Resort to force produced the desired result: by nightfall the capital was calm. Nicholas Sukhanov, the author of the best eyewitness account of 1917 in Petrograd, thought that the government had succeeded in regaining control of the center of the city.25 That evening Princess Radziwill held her soiree, which had had Petrograd society talking for weeks. To the French Ambassador the sight of her brilliantly illuminated palace on Fontanka brought to mind similar scenes in the Paris of 1789.26
To remove the main source of political opposition, Nicholas ordered the Duma to adjourn until April. Golitsyn communicated this news to Rodzianko late at night on February 26.
As night fell, on the surface everything seemed in order. But then a succession of events occurred which to this day astonish with their suddenness and scope: a mutiny of the Petrograd garrison which in twenty-four hours transformed half the troops into rioters and by March 1 had the entire contingent of 160,000 uniformed men in open rebellion.
To understand this development, one must bear in mind the composition as well as living conditions of the Petrograd garrison. It consisted of freshly drafted recruits and superannuated reserves assigned to the reserve battalions of the Guard Regiments normally stationed in Petrograd but now away at the front. They were meant to stay in Petrograd for several weeks of basic training and then leave for the front. Organized into training units, they were heavily overmanned: some reserve companies had more than 1,000 soldiers, and there were battalions with 12,000–15,000 men; 160,000 soldiers were packed into barracks designed to hold 20,000.27 The reservists drawn from the National Militia, many in their thirties and early forties, felt unfairly inducted. In Petrograd, they were subjected to the usual indignities inflicted on Russian soldiers, such as being addressed by officers in the second-person singular and being forbidden to ride inside streetcars.28 Although dressed in uniform, they did not differ in any significant way from the workers and peasants crowding the streets of Petrograd, whom they were now ordered to shoot. Rodzianko, who observed them at close range, said one week after the events:
Unexpectedly for all, there erupted a soldier mutiny such as I have never seen. These, of course, were not soldiers but muzhiki taken directly from the plow who have found it useful now to make known their muzhik demands. In the crowd, all one could hear was “Land and Freedom,” “Down with the Dynasty,” “Down with the Romanovs,” “Down with the Officers.” In many units officers were beaten. This was joined by the workers and anarchy reached its apogee.29
In view of the fact that the February Revolution is often depicted as a worker revolt, it is important to emphasize that it was, first and foremost, a mutiny of peasant soldiers whom, to save money, the authorities had billeted in overcrowded facilities in the Empire’s capital city—in the words of one eyewitness, like “kindling wood near a powder keg.”
The survival of the tsarist regime ultimately depended on the loyalty of the army since the usual forces of order—the police and the Cossacks—did not have the numbers to cope with thousands of rebels. In February 1917, these forces consisted of 3,500 policemen, armed with antiquated Japanese rifles, and Cossack detachments which, for an unaccountable reason, had been divested of nagaiki, their dreaded whips.30 Nicholas showed that he was aware of his dependence on the troops when he assured the British Ambassador the army would save him. But the troops’ loyalty wavered when ordered to fire on unarmed crowds. The Russian army never liked being used against civilians; it liked this role less than ever now because its green recruits shared the grievances of the crowds. Observing the Cossacks and troops during these critical days, Sukhanov felt they were merely looking for a pretext to join the demonstrators.31 One of the very last reports filed by the Okhrana on February 26, just before it was shut down by the rioters, shared this assessment:
The movement broke out spontaneously, without preparation and exclusively on the basis of the supply crisis. Inasmuch as the military units did not hinder the crowd and in individual cases even took steps to paralyze the actions of the police, the masses gained confidence that they could act with impunity. Now, after two days of unimpeded movement on the streets, when revolutionary circles have raised the slogans “Down with the war” and “Down with the government,” the people have become convinced that the revolution has begun, that the masses are winning, that the authorities are powerless to suppress the movement by virtue of the fact that the military units are not on their side, that the decisive victory is near because the military either today or tomorrow will come out openly on the side of the revolutionary forces, that the movement which has begun will not subside but grow ceaselessly until ultimate victory and the overthrow of the government.32
E. I. Martynov, a tsarist general who after October went over to the Bolsheviks, in his excellent account of the role of the army in the February Revolution commented critically on the passivity of the Imperial authorities in the face of fraternization of the Petrograd garrison with the rioters. He contrasted this behavior with the energetic measures of the French President, Adolphe Thiers, in March 1871. As soon as the troops were observed fraternizing with the Parisian mobs, Thiers ordered them to Versailles, from where they later counterattacked and recaptured the capital.33 Beliaev and Khabalov, by contrast, helplessly watched the rising storm.
The first break in the garrison’s discipline occurred in the afternoon of February 26 in reaction to the shooting on Znamenskii Square. Immediately after the event, a group of angry workers went to the Champs de Mars, where the Pavlovskii Regiment had its billets. They told the men of the 4th Company of the Reserve Battalion that their comrades in the Volynskii Regiment had fired on an unarmed crowd. Incensed, the Pavlovtsy broke into the company arsenal, removed thirty rifles, and took to the streets. One hundred strong, they marched toward Nevsky intending to persuade or compel the Volyntsy on Znamenskii Square to stop the shooting. En route, they ran into a detachment of mounted policemen, with whom they exchanged fire. The leader of the mutineers, a young lieutenant, received a disabling wound. The loss of the commander threw them into confusion. No support came from other garrison units. By nightfall, when the Pavlovtsy returned to their barracks, nineteen of their ringleaders were placed under guard.34 In cables sent to Mogilev that evening, Khabalov and Beliaev alluded to the mutiny of some units, but assured the Tsar they would be suppressed.35
If the February Revolution is to have a date when it began, that date has to be February 27/March 12, 1917, when “worker demonstrations turned into a soldier mutiny”36 and the tsarist authorities lost control of the capital. The most stupendous military revolt in recorded history, it started with the Pavlovskii Regiment. The regiment’s troops held meetings through the night to protest the Znamenskii Square massacre and finally voted to disobey further orders to fire at civilians. Messengers were sent to the Preobrazhenskii and Litovskii Guard Regiments, billeted nearby, which agreed to follow suit. The next morning the three regiments went into the streets. The Pavlovtsy killed one of their officers. Gendarme barracks were attacked and demolished. Pushing aside pro-government pickets, soldiers made their way to the Vyborg District, where they were joined by rebellious workers. The mutinous troops drove around the snow-covered streets in commandeered armored cars, waving their weapons and shouting. Anyone who stood in their way risked being lynched. Other soldiers broke into the Peter and Paul Fortress, releasing prisoners. A mob sacked the Ministry of the Interior. The red flag went over the Winter Palace. Policemen caught in uniform were beaten and killed. In the late afternoon, crowds stormed the Okhrana headquarters, scattering and burning files—Okhrana informers were observed to display particular zeal on this occasion. Arsenals were broken into and thousands of guns removed. There was widespread looting of shops, restaurants, and private residences.