Euth. Certainly; when you began I thought you were limiting the question to the case of friends.
Soc. So then everything which we set down on the side of Wrong will now have to be placed to the credit of Right?
Euth. Apparently.
Soc. Very well then, let us so place them; and please, let us make a new definition--that while it is right to do such things to a foe, it is wrong to do them to a friend, but in dealing with the latter it behoves us to be as straightforward as possible.[29]
[29] Or, "an absolutely straightforward course is necessary."
I quite assent (replied Euthydemus).
So far so good (remarked Socrates); but if a general, seeing his troops demoralised, were to invent a tale to the effect that reinforcements were coming, and by means of this false statement should revive the courage of his men, to which of the two accounts shall we place that act of fraud?[30]
[30] Cf. "Hell." IV. iii. 10; "Cyrop." I. vi. 31.
On the side of right, to my notion (he replied).
Soc. Or again, if a man chanced to have a son ill and in need of medicine, which the child refused to take, and supposing the father by an act of deceit to administer it under the guise of something nice to eat, and by service of that lie to restore the boy to health, to which account shall we set down this fraud?
Euth. In my judgment it too should be placed to the same account.
Soc. Well, supposing you have a friend in deplorably low spirits, and you are afraid he will make away with himself--accordingly you rob him of his knife or other such instrument: to which side ought we to set the theft?
Euth. That too must surely be placed to the score of right behaviour.
Soc. I understand you to say that a straightforward course is not in every case to be pursued even in dealing with friends?
Heaven forbid! (the youth exclaimed). If you will allow me, I rescind my former statement.[31]
[31] See above, I. ii. 44 ({anatithemai}).
Soc. Allow you! Of course you may--anything rather than make a false entry on our lists. . . . But there is just another point we ought not to leave uninvestigated. Let us take the case of deceiving a friend to his detriment: which is the more wrongful--to do so voluntarily or unintentionally?
Euth. Really, Socrates, I have ceased to believe in my own answers, for all my former admissions and conceptions seem to me other than I first supposed them.[32] Still, if I may hazard one more opinion, the intentional deceiver, I should say, is worse than the involuntary.
[32] Or, "all my original positions seem to me now other than I first conceived them"; or, "everything I first asserted seems now to be twisted topsy-turvy."
Soc. And is it your opinion that there is a lore and science of Right and Justice just as there is of letters and grammar?[33]
[33] {mathesis kai episteme tou dikaiou}--a doctrine and a knowledge of the Just.
Euth. That is my opinion.
Soc. And which should you say was more a man of letters[34]--he who intentionally misspells or misreads, or he who does so unconsciously?
[34] Or, "more grammatical"; "the better grammarian."
Euth. He who does so intentionally, I should say, because he can spell or read correctly whenever he chooses.
Soc. Then the voluntary misspeller may be a lettered person, but the involuntary offender is an illiterate?[35]
[35] Or, "In fact, he who sins against the lore of grammer intentionally may be a good grammarian and a man of letters, but he who does so involuntarily is illiterate and a bad grammarian?"
Euth. True, he must be. I do not see how to escape from that conclusion.
Soc. And which of the two knows what is right--he who intentionally lies and deceives, or he who lies and deceives unconsciously?[36]
[36] Or, Soc. And does he who lies and deceives with intent know what is right rather than he who does either or both unconsciously?
Euth. Clearly he does.
Euth. The intentional and conscious liar clearly.
Soc. Well then, your statement is this: on the one hand, the man who has the knowledge of letters is more lettered than he who has no such knowledge?[37]
[37] Or, Soc. It is a fair inference, is it not, that he who has the {episteme} of grammar is more grammatical than he who has no such {episteme}?
Euth. Yes.
Soc. And he who has the {episteme} of things rightful is more righteous than he who lacks the {episteme}? See Plat. "Hipp. min."; Arist. "Eth. Eud." VI. v. 7.
Euth. Yes.
Soc. And, on the other, he who has the knowledge of what is right is more righteous than he who lacks that knowledge?
Euth. I suppose it is, but for the life of me I cannot make head or tail of my own admission.[38]
[38] Lit. "Apparently; but I appear to myself to be saying this also, heaven knows how." See Jowett, "Plato," ii. p. 416 (ed. 2).
Soc. Well (look at it like this). Suppose a man to be anxious to speak the truth, but he is never able to hold the same language about a thing for two minutes together. First he says: "The road is towards the east," and then he says, "No, it's towards the west"; or, running up a column of figures, now he makes the product this, and again he makes it that, now more, now less--what do you think of such a man?
Euth. Heaven help us! clearly he does not know what he thought he knew.
Soc. And you know the appellation given to certain people-- "slavish,"[39] or, "little better than a slave?"
[39] {andropododeis}, which has the connotation of mental dulness, and a low order of intellect, cf. "boorish,' "rustic," "loutish," ("pariah," conceivably). "Slavish," "servile," with us connote moral rather than intellectual deficiency, I suppose. Hence it is impossible to preserve the humour of the Socratic argument. See Newman, op. cit. i. 107.
Euth. I do.
Soc. Is it a term suggestive of the wisdom or the ignorance of those to whom it is applied?
Euth. Clearly of their ignorance.
Soc. Ignorance, for instance, of smithying?
Euth. No, certainly not.
Soc. Then possibly ignorance of carpentering?
Euth. No, nor yet ignorance of carpentering.
Soc. Well, ignorance of shoemaking?
Euth. No, nor ignorance of any of these: rather the reverse, for the majority of those who do know just these matters are "little better than slaves."
Soc. You mean it is a title particularly to those who are ignorant of the beautiful, the good, the just?[40]
[40] Cf. Goethe's "Im Ganzen Guten Schonen resolut zu leben."
It is, in my opinion (he replied).
Soc. Then we must in every way strain every nerve to avoid the imputation of being slaves?
Euth. Nay, Socrates, by all that is holy, I did flatter myself that at any rate I was a student of philosophy, and on the right road to be taught everything essential to one who would fain make beauty and goodness his pursuit.[41] So that now you may well imagine my despair when, for all my pains expended, I cannot even answer the questions put to me about what most of all a man should know; and there is no path of progress open to me, no avenue of improvement left.
[41] {tes kalokagathias}, the virtue of the {kalos te kagathos}-- nobility of soul. Cf. above, I. vi. 14.
Thereupon Socrates: Tell me, Euthydemus, have you ever been to Delphi?
Yes, certainly; twice (said he).
Soc. And did you notice an inscription somewhere on the temple: {GNOMI SEAUTON}--KNOW THYSELF?
Euth. I did.
Soc. Did you, possibly, pay no regard to the inscription? or did you give it heed and try to discover who and what you were?
I can safely say I did not (he answered). That much I made quite sure I knew, at any rate; since if I did not know even myself, what in the world did I know?
Soc. Can a man be said, do you think, to know himself who knows his own name and nothing more? or must he not rather set to work precisely like the would-be purchaser of a horse, who certainly does not think that he has got the knowledge he requires until he has discovered whether the beast is tractable or stubborn, strong or weak, quick or slow, and how it stands with the other points, serviceable or the reverse, in reference to the use and purpose of a horse? So, I say, must a man in like manner interrogate his own nature in reference to a man's requirements, and learn to know his own capacities, must he not?