Keeping my eye on what was happening with the economy at that time, I did not see the operations of Yukos as anything out of the ordinary. I did not pay any great attention to the fact that Khodorkovsky had begun talking about the need for greater transparency in the operations of large corporations, about creating the right climate for investment and fighting corruption. It sounded sensible and timely. At the same time, information began to circulate that in the 1990s his company had underpaid billions of dollars in taxes, and that at a time when millions of people had not been paid their wages and pensions for months. People in the know tell me that was how almost all the major companies behaved, and the government chose, for the time being, to turn a blind eye to tax evasion schemes.
When charges were laid against him, Khodorkovsky tried to shield Yukos by resigning from the company. Viktor Gerashchenko was invited to head it. I knew Viktor well as the head of the USSR State Bank and subsequently of Russia’s Central Bank, but the situation was becoming more ominous by the day. Foreign businessmen warned me that a trial of Khodorkovsky might impact negatively on the investment climate. I was astonished and perplexed when Khodorkovsky was arrested in a crude, ostentatious manner by people wearing masks and carrying automatic weapons.
I heard of comparable cases in the United States during visits there. They culminated in different ways, sometimes with large fines, sometimes with prison sentences. The main thing was that there should be no doubts about the court’s impartiality and independence from the executive branch, in order to avoid any impression that ‘justice’ was being applied selectively. Ultimately, I stress again, everything hinges on the political background, on the existence of democratic institutions, strong branches of government independent of each other. Whether we will have them in Russia or not is the big question.
The elections were approaching. Russia and her citizens could feel the results of the stabilization of politics and the economy. Growth rates were gradually improving and wages rising, primarily due to an influx of oil revenues unprecedented in the country’s history. Under Putin, life had improved for the two-thirds of the population who had been battered by Yeltsin’s radical ‘reforms’.
It was clear to me that, in these circumstances, the president had every likelihood of gaining a new endorsement from the electorate by winning in the first round. But how and to what end would he use his power? To move ahead on the path of democracy and modernization, reforming the economy in the interests of all our citizens, or primarily in the interests of the government itself and its cronies?
A party of new bureaucrats
It was plain that new mafias were forming, groups no less predatory than the previous high and mighty individuals they had deprived of power and wealth in their own selfish interests. The mouthpiece for the interests of these people and their associated mushrooming bureaucracy was increasingly the United Russia Party. The only way to combat these negative trends was by developing democracy.
My reflections on these matters were dark and uneasy. Many others were similarly pondering the situation. In November 2003 I again discussed current issues with my invariable conversation partner, Dmitry Muratov. Our discussion was published in Novaya Gazeta under the headline, ‘Do we need a party of new bureaucrats? I think not.’
DM: Mikhail Sergeyevich, how is it that when you were undertaking the reforms the world came to know as Perestroika, free speech and transparency were helpful to it? Not all that much time has passed since then, but now we find that Glasnost and free speech are a hindrance to today’s reforms. How has this happened? To be more specific, why is it, for example, that when you were president the whole country was transfixed, watching live broadcasts of the Congresses of People’s Deputies? For the first time people found out many things about themselves, about you and about the Russian people. Now the government party refuses to participate in public debates.
MG: That is a good question. As regards the past, I will say openly that, if we had not first had Glasnost and then free speech, Perestroika as a wholly unique, difficult, risky policy would never have got off the ground. I am sure, even more certain now, that it would never have happened.
Now, about the party in government’s refusal to participate in debates. I was shocked. Who is giving them this sort of advice? It would seem that United Russia, which has not yet won the election, no longer wants anything to do with other parties. What are they going to be like after the election? They seem to have a very odd idea of democracy.
In short, not everybody is yet able to withstand the test of Glasnost, freedom and democracy. This also applies to the press. We see often enough that you are all for freedom when writing about other people, but when the media have their attention drawn to something they have published, you all regard it as an assault on free speech and rush to your colleagues’ defence.
DM: Well, what do you expect? Of course we do. That is freedom, solidarity, esprit de corps.
MG: Well that lot are just showing esprit de corps in defending their interests! It is a struggle, which is why I really want to emphasize yet again that our greatest achievement, with which everything, the reforms, started, was Glasnost and freedom. I do not think that now, after the painful, difficult years of rule by Boris Yeltsin, which left us only a legacy of chaos, anyone can sensibly still argue that what Russia needs is a ‘firm hand’.
In fact, all this talk about a strong state, as if it were something separate from democracy, is ridiculous. The strongest state is a democratic state.
I was talking once to a former prime minister of France. He said, ‘I can see that in this situation President Putin cannot avoid using authoritarian methods to resolve certain particular problems.’ But, he asked, did I not fear this might lead to an authoritarian regime? I told him that, as I saw and understood Vladimir Putin, that seemed unlikely to happen.
DM: What are these feelings of yours based on?
MG: I said they are feelings. The nous, the intuition of a politician. But let me, nevertheless, try to reply to your remark. Look at what is happening. According to UN statistics, in the last quarter of the twentieth century more than 80 dictatorial or totalitarian regimes disappeared from the arena of history and politics; a wave of democracy swept the world. Think how many such regimes disappeared as the result of free elections in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union!
DM: How many?
MG: But right at the end of the twentieth century we see the beginnings of a backlash. That has been worrying me for several years now. In the post-Soviet territories it has become increasingly common to try to resolve complex problems by authoritarian methods, and in some cases we have even seen the establishment of authoritarian regimes. In many countries, even in Europe, the electorate is voting for politicians of an authoritarian bent. Political science scholars gathered in Quebec at their World Conference concluded that the unregulated spread of globalization had generated tensions nationally and internationally. They believed that authoritarian tendencies might not only survive, but actually gain ground.
DM: To put it simply, the twenty-first century is going to be the century of totalitarianism? And that justifies what is happening in Russia?