14. Q. Did you at the time feel that everything was being done either locally or by making recommendations to higher authority to correct the deficiencies and weaknesses that you referred to?
A. We certainly felt that there was much to be done and all hands were working very hard to overcome deficiencies. I believe that in general suitable representations had been made to higher authority, and that the Commander-in-Chief and his subordinates were taking all corrective measures that they felt was within their own purview to accomplish. It is doubtful if any were entirely satisfied with the rapidity of progress.
15. Q. Major, going back to the basic ‘Pincher’ war plan, what was your opinion at the time as to how that plan contemplated that war with the Soviet Union would start?
A. The plan itself may not, and probably did not, directly give such an indication, but it certainly must have contemplated that such a war would probably not have been preceded by a formal declaration but rather that it would arise from such hostile attack on the part of the Soviets.
16. Q. In estimating the situation with respect to the Western Occupation Zones of Germany was a surprise air attack on what are now the NATO forces considered as a course of action available to the Soviets to initiate such a war?
A. Probably not. At least I, as War Plans Officer did not hold such a view with respect to Western Germany although I did consider such an act possible in Iran or even directed against Korea. It may have been that such a possibility was discussed with the Commander-in-Chief or with other members of the staff. It is probable that some such discussions may have taken place although I have no specific recollection of one.
17. Q. Do you recall during this planning period any consideration that was given to the efficiency of the Soviet ground and air forces?
A. Yes sir. While specific data was lacking I and I believe others within the staff felt that there was a rather high degree of proficiency in Soviet air organization on a tactical level.
18. Q. Do you recall any discussion as to the ability of the Soviet air forces to conduct such an attack as they did on the 2nd of May?
A. I think perhaps some such discussions, informal discussions, did take place. I do remember giving consideration to the potential danger of ground-attacks to the major airfields particularly after the Soviets’ attack in Manchuria in 1945; even though some thought and consideration was given to the possibility of an attack I, personally, never considered it as more than a remote possibility.
19. Q. Major, are you able to state the views that the Commander-in-Chief American Occupation Zone of Germany, held at that time in this respect?
A. I feel that if he had entertained the idea that there was serious danger of that nature I would have heard of it in very emphatic terms. I am certain that he was not anticipating any such attack.
20. Q. General in your thinking and planning at that time, that is the six months leading up to the attack, do you recall what consideration was given to the characteristics of the Soviet Army’s leadership particularly Marshal Aleksandr Vasilevsky?
A. The leadership in the Soviet Army was discussed from time to time between General Smart, myself, his Chief of Staff, his Operations Officer, his Intelligence Officer, and perhaps others. As I recall now the general impression that was obtained was that in case of war we would have to contend with rather capable and aggressive leadership on the part of the enemy.
21. Q. Were you at that time familiar with the character of Marshal Aleksandr Vasilevsky?
A. Not especially so, but I did consider him capable and bold.
22. Q. Do you recall discussing him with Captain Roche, while you were serving together on the Staff of the Commander, Scouting Force?
A. While I have no specific recollection of such discussions, I feel that it is almost certain that a number of such discussions did take place; not only when Roche and I were serving together in the Scouting Force, but also after I came to General Smart’s staff and Roche was serving with the Intelligence component in the Fourteenth U.S. Army.
23. Q. General during this planning period leading up to the attack do you recall occasions on which the Commander-in-Chief communicated with army aviators with respect to the ability of Soviet air forces and the possibility of such attacks as occurred on May 2nd?
A. No, although it is quite possible that I was present at some such discussion with Generals Hall and Bellinger, or perhaps other aviation personnel including Captain Davis, the staff Aviation Liaison Officer. But no, I have no recollection of any discussion with any of them with the particular idea in view that we should have to contend with such an attack.
24. Q. Did you have knowledge of any aviator whatever who really foresaw the attack of May 2nd, and so expressed himself before that time?
A. No sir.
25. Q. General, in the preparation of the Commander-in-Chief’s Contributory ‘Pincher’ War Plan was it ever contemplated at the time that it might be placed in effect either in its entirety, or in part, by order of the Commander-in-Chief prior to the start of actual war?
A. I believe it was not contemplated that the plan would be placed into effect either in whole or in part by the Commander-in-Chief without reference to higher authority, because of the rapidity of communications. Conversely, I do not believe that that plan circumscribed the Commander-in-Chief’s authority in any way to take any suitable action to meet whatever circumstances that might arise.
26. Q. At that time then, what methods did you contemplate using for alerting army units should the international situation so require and before actual start of war?
A. By preparatory, or warning message.
27. Q. General as I understand from your previous testimony, it was your estimate as well as the estimate of practically all of General Smart’s staff, that a surprise attack on western Germany was a remote possibility. Will you state the basis for that conclusion?
A. For us to conduct an attack on the Soviet Union would have involved massive troop movements that could be easily detected. We felt that the Soviets would find the same considerations would deter them from making such an effort against us. It also seemed highly probable that more attractive targets could be found, where their units could be more profitably employed. We felt that even should such an attack be launched our defenses in depth would be sufficient to make the damage inflicted on us small as opposed to the attacking forces, which would have suffered disproportionately heavy casualties by comparison.
28 Q. Do you recall that your thinking along those lines gave due value to the power of initiative if employed by the enemy in a surprise attack?
A. I don’t think so now; I did think so then. We did anticipate that heavy armored concentrations would be encountered in this area and had considered it quite possible, if not probable, that a mass air attack about the time that considerable forces were on training exercises might be the commencement of the war.
29. Q. General, under the Joint Action, what service was primarily responsible for the defense of western Germany?
A. The Army.
30. Q. Were you in the months preceding the attack on Western Germany familiar with the Army’s ability to fulfill its commitments as prescribed by that document?
A. In a general way, yes. I had made a tour of the front lines with the Commanding General, and some members of his staff in order to see the defenses and as a part of that tour attended a short presentation in Frankfurt with particular emphasis on anti-aircraft defenses. With my limited knowledge of the Army’s requirements and methodologies of defense I personally felt they were good and adequate. With this in mind I knew as did the Army authorities felt that certain improvements should be made, particularly in respect to anti-aircraft artillery.