Hipp. No, that is not the right way.
Soc. Then children who are so produced are produced not as they ought to be?
Hipp. So it appears to me.
What offspring then (he asked) will be ill produced, ill begotten, and ill born, if not these?
I subscribe to that opinion also (replied Hippias).
Soc. Well, it is a custom universally respected, is it not, to return good for good, and kindness with kindness?
Hipp. Yes, a custom, but one which again is apt to be transgressed.
Soc. Then he that so transgresses it pays penalty in finding himself isolated; bereft of friends who are good, and driven to seek after those who love him not. Or is it not so that he who does me kindness in my intercourse with him is my good friend, but if I requite not this kindness to my benefactor, I am hated by him for my ingratitude, and yet I must needs pursue after him and cling to him because of the great gain to me of his society?
Hipp. Yes, Socrates. In all these cases, I admit, there is an implication of divine authority;[38] that a law should in itself be loaded with the penalty of its transgression does suggest to my mind a higher than human type of legistlator.
[38] Lit. "Yes, upon my word, Socrates, all these cases look very like (would seem to point to) the gods."
Soc. And in your opinion, Hippias, is the legislation of the gods just and righteous, or the reverse of what is just and righteous?
Hipp. Not the reverse of what is just and righteous, Socrates, God forbid! for scarcely could any other legislate aright, of not God himself.
Soc. It would seem then, Hippias, the gods themselves are well pleased that "the lawful" and "the just" should be synonymous?[39]
[39] Or, "it is well pleasing also to the gods that what is lawful is just and what is just is lawful."
By such language and by such conduct, through example and precept alike, he helped to make those who approached him more upright and more just.
V
And now I propose to show in what way he made those who were with him more vigorous in action.[1] In the first place, as befitted one whose creed was that a basis of self-command is indispensable to any noble performance, he manifested himself to his companions as one who had pre-eminently disciplined himself;[2] and in the next place by conversation and discussion he encouraged them to a like self- restraint beyond all others.[3] Thus it was that he continued ever mindful himself, and was continually reminding all whom he encountered, of matters conducive to virtue; as the following discussion with Euthydemus, which has come to my knowledge,[4] will serve to illustrate--the topic of the discussion being self-command.
[1] Lit. "more practical," i.e. more energetic and effective.
[2] "If any one might claim to be a prince of ascetics, it was Socrates; such was the ineffaceable impression left on the minds of his associates."
[3] Or, "he stimulated in these same companions a spirit of self- restraint beyond all else."
[4] Or, "which I can vouch for."
Tell me, Euthydemus (he began), do you believe freedom to be a noble and magnificent acquisition, whether for a man or for a state?
I cannot conceive a nobler or more magnificent (he answered).
Soc. Then do you believe him to be a free man who is ruled by the pleasures of the body, and thereby cannot perform what is best?
Certainly not (he answered).
Soc. No! for possibly to perform what is best appears to you to savour of freedom? And, again, to have some one over you who will prevent you doing the like seems a loss of freedom?
Most decidedly (he answered).
Soc. It would seem you are decidedly of opinion that the incontinent are the reverse of free?[5]
[5] Or, "incontinency is illiberal."
Euth. Upon my word, I much suspect so.
Soc. And does it appear to you that the incontinent man is merely hindered from doing what is noblest, or that further he is impelled to do what is most shameful?
Euth. I think he is as much driven to the one as he is hindered from the other.
Soc. And what sort of lords and masters are those, think you, who at once put a stop to what is best and enforce what is worst?
Euth. Goodness knows, they must be the very worst of masters.
Soc. And what sort of slavery do you take to be the worst?
I should say (he answered) slavery to the worst masters.
It would seem then (pursued Socrates) that the incontinent man is bound over to the worst sort of slavery, would it not?
So it appears to be (the other answered).
Soc. And does it not appear to you that this same beldame incontinence shuts out wisdom, which is the best of all things,[6] from mankind, and plunges them into the opposite? Does it not appear to you that she hinders men from attending to things which will be of use and benefit, and from learning to understand them; that she does so by dragging them away to things which are pleasant; and often though they are well aware of the good and of the evil, she amazes and confounds[7] their wits and makes them choose the worse in place of the better?
[6] "Wisdom, the greatest good which men can possess."
[7] Schneid. cf. Plat. "Protag." 355 A; and "Symp." iv. 23.
Yes, so it comes to pass (he answered).
Soc. And[8] soundness of soul, the spirit of temperate modesty? Who has less claim to this than the incontinent man? The works of the temperate spirit and the works of incontinency are, I take it, diametrically opposed?
[8] "And if this be so concerning wisdom, {sophia}, what of {sophrasune}, soundness of soul--sobriety?"
That too, I admit (he answered).
Soc. If this then be so concerning these virtues,[9] what with regard to carefulness and devotion to all that ought to occupy us? Can anything more seriously militate against these than this same incontinence?
[9] Or add, "If this be so concerning not wisdom only, but concerning temperance and soundness of soul, what," etc.
Nothing that I can think of (he replied).
Soc. And can worse befall a man, think you? Can he be subjected to a more baleful influence than that which induces him to choose what is hurtful in place of what is helpful; which cajoles him to devote himself to the evil and to neglect the good; which forces him, will he nill he, to do what every man in his sober senses would shrink from and avoid?
I can imagine nothing worse (he replied).
Soc. Self-control, it is reasonable to suppose, will be the cause of opposite effects upon mankind to those of its own opposite, the want of self-control?
Euth. It is to be supposed so.
Soc. And this, which is the source of opposite effects to the very worst, will be the very best of things?
Euth. That is the natural inference.
Soc. It looks, does it not, Euthydemus, as if self-control were the best thing a man could have?
It does indeed, Socrates (he answered).
Soc. But now, Euthydemus, has it ever occurred to you to note one fact?
What fact? (he asked).
Soc. That, after all, incontinency is powerless to bring us to that realm of sweetness which some look upon[10] as her peculiar province; it is not incontinency but self-control alone which has the passport to highest pleasures.
[10] Or, "which we are apt to think of as."
In what way? (he asked). How so?
Why, this way (Socrates answered): since incontinency will not suffer us to resist hunger and thirst, or to hold out against sexual appetite, or want of sleep (which abstinences are the only channels to true pleasure in eating and drinking, to the joys of love, to sweet repose and blissful slumber won by those who will patiently abide and endure till each particular happiness is at the flood)[11]--it comes to this: by incontinency we are cut off from the full fruition of the more obvious and constantly recurring pleasures.[12] To self-control, which alone enables us to endure the pains aforesaid, alone belongs the power to give us any pleasure worth remembering in these common cases.
[11] Or, "at its season." Lit. "is as sweet as possible."