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Rejecting outside pressure, however, obliges us ourselves to analyse and assess all the more carefully and critically the current state of progress in our country towards democracy. My own belief is that Russia can reach the goals we are striving for only by following the path of democracy. At the same time, it needs to be recognized that the transition from totalitarianism to democracy is not taking place in a vacuum, under ideal conditions, but within the context of our history. It is proving difficult and will require considerable time and effort from the whole of our society.

The conditions under which our ‘transition to democracy’ is occurring were made much more difficult by misguided policies of the Russian leadership in the 1990s. Given impoverishment of the majority of the population, chaos at the heart of government and in the economy and the threat that the nation might simply disintegrate, what chance was there of developing democracy? To all intents and purposes there was none, and it was replaced by a shabby imitation.

Having inherited that situation, Vladimir Putin’s first priority had to be preventing the collapse of the country and stabilizing the economy and society. He had to act fast, and inevitably not everything could be done without certain measures that do not feature in standard textbooks on democracy. Overly independent regional leaders had, for example, to be obliged to bring regional legislation into accordance with federal law. Harsh measures were necessary to combat terrorism.

The measures taken dealt with the crisis of the Russian state and led to economic growth, whose results are beginning to impact positively on people’s lives. This has changed the situation, but something else is also true: social stability and a noticeable improvement in the economic figures do not of themselves resolve all the issues relating to the state of our democracy. Quite the contrary. If the difficult circumstances, even emergency, that we confronted at the start of the decade have been dealt with, it is all the more time now to examine how far our democratic institutions and current legislative proposals accord with the overriding aim of constructing a new, free, democratic society in Russia.

Here there is cause for concern. Twenty years have passed since the beginning of democratic reforms, yet there are many unjustifiable restrictions, prohibitions and barriers – both old and recently introduced. I do not doubt that Alexander Veshnyakov, the chairman of the Central Electoral Commission, knew what he was talking about when he said recently there was a danger that, instead of a genuine political contest, the election might turn into a farce. The president himself was obliged to remind everyone that the opposition has a right to express its opinions and that it should be listened to. This is a matter of great importance, because competitive elections and a real opposition are essential features of any democracy.

It has to be said that the closer the parliamentary and presidential elections come, the more evident is the desire of a section of the Russian political elite to restrict and reduce the participation of citizens in the political process. Instead of involving people in politics, in the taking of vital decisions by availing themselves of their constitutional rights, we see attempts to limit their participation in the affairs of the state and to regulate it to the point where it ceases to be effective or even to make sense.

Most worrying of all are changes in electoral law.

A law passed last year abolished constituencies fielding independent candidates. This was a retrograde step. In these constituencies the deputy directly represents his or her constituents and their interests. Voting for party lists, on the contrary, the voter sees only the names of celebrities at the top of the list who, as a rule, have not the slightest intention of actually working in the Duma. It is a disgraceful practice, a brazen deception, but there has been no talk at all about abolishing that. The ‘merit’ of the system is that it enables parties to funnel ‘the right people’ into the Duma, people whose loyalty is not to Russia’s citizens but only to the leaders of their party.

The move to a wholly proportional system of representation could only be justified if Russia had already generated a stable party system, with political parties that, taken together, adequately reflect the interests of all the segments and groups in society. We have a long way to go before that is the case. In the present situation, it is blindingly obvious that the aim of this innovation is to establish a monopoly over Russia’s politics.

The law on political parties adopted in 2001 established a rigid state regulation and control of the activities of parties, and was subsequently made even more draconian with additional requirements on the number of parties, the number of regional offices they were required to have, and so on. When I was head of the Social Democratic Party, I reluctantly agreed to these provisions, supposing that any legal framework was better than none. Experience has shown, however, that such regulation is not consistent with democratic principles: the political credibility of parties should be determined by the voters, not by the state.

The process of chiselling away at the rights and opportunities of political parties is still continuing: the entrance barrier for parties to be admitted to the Duma has been raised to 7 per cent of the overall vote, with the manifest intention of obstructing the appearance in parliament of ‘undesirable’ opposition parties. The new electoral law decrees that, of the 200,000 signatures that must first be collected by any party aspiring to participate in the elections, the permissible proportion of those considered questionable or invalid has been reduced from the previous 20 per cent to 5 per cent. Quite clearly, those conducting the inspection will have no difficulty finding the required number of rejects if they are so minded. There is immense scope for administrative malfeasance.

One of the latest innovations is the removal from voting slips of the box labelled ‘Against all the above’. It is claimed that this will raise the sense of civic responsibility among voters, but in reality a substantial section of the electorate is being prevented from voting. In 2003, some 13 million people voted ‘Against all the above’ and, moreover, most often those who did were educated people protesting against the lack of real choice. The likelihood is that most of them will in future simply boycott the elections.

Even that is not the end of it. The government has resuscitated the provision for early voting, which is a charter for ballot-rigging. Nongovernmental organizations are now excluded from monitoring the elections. Newspapers established by political parties are banned from informing voters about their parties’ activities until one month before the election. All these are initiatives proceeding from United Russia, exploiting its majority in the fourth Duma. Their only purpose is to ensure at all costs that ‘the bosses’ party’ is guaranteed a majority in the next elections.

What might look like piecemeal changes to the legislation lead cumulatively to a degrading of the entire electoral system, which is increasingly being turned into a pure formality. This is particularly obvious in respect of the Federation Council, which now consists of appointed officials who often have no connection whatsoever with the regions they ‘represent’. Flagrant instances of corruption have been exposed recently. One can only sympathize with the demand of the Federation Council’s chairman, Sergey Mironov, for a review of the manner in which this chamber is constituted.

Voters’ trust in elections and government institutions has been falling in recent years. Eloquent testimony to this is the low voter turnout in recent elections and referendums.