LT: You must yourself have been tempted to try to hold on to power at all costs.
MG: Is it really so difficult to see that even during the Soviet period Gorbachev began delegating power, giving more and more of it to others? I think I did the right thing there. I am certain of it. That was my choice.
Here is another candid interview, where we started discussing the already impending presidential election. I gave it to Kommersant, another offspring of Perestroika. Stanislav Kucher asked me a lot of questions, both about Perestroika and about the current state of affairs. I made no attempt to duck them, and was even deliberately provocative.
SK: People think Medvedev should be the engine for reform. Mikhail Khodorkovsky said last year that Medvedev had become a symbol of reform, but not its engine. Now people are urging him to show some political will and get rid of Putin, one way or another. Legally, of course. Those against that idea say that then Medvedev should accept he would find himself in the role of Gorbachev, that the process he initiated would end up sweeping him off the political stage. If Medvedev starts the process, there is no guarantee the wave will not sweep away not only Putin, but him too, and in such a way that he would be forced to emigrate from Russia because he is a part of the system. What do you think about these parallels?
MG: In the first place, I think their regular and increasingly frequent remarks about coming together to talk and agree everything at the appropriate time testifies, at the very least, to a lack of humility on their part. They have no right to behave in that manner. They were elected by the Russian people and it is not for them but for the people, the electorate, to decide.
SK: That is what is supposed to happen, but not the way things are in reality.
MG: If it is what is supposed to happen, that is how they should behave.
SK: True, but they think they are going to decide.
MG: Who cares what they think. How do they think they will decide? They do, after all, face an election.
SK: Well, you know yourself how elections are conducted in Russia. Hardly anybody believes in fair elections any more.
MG: Well that is just not how it should be. It is something that concerns all of us.
SK: So what should be done, Mikhail Sergeyevich?
MG: We need a completely new electoral system, in which it should be firmly established that two terms is the maximum and that is that.
The arguments about the presidency continued. Some said Putin would stand, others continued to pin their hopes on Medvedev. I was asked to sign a letter to Medvedev urging him to declare his intention of running for a second term.
That was logical enough. After the amendment to the constitution (how easy it is for us to do that!), he could claim six years in office, which would be sufficient to pave the way for a serious move towards real democracy. It would see the formation of genuine, competitive parties, an even playing field for all candidates in the election campaign, introduce essential changes to the electoral system and, most importantly, create a sense of pluralism and genuine alternatives. I believe Dmitry Medvedev would have been all in favour of that, but I was not at all certain he had the will, tenacity and independence to go for it. In any case, I would have preferred to see, not this manoeuvring around which of the two, Medvedev or Putin, would ‘get to be president’, but a genuine contest, with the emergence of new candidates.
Of course, the loophole in the constitution, allowing a former president who had been in office for two terms to be back in office after a break, was a major flaw, and I suspect the oversight had been entirely deliberate. During my years in power and subsequently I had a very different approach to the issue. I thought, and still think, that the opportunity to constantly replace and renew the group in power is imperative in modern politics. When talking to journalists, I made no bones about it: failure to replace the state authorities took us back to the old ways. Putin’s Petersburg team had run its course.
As regards the relationship between the president and prime minister, I was not in favour of trying to ‘split the tandem’. I considered that, if they were genuinely working together in a coordinated manner, any such split would be downright harmful for the country. The difference in their approach to Russia’s problems was nevertheless substantial and, with the passage of time, becoming ever more apparent. Getting back to normal in the summer after surgery on my back, I began drawing attention to this. In an interview with my old British friend, Jonathan Steele, the correspondent of the Guardian, I decided to call a spade a spade:
The president’s plan for modernizing the economy, politics and other areas is all well and good, but his options are limited. A coalition with the democratic forces of civil society is essential.
I can see, though, that Putin is outplaying him. He is setting up all sorts of fronts, a so-called ‘Popular Front’. I don’t know how many of these fronts he will come up with, but it does indicate that he has little faith in what United Russia can achieve, and at least he is right about that. He can see that United Russia is incapable of winning on its own.
Again, what is going to be the mainstay of modernization? Vladimir Vladimirovich is calling for stability. He thinks we should maintain the status quo. We say, ‘No! If you want to keep the status quo, where does modernization fit in?
I went on to be even more explicit:
We need now to realize that we are facing a wave of social problems that will determine Russia’s future, the situation in education, healthcare and other areas. If we cannot find solutions to these problems, Russia will not modernize. We need a different programme from that advocated by Putin.
I have criticized Putin for bumptiousness. I respect him as a political leader and a person, but I believe his current policies are an obstacle to progress.
The summer holidays were not yet over, but already debate was raging in Moscow over who it was going to be: Putin or Medvedev? Gradually, opinion was inclining towards Putin. Yevgenia Albats, editor of New Times, asked me straight out: ‘Are you certain Putin will be back in the Kremlin in 2012?’ I replied, ‘No, I am not certain.’
I do not know how, ultimately, the decision was taken. Was there really an understanding from the outset, as Putin once hinted, that Medvedev was a ‘caretaker president’, or did that decision come later? That is not now particularly important. What is important is that the decision was taken without consulting the country’s citizens. They, just like the ‘political elite’, were presented with a fait accompli. Evidently, Putin had more of a specifically Russian kind of political expertise and willpower.
There was one occasion in late 2010 when Dmitry Medvedev did demonstrate a strong will, and that was when he dismissed the mayor of Moscow, Yury Luzhkov. I knew Luzhkov quite well. At a difficult time for the country, after the August 1991 coup, he was one of the leaders of a Management Committee of the USSR Economy, and did a great deal to maintain essential supplies and keep the situation under control. He also achieved a lot as mayor of Moscow. For all that, Luzhkov was a living example of why no one should hold high office for decades. After becoming encumbered by clannish ties, personal and family interests, and too many automatic, well-practised moves, a politician becomes incapable of resolving problems purely on the basis of the public interest. As time passes, the more those other interests encroach, and so it was with Luzhkov. My understanding is, however, that this is not why he was dismissed, but because he got involved rather too soon in the intrigues surrounding the presidency, openly and energetically making clear his support for Putin. Perhaps he knew or had heard something. Perhaps in his own way he wanted to thank Putin for not sacking him in the summer of 2010 when, during the forest fires that engulfed Moscow in smoke, Luzhkov failed to return immediately from his holiday. Whatever it was, he got on the wrong side of Medvedev. His dismissal was for personal, rather than sound political, reasons.