[11] For "dice-playing" see Becker, "Charicl." 354 (Engl. trans.); for "buffoonery," ib. 98; "Symp."
(To pass to another definition.) They are not kings or rulers (he said) who hold the sceptre merely, or are chosen by fellows out of the street,[12] or are appointed by lot, or have stepped into office by violence or by fraud; but those who have the special knowledge[13] how to rule. Thus having won the admission that it is the function of a ruler to enjoin what ought to be done, and of those who are ruled to obey, he proceeded to point out by instances that in a ship the ruler or captain is the man of special knowledge, to whom, as an expert, the shipowner himself and all the others on board obey. So likewise, in the matter of husbandry, the proprietor of an estate; in that of sickness, the patient; in that of physical training of the body, the youthful athlete going through a course; and, in general, every one directly concerned in any matter needing attention and care will either attend to this matter personally, if he thinks he has the special knowledge; or, if he mistrusts his own science, will be eager to obey any expert on the spot, or will even send and fetch one from a distance. The guidance of this expert he will follow, and do what he has to do at his dictation.
[12] Tom, Dick, and Harry (as we say).
[13] The {episteme}. See above, III. v. 21; Newman, op. cit. i. 256.
And thus, in the art of spinning wool, he liked to point out that women are the rulers of men--and why? because they have the knowledge of the art, and men have not.
And if any one raised the objection that a tyrant has it in his power not to obey good and correct advice, he would retort: "Pray, how has he the option not to obey, considering the penalty hanging over him who disobeys the words of wisdom? for whatever the matter be in which he disobeys the word of good advice, he will fall into error, I presume, and falling into error, be punished." And to the suggestion that the tyrant could, if he liked, cut off the head of the man of wisdom, his answer was: "Do you think that he who destroys his best ally will go scot free, or suffer a mere slight and passing loss? Is he more likely to secure his salvation that way, think you, or to compass his own swift destruction?"[14]
[14] Or, "Is that to choose the path of safety, think you? Is it not rather to sign his own death-warrent?" L. Dind. cf. Hesiod, "Works and Days," 293. See Newman, op. cit. i. 393-397.
When some one asked him: "What he regarded as the best pursuit or business[15] for a man?" he answered: "Successful conduct";[16] and to a second question: "Did he then regard good fortune as an end to be pursued?"--"On the contrary," he answered, "for myself, I consider fortune and conduct to be diametrically opposed. For instance, to succeed in some desirable course of action without seeking to do so, I hold to be good fortune; but to do a thing well by dint of learning and practice, that according to my creed is successful conduct,[17] and those who make this the serious business of their life seem to me to do well."
[15] Or, "the noblest study."
[16] {eupraxia, eu prattein}--to do well, in the sense both of well or right doing, and of welfare, and is accordingly opposed to {eutukhia}, mere good luck or success. Cf. Plat. "Euthyd." 281 B.
[17] Lit. "well-doing"; and for the Socratic view see Newman, op. cit. i. 305, 401.
They are at once the best and the dearest in the sight of God[18] (he went on to say) who for instance in husbandry do well the things of farming, or in the art of healing all that belongs to healing, or in statecraft the affairs of state; whereas a man who does nothing well-- nor well in anything--is (he added) neither good for anything nor dear to God.
[18] Or, "most divinely favoured." Cf. Plat. "Euthyphro," 7 A.
X
But indeed,[1] if chance brought him into conversation with any one possessed of an art, and using it for daily purposes of business, he never failed to be useful to this kind of person. For instance, stepping one time into the studio of Parrhasius[2] the painter, and getting into conversation with him--
[1] {alla men kai} . . . "But indeed the sphere of his helpfulness was not circumscribed; if," etc.
[2] For Parrhasius of Ephesus, the son of Evenor and rival of Zeuxis, see Woltmann and Woermann, "Hist. of Painting," p. 47 foll.; Cobet, "Pros. Xen." p. 50 (cf. in particular Quint. XII. x. 627). At the date of conversation (real or ideal) he may be supposed to have been a young man.
I suppose, Parrhasius (said he), painting may be defined as "a representation of visible objects," may it not?[3] That is to say, by means of colours and palette you painters represent and reproduce as closely as possible the ups and downs, lights and shadows, hard and soft, rough and smooth surfaces, the freshness of youth and the wrinkles of age, do you not?
[3] Reading with Schneider, L. Dind., etc., after Stobaeus, {e graphike estin eikasia}, or if the vulg. {graphike estin e eikasia}, trans. "Painting is the term applied to a particular representation," etc.
You are right (he answered), that is so.
Soc. Further, in portraying ideal types of beauty, seeing it is not easy to light upon any one human being who is absolutely devoid of blemish, you cull from many models the most beautiful traits of each, and so make your figures appear completely beautiful?[4]
[4] Cf. Cic. "de Invent." ii. 1 ad in. of Zeuxis; Max. Tur. "Dissert." 23, 3, ap. Schneider ad loc.
Parrh. Yes, that is how we do.[5]
[5] Or, "that is the secret of our creations," or "our art of composition."
Well, but stop (Socrates continued); do you also pretend to represent in similar perfection the characteristic moods of the soul, its captivating charm and sweetness, with its deep wells of love, its intensity of yearning, its burning point of passion? or is all this quite incapable of being depicted?
Nay (he answered), how should a mood be other than inimitable, Socrates, when it possesses neither linear proportion[6] nor colour, nor any of those qualities which you named just now; when, in a word, it is not even visible?
[6] Lit. "symmetry." Cf. Plin. xxxv. 10, "primus symmetriam picturae dedit," etc.
Soc. Well, but the kindly look of love, the angry glance of hate at any one, do find expression in the human subject, do they not?[7]
[7] Or, "the glance of love, the scowl of hate, which one directs towards another, are recognised expressions of human feeling." Cf. the description of Parrhasius's own portrait of Demos, ap. Plin. loc. cit.
Parrh. No doubt they do.
Soc. Then this look, this glance, at any rate may be imitated in the eyes, may it not?
Undoubtedly (he answered).
Soc. And do anxiety and relief of mind occasioned by the good or evil fortune of those we love both wear the same expression?
By no means (he answered); at the thought of good we are radiant, at that of evil a cloud hangs on the brow.
Soc. Then here again are looks with it is possible to represent?
Parrh. Decidedly.
Soc. Furthermore, as through some chink or crevice, there pierces through the countenance of a man, through the very posture of his body as he stands or moves, a glimpse of his nobility and freedom, or again of something in him low and grovelling--the calm of self-restraint, and wisdom, or the swagger of insolence and vulgarity?
You are right (he answered).
Soc. Then these too may be imitated?
No doubt (he said).
Soc. And which is the pleasanter type of face to look at, do you think --one on which is imprinted the characteristics of a beautiful, good, and lovable disposition, or one which bears the impress of what is ugly, and bad, and hateful?[8]
[8] For this theory cp. Ruskin, "Mod. P." ii. 94 foll. and indeed passim.
Parrh. Doubtless, Socrates, there is a vast distinction between the two.
At another time he entered the workshop of the sculptor Cleiton,[9] and in course of conversation with him said:
[9] An unknown artist. Coraes conj. {Kleona}. Cf. Plin. xxxiv. 19; Paus. v. 17, vi. 3. He excelled in portrait statues. See Jowett, "Plato," iv.; "Laws," p. 123.