“I’ve already drawn attention to all this, and in considerable detail, in the Introduction to History. All I want to add here are a few bitter appendices concerning the way time is proceeding to our own disadvantage. It’s almost as though it is working actively against us and planning yet more fiascoes and false steps.
“Hammu, just take a look with me at the Hafsi, ‘Abd al-Wadi, and Marini regimes in the Maghrib. Join me in an assessment of the way they compete with one another to see which one can be the most fractious and disorganized. Keep doing it until, like me, you reach a stage at which you start to yearn for the days of the great Almohad empire before al-Nasir’s defeat of al-‘Iqab and its eventual demise in the time of al-Ma’mun. How puny and pathetic the sultans of this era are by comparison, despite their displays of tyranny! They have no competence in public affairs and politics. The only thing they are good at is hatching plots and indulging in intrigue.
“As I contemplate these sultans of today, I might adjust my previous statements by suggesting that tyranny comes in two kinds: the first involves the ruler monopolizing power, then successfully blending the physical and ideational aspects of authority into one; the second sees the ruler losing all sense of self-respect due to personal weakness or else the domineering effect of his own ministers, all of which leads him to treat his people with unadulterated violence. The first type brings beneficial consequences and is normally encountered during formative phases in a dynasty’s course, whereas the second is both futile and deleterious and is a feature of all subsequent phases. In my opinion, Sultan Abu Salim, in whose chancery I used to work and composed some sycophantic verse, can serve as a primary example of what I’ve today termed ‘futile tyranny.’ Once he had recovered his throne thanks to the support of Pedro, king of Castille, he started practicing tyranny in its starkest form: his brothers, cousins, and all male relatives in the larger ruling family were all tossed overboard at sea. He then came under the direct influence of the jurist al-Khatib ibn Marzuq, and began to follow his advice, even though he had hired me as one of his senior secretaries. When he started losing his nerve, he asked Ibn Rudwan to write him a manual, namely The Flashing Meteor Concerning Effective Government. During the reign of Abu Salim, people ‘were so overwhelmed by fines and other exactions that no sowing or planting was possible,’ as my dear colleague. Ibn al-Khatib, put it. Circumstances so willed that it should be this sultan who received a number of gifts from Mansazata, the king of Mali, including a giraffe that astonished everyone and duly impressed the poets of the era. This incident showed me just how prosperous the region of black Africa was in comparison with the collapsing power in the Maghrib. Eventually another minister named Fawdudi succeeded in getting Abu Salim’s head into a basket, thanks to help from the Christian army commander, Garcia ibn Antun. As a result, that minister became the effective ruler of the country in the name of the insane prince, Tashfin, who was followed by a pseudo-prince, Abu Zayyan. The dynasty was only rid of the latter when he was murdered at the hands of Sultan ‘Abd al-‘Aziz who managed to restore authority to the Marini house, if only for a short period.
“So why have I let myself to be distracted by these details? What, for heaven’s sake, have we established? What I’ve wanted to demonstrate is that, when a state follows the various stages on the downward path toward outright despotism, it reveals its flaws for all to see; in fact, with its untutored infant rulers it becomes a genuine laughingstock. Here’s what Lisan al-Din Ibn al-Khatib has to say about being a guest of the infant, Sultan al-Sa‘id ibn Abi ‘Inan: Ί hear a voice but see no one. All I know about him is that he toddles his way from the minister’s presence to the congregational prayer mosque. During parades he sits there like a stuffed chicken, all daubed, tail tucked under, clasping a handkerchief or knife for all he’s worth; the turban encircles a moonlike visage. And there he stays, sitting atop his throne and glowing like the wicks in his own lamps, a model of brittle nobility.’
“By my life, Hammu, that quotation reveals for us just a minute segment of the dire consequences of rapacious rulership.”
With that Ibn Khaldun stopped deliberately with the intention of giving his amanuensis a bit of a breather. He yelled out to Sha‘ban to bring in some fresh coffee, then adjusted his sitting position. Sometimes he stared at the floor, at others the ceiling. For his part, al-Hihi was doing what he normally did during breaks in dictation, namely tapping his fingers by way of apology and checking on his pens and ink.
“Fine, Hammu,” said ‘Abd al-Rahman, “let’s go back to where we were. .”
“You mean, finding a way out of the genie’s magic time-lamp which is constantly working against us?”
“That’s a fine way of putting it. I’ve no doubt that some rulers have tried to escape from the bottleneck or to break the cycle of history with its inverted impact. One may have developed a sensible system of taxation and put in place some principles of justice and civil society. Another may have tackled the profit sectors and utilized their revenues to boost the exchequer. Still another may have tried to suppress feelings of tribal solidarity by creating a professionalized and multiracial army as a substitute. All these constitute different options, and, in spite of any number of obstacles and roadblocks on the way, other rulers will come along and try their hand at giving greater weight to the factors involved. Among such rulers, highly principled reformers will adopt the loftiest principles of the Islamic caliphate to effect such transformations. But what I envisage is a powerful ruler in the Maghrib, someone who can appreciate that the way ahead is blocked to the north and east and who can then order the army to march southward into the lands of the Africans, all out of a desire for the good things they can provide. I can also imagine another ruler who thinks that the best solution for controlling his entire country and all its people is to create a slave army that will only respond to his commands, and no one else’s.
“All that said, the moral is always to be found in results and consequences. When it comes to the question of reform, what history tells us is that at the start of a particular reign it may last for a short period but it remains fragmentary. Before long, however, the winds of tyranny and personal whim sweep it all aside.
“What history tells us about eras of expansion and campaigns beyond borders is that every such extension of power and influence is followed in the vast majority of cases by an era of waning power, the disruptive effects of which may have a negative impact on the functions of the power center itself.
“What we learn from history about the creation of a tightly organized slave-army with all its concomitant force is that such soldiers rapidly become part of the gentry themselves, members of the ruling elite, and occupiers of the regal throne. I am firm in my conviction that the fault in this process does not lie in the fact that manumitted slaves become rulers of mankind, but rather that their reliance on esprit de corps is no less erratic and capricious than that of any other group. Just consider the situation with the Burji Mamluks of our generation and with their predecessors, the Bahri Mamluks; the problem is there for all to see. Their paranoia regarding the intentions of other Muslim communities leads them to give prominent positions in the chancery and treasury to Jews and Christians. Every dispute that breaks out within their coterie is settled with the sword, and as a result, many of their rulers and senior officials are murdered. Then consider how often the lives of judges and teachers are disrupted when they keep being appointed and then dismissed, something that will soon happen to me, no doubt. That’s because the Mamluks prefer to deal with legal scholars who thrive on conspiracy theories and an atmosphere of gloom and doom, the kind of people who were directly responsible for the trial of Taqi al-Din ibn Taymiya.