Stalin had made certain gains. The materials were in his hand for prolonging the Purge. He now had, after all, a reasonable quota for the next triaclass="underline" Serebryakov and Sokolnikov, and now Radek, arrested on 22 September, and Pyatakov, who had been taken on 12 September, while Sokolnikov (though not Serebryakov) was already confessing. The failure over Bukharin and Rykov, even if Stalin had not been certain of success at the first attempt, evidently rankled. It was plain that a powerful effort, a new campaign, would be needed. In the Black Sea sunshine, he considered the next move. The Soviet press concerned itself with other matters: democracy, the triumph of Soviet aviation, the successful harvest, and massive support for the struggle of the Spanish Republic.
Like a general who transfers the weight of his offensive from a line where the going is heavy to an easier approach, Stalin shifted his attack to Yagoda.
Yagoda’s position at that time remains something of a mystery. It is clear that he was involved in the preparations for the 1936 Trial from the start—though perhaps excluded from the key discussions and conversations preceding the case. He is indeed said to have “urged that the case be discussed in the Politburo.”16 At the same time, it seems that he was himself deceived by Stalin’s assurance that Zinoviev and Kamenev would not be executed.17 He was later to be accused of shielding I. N. Smirnov—though there was an obvious motive here, in that this was advanced as an explanation for Smirnov’s unsatisfactory behavior in the dock.18 Nevertheless, it does seem that Yagoda may have made some attempt to temper the wind to the oppositionists.19 He was to be similarly accused of ordering that Uglanov’s testimony be kept “within certain limits.”20 And there are other reports of underground obstruction within the NKVD which took the form of framing questions in such a way as to protect those interrogated.21 The most likely occasion for the development of more definite resistance on Yagoda’s part would be following the executions. This could only have manifested itself in the discussions about the fates of Bukharin and Rykov.
We can be sure that Yezhov (who was to replace Yagoda) offered stronger resistance to clearing the Rightists. He seems to have acquiesced very reluctantly in the decision. He regarded the rehabilitation of Bukharin and Rykov as temporary, “vowing that he would yet make good the ‘mistake,’”22 and he and Agranov almost immediately started accusing Yagoda of laxness.
For the moment, Bukharin and Rykov were safe. The former continued to hold his position as editor of lzvestiya, and both remained candidate members of the Central Committee. It was clear that some leaders hoped that the momentum of the Purge would peter out with the forthcoming Pyatakov Case. But if Stalin could not obtain the support he needed in the highest Party bodies, he had other methods of gaining his ends. He proceeded to the coup which was to bring the Terror to its most frightful climax—the appointment of Yezhov as People’s Cornmissar for Internal Affairs.
On 25 September, Stalin and Zhdanov sent a telegram from Sochi to Kaganovich, Molotov, “and other members of the Political Bureau”:
We deem it absolutely necessary and urgent that Comrade Yezhov be nominated to the post of People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs. Yagoda had definitely proved himself to be incapable of unmasking the Trotskyite–Zinovievite bloc. The OGPU is four years behind in this matter. This is noted by all Party workers and by the majority of the representatives of the NKVD.23
The “four years” is significant and sinister. It was four years almost to the day since the September session of 1932 which had blocked the attempt to execute Ryutin. It has since been suggested that the phrase might refer to the four years passed after meetings and connections between Trotsky’s son and Soviet sympathizers, and the alleged formation of the Trotskyite–Zinovievite bloc, in 1932. But the chief offender, I. N. Smirnov, had been arrested within weeks, and since 1934 the NKVD had been finishing off Trotskyites and Zinovievites by the score, so could hardly have been said to have fallen behind four years. The point is hardly a crucial one. But in fact it was now that Ryutin was brought back to the Lubyanka from an isolator and his interrogation began. On 4 November, he was signing a “categorical refusal” to confess to terrorism.24 It seems certain that Stalin proposed to use him in the next show trial, but despite “illegal methods” he remained recalcitrant.
No one, of course, thought for a moment that Yagoda’s removal indicated mere “incapability.” It was at once noted in the Party that “it was not a question of dissatisfaction with his insufficiently active work … this indicated political distrust of him.”25
The transfer of Yezhov to duties that he was already much concerned with in any case could hardly have been the occasion for members of the Politburo to oppose the General Secretary, even if Ordzhonikidze, Chubar, or Kossior might have wished this. Although the tone and the intention of the new appointment would be obvious, as a practical measure it would be hard to argue against.
The following day, Molotov carried out instructions. The shift was used to rid the Soviet Government of Rykov. Next day, the papers announced Rykov’s “release,” without the conventional comment that he was going to “other work”; the appointment of Yagoda to Rykov’s post of People’s Commissar of Communications; and Yezhov’s appointment as Head of the NKVD.
On 29 September 1936 (and again on 21 October 1936) circulars were issued from the Central Committee. They called in effect for the end of unfair expulsions from the Party and a stepping-up of fair ones. They were followed by press censures of a number of local leaders for failure in one or another of these respects. On 29 September, too, a secret directive (drafted by Kaganovich, accepted by the Politburo, and signed by Stalin) called for settling with the Trotskyite–Zinovievites, including not only those arrested whose interrogation was complete, and those like Muralov, Pyatakov, and Beloborodov, whose investigation had not yet ended, but also “those who were earlier exiled.”26 That is to say, Ryutin and others who had never been Trotskyites or Zinovievites.
Yagoda handed over his office on 30 September 1936. On the same day, the announcement of M. D. Berman as Deputy Head of the NKVD was made, while Yagoda’s Second Deputy, G. E. Prokofiev, was transferred with him. On 17 October, a more sinister figure still, the puffy-faced M. P. Frinovsky, was also appointed a Deputy Head of the NKVD (and on 3 November, L. N. Bel’ski). Neither Berman nor Frinovsky nor Bel’ ski had been serving in the old Secret Police apparatus proper. Berman had headed the Labor Camp Administration, Gulag; Frinovsky commanded the Frontier Guards; while Bel’ski was Head of the Militia. Otherwise, the old NKVD chiefs were not yet disturbed. Even Yagoda’s personal assistant remained in the NKVD for some time. Molchanov and the other departmental chiefs kept their posts, though Yezhov brought in his own men from the Central Committee apparatus to help them in their work, and to learn how to supplant them.
A team of more than twenty-five interrogators headed by Agranov started to prepare the new trial.27 The original script for this described Pyatakov and his fellow accused simply as a “Reserve Center” which had plotted but not acted. By this means, the case was represented as less serious than that of August, and one not implying the death penalty. It was no doubt partly by this means that Stalin had gained the leadership’s consent to go forward with the Pyatakov Case—which, it might be hoped, would be no more than a tidying-up of loose ends in a fairly restrained fashion.