These arrests, and particularly Shmidt’s, caused considerable worry in military circles in the Ukraine. No one believed he was guilty. Although he had once voted for Trotsky, he had long since “repented” of this. And throughout August, there were further arrests. On 25 September came that of Divisional Commander Yu. Sablin. A woman NKVD officer, Nastya Ruban, who knew Yakir, went to him secretly and told him that she had seen the materials against Sablin, and it was quite clear that he was not guilty. Three days later, her death by heart attack was announced. It was soon learned that it had really been suicide.27
Meanwhile, in the Lubyanka, Shmidt was being interrogated “in all degrees” by top-ranking NKVD operatives, including the Head of the Special Department, M. I. Gay, and the notorious Z. M. Ushakov, on the charge of planning to kill Voroshilov. Documentary evidence was produced: a route card of Voroshilov’s movements at the maneuvers, as issued to all commanders. For some time, Shmidt denied all the accusations.28
While Shmidt and Kuzmichev had been implicated in the preliminary interrogations of the Zinoviev Trial prisoners and publicly named in the indictment, it was only in the course of the trial itself that, on 21 August 1936, a more senior figure, and one of the Tukhachevsky group proper, was unexpectedly brought in. Dreitzer, who had finished his evidence on 19 August, was recalled. And as the last evidence given at the whole trial, he implicated Putna. This officer was now alleged to have been in direct contact with Trotsky and Ivan Smirnov. Smirnov denied that Putna had anything to do with it. But Pikel, Reingold, and Bakayev corroborated Dreitzer.29 Putna, recalled from London, had been arrested on 20 August.30 His wife learned of the arrest in Warsaw on her way to join him.31 By 31 August, he had already admitted the existence of various Trotskyite groups.32
Corps Commander Primakov, though not so implicated at the Zinoviev Trial, had been arrested on 14 August.33 He had already been in NKVD hands in, apparently, 1934,34 so was particularly vulnerable. However, he denied all the charges, even at a confrontation before Stalin and the Politburo, for nine months.35
On the face of it, it was no more extraordinary for Trotskyite plots to involve Communists in the Red Army than in any other field. It could not easily be complained of as an attack on the Army as such. On the other hand, according to Dreitzer, Trotsky’s instructions had included as a particular duty “to unfold work for organizing nuclei in the Army”36—a direct threat. During the autumn, there were rumors that a show trial of “Trotskyist” commanders in the Army was to be held, with Putna in the leading role. Tukhachevsky himself appeared to be under a cloud, if the lack of prominence given to him in the Army maneuvers was any guide. Voroshilov made sinister comments on lack of vigilance to the Kiev commanders during his visit to their autumn exercises.37
The fall of Yagoda was interpreted as, in part, a victory for the Army. German diplomatic reports of the time say that no more was to be heard of any Army trial, and that Tukhachevsky himself was fully “reinstated.” And Stalin is now, in fact, reported at the December 1936 plenum mentioning material against Tukhachevsky which had proved unfounded.38
As ever, this relaxation proved to be simply another maneuver of Stalin’s. Shmidt, Primakov, and Putna were not released, and Yezhov was soon planning a more effective blow at the military. There is an unconfirmed report that Putna was worked on from the start for evidence incriminating Tukhachevsky as a British spy.39 This would, indeed, be natural from Putna’s London post. And in the trials, the accused were often charged with working for several foreign powers. But, anyhow, the charge was not developed in later propaganda, and may have been overtaken by the Nazi connection.
As we have seen, at the Pyatakov Trial, Putna was once again incriminated—though still for terrorism only, not treason. On 24 January 1937, Radek remarked, as if in passing, that Putna had come to him “with some request from Tukhachevsky.” An extraordinary exchange between Vyshinsky and Radek on the following day ran like this:
Vyshinsky:
Accused Radek, in your testimony you say: ‘In 1935 … we resolved to call a conference, but before this, in January, when I arrived, Vitaly Putna came to me with a request from Tukhachevsky…’ I want to know in what connection you mention Tulchachevsky’s name?
Radek:
Tukhachevsky had been commissioned by the Government with some task for which he could not find the necessary material. I alone was in possession of this material. He rang me up and asked if I had this material. I had it, and he accordingly sent Putna, with whom he had to discharge this commission, to get the material from me. Of course, Tukhachevsky had no idea either of Putna’s role or of my criminal role.…
Vyshinsky:
And Putna?
Radek:
He was a member of the organization, and he did not come to talk about
the organization, but I took advantage of his visit to have this talk.
Vyshinsky:
So Putna came to you, having been sent by Tukhachevsky on official business having no bearing whatever on your affairs since he, Tukhachevsky, had no relations with them whatever?
Radek:
Tukhachevsky never had any relations whatever with them.
Vyshinsky:
He sent Putna on official business?
Radek:
Yes.
Vyshinsky:
And you took advantage of this in order to engage in your own particular affairs?
Radek:
Yes.
Vyshinsky:
Do I understand you correctly, that Putna had dealings with the members of your Trotskyite underground organization, and that your reference to Tukhachevsky was made in connection with the fact that Putna came on official business on Tukhachevsky’s orders?
Radek:
I confirm that, and I say that I never had and could not have had any dealings with Tukhachevsky connected with counter-revolutionary activities, because I knew Tukhachevsky’s attitude to the Party and the Government to be that of an absolutely devoted man.
40
An experienced NKVD officer who read this at once remarked that Tukhachevsky was lost. Why, his wife asked, since Radek’s evidence so emphatically exculpated him? Since when, was the reply, had Tukhachevsky needed a character reference from Radek?41
The whole clumsy interchange must have been a set piece, doubtless dictated by Stalin himself, perhaps at Tukhachevsky’s own insistence after the earlier mention of his name. Typically, it gave the Marshal full satisfaction in a superficial sense. He could hardly ask for a plainer assertion of his loyalty and innocence. But at the same time, the idea had been launched. And when Vyshinsky in his final speech complained of the accused having confessed much, but not enough, of their criminal connections, the foundations were laid for further development in his direction as in others.
When Shmidt finally broke down under severe interrogation, his confession was apparently circulated in the upper levels of the Party. Yakir determined to check the charges. He insisted on seeing Shmidt in jail. Shmidt had become very gray and thin, seemed apathetic, and spoke listlessly. Yakir described him as looking “like a Martian,” a being from another planet. But when Yakir asked him if his confessions were true, Shmidt repudiated them. Yakir was not allowed to question him on the details, but had Shmidt write a note to Voroshilov denying all the accusations. Yakir took this to Voroshilov and told him that the charges were clearly false.