorist groups: two of them had been intended to attack Voroshilov during the 1936 maneuvers.57
Sabotage, on a large scale, had been designed to cause discontent as well as disruption. He, too, had spread disease among animals:
I must also say that in 1932 we took measures to spread plague among pigs, which resulted in a high pig mortality; this was done by inoculating pigs against plague in a wrecking fashion.58
… Further, as regards rural economy, I should like to say something about our diversionist activities in horse-breeding. In 1936 we caused a wide outbreak of anaemia in Byelorussia. This was done intentionally, because in Byelorussia horses are extremely important for defence purposes. We endeavoured to undermine this powerful base in case it should be needed in connection with war….
As far as I can now recall, about 30,000 horses perished owing to this measure.59
More essentially, he took the blame for the early excesses of collectivization. These had been put through for anti-Party reasons:
At that period there were still about 100,000 individual peasants in Byelorussia. We gave it out that an individual peasant who failed to join the collective farm was an enemy of the Soviet power. This was done for provocative purposes; in accordance with our provocative stand, we applied to the individual peasants who resisted collectivization such taxation measures which caused discontent and an insurrectionary spirit among the individual peasants.60
But fortunately Moscow had known better:
… Later the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. took measures to correct what we had done, and the situation changed. The spirit among the individual peasants, among those whom we had provoked, took a distinct turn for the better.
This interpretation of the events of 1929 and 1930 is a striking one, and shows a continual preoccupation with the peasantry on Stalin’s part.
In industry, too, the “national fascists” had operated on a large scale: