56See Cullmann, The Early Church, pp. 65-66; cf. p. 73; Jeremias, Eucharistic Words, p. 106; Hengel, The Atonement, p. 38; Dodd, Apostolic Preaching, pp. 16-17.
57Cullmann, Confessions, pp. 72-73.
58Hans von Campenhausen, “The Events of Easter and the Empty Tomb,” in Tradition and Life in the Church (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1968), p. 44, as quoted by Ladd, I Believe, p. 105.
59Hunter, Jesus, p. 100.
60Cullmann, The Early Church, p. 64; Jeremias, Eucharistic Words, p. 96; Pannenberg, Jesus, p. 90; Dodd, Apostolic Preaching, p. 17.
61Dodd, Apostolic Preaching, p. 16.
62Bultmann, Theology, vol. 1, p. 295; Neufeld, Confessions, pp. 66-67, 146.
63Cullmann, Earliest Confessions, p. 32; Wolfhart Pannenberg, “A Dialogue on Christ’s Resurrection,” in Christianity Today, 12/14, April 12, 1968, pp. 9-11.
64Weber, The Cross, p. 58; Hengel, The Atonement, p. 37.
65For details, see, in particular, Gary R. Habermas, The Resurrection of Jesus: A Rational Inquiry (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1976), pp. 114-171; Orr, The Resurrection of Jesus, chapters VIII and IX in particular.
66Numerous excellent critiques of Hume and more recent updates have appeared, exposing the invalidity of such attempts. For example, see C.S. Lewis, Miracles (New York: Macmillan, 1961); Richard Swinburne, The Concept of Miracle; Werner Schaaffs, Theology, Physics and Miracles, transl. by Richard L. Renfield (Washington, DC: Canon Press, 1974); Gary R. Habermas, “Skepticism: Hume” in Norman L. Geisler, ed., Biblical Errancy: An Analysis of its Philosophical Roots (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1981).
67For details, including a listing of primary sources from these nineteenth century rejections of each other’s views, see Habermas, The Resurrection of Jesus: A Rational Inquiry, pp. 286-293.
68For examples, see Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, vol. 4, part 1, p. 340; Raymond E. Brown, “The Resurrection and Biblical Criticism,” especially p. 233; Pannenberg, Jesus, pp. 88-97; Wilckens, Resurrection, pp. 117-119; Günther Bornkamm, Jesus of Nazareth, pp. 181-185.
69Fuller, Resurrection Narratives, p. 37. See also Wilckens, Resurrection, p. 113.
70Fuller, ibid., pp. 37, 46-47.
71As mentioned above, some would not include the empty tomb as a known fact, but it is accepted by many scholars as historical. For an excellent defense of this fact, see Edward Lynn Bode, The First Easter Morning, Analecta Biblica 45 (Rome: Biblical Institute, 1970), pp. 155-175; William Lane Craig, “The Empty Tomb of Jesus,” pp. 173-200; Robert H. Stein, “Was the Tomb Really Empty?” in the Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 20 (1977), pp. 23-29.
72This does not even include the experience of the more than 500 persons who also claimed to have seen the risen Jesus, concerning whom Paul asserted that most were still alive and could be questioned.
73The advantage of using only four of the facts is that, with such a small number, there is even wider support for these facts among critical scholars. Additionally, these four reveal how strong the case for the resurrection is, in actuality. But it should be noted that the case for the resurrection does not rest on these four facts alone. In fact, there is no particular reason to use only four, except to make a point concerning their strong attestation.
74For a sampling of critical theologians who accept these four core facts, see Fuller, Resurrection Narratives especially pp. 27-49; Bultmann, Theology, vol. 1, pp. 44-45; Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol. 2, pp. 153-158; Bornkamm, Jesus, pp. 179-186; Wilckens, Resurrection, pp. 112-113; Pannenberg, Jesus, pp. 88-106; Moltmann, Theology of Hope, especially pp. 197-202; Hunter, Jesus, pp. 98-103; Perrin, Resurrection, pp. 78-84; Brown, Bodily Resurrection, especially pp. 81-92; Paul VanBuren, The Secular Meaning of the Gospel (New York: Macmillan, 1963), pp. 126-134.
75See especially Acts 1:1-11; 2:32; 3:15; 5:30-32; 10:39-43; 13:30-31.
76Compare the testimony of historian Michael Grant (Jesus: An Historian’s Review, p. 176) with that of theologian Rudolf Bultmann (Theology, vol. 1, p. 45), who agree at this point with scholarship as a whole.
77Fuller, Foundations, p. 142.
78See Eusebius, Book II: IX, XXIII; XXV.
79See Habermas and Moreland, Immortality, pp. 245-246, endnote 67.
80See note 74 above. See also Grant, Jesus: An Historian’s Review, especially pp. 175-178; W.T. Jones, The Medieval Mind (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1969), pp. 34-35; Carl Braaten, History and Hermeneutic (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1966), p. 78.
81Grant, ibid., p. 176.
82Braaten, History, p. 78.
83See Gary R. Habermas, The Resurrection of Jesus: An Apologetic, chapter I for this argument in expanded form, including support for these facts.
84Expansions of these critiques and many additional refutations gathered from the larger list of known historical facts above cannot be presented here. For a more complete treatment of these and other such alternative theories, see Habermas, The Resurrection of Jesus: A Rational Inquiry, pp. 114-171.
85The additional known facts also provide other significant arguments for this event, such as the other evidences listed there.
Perhaps an illustration utilizing a court case will be helpful. We will postulate that more than a dozen eyewitnesses clearly observed some events that involved seeing a person perform a series of acts on various occasions. This testimony both came immediately after the occurrences themselves and the eyewitnesses were firm in their claims, as evidenced at numerous points. Further, the opposing lawyer and his assistants could not disprove the testimony even after literally years of research, in spite of their interest in doing so. No lying, collusion or other fraud, hallucinations, or any other means of fakery or misconception could be established. Admittedly, quite a strong case would be made that this person in question was, in fact, seen by these persons at those places and times. But even more revealing, a limited but demonstrable case could be built based only on the facts that their opponents admitted to be true. Thus the argument could be based on the antagonistic testimony alone.
Theoretically, would the jury be satisfied if the opposing lawyer pleaded that “Maybe the witnesses did not really see the person for some unknown reason in spite of the evidence” or “It’s not really important whether they saw him or not”? Clearly these would be inappropriate responses because the testimony reveals that the eyewitnesses did, in fact, literally see the person.