The stage was thus set for a formal takeover: nominally in the name of the Soviet, in reality on behalf of the Bolsheviks. In preparation for this crowning event the Bolsheviks had arranged for a delegation of handpicked “representatives” of fifty-four factories to call on Taurida with a petition demanding the Soviet assume power. These men forced their way into the room occupied by the Ispolkom. Several of them were allowed to speak. Martov and Spiridonova supported their demand: Martov declared that such was the will of history.168 At this point it seemed that the rioters would physically inundate and take over the seat of the Soviet. The Soviet had no defense against this threat: its total protection consisted of six guards.169
And yet the Bolsheviks failed to deliver the coup de grace. It is impossible to tell whether this was due to poor organization, indecisiveness, or both. Nikitin blamed the Bolshevik failure to take power on poor planning.
The uprising was improvised: all the actions of the enemy indicated that it had not been prepared. The regiments and large units did not know their immediate missions even in the main area. They were told from the balcony of Kshesinskaia’s: “Go to Taurida Palace, take power.” They went and while awaiting the promised further orders commingled with one another. By contrast, units of ten to fifteen men in trucks and armored cars and small detachments in automobiles enjoyed complete freedom of action, lorded it over the city, but they, too, received no concrete orders to take over the strongpoints such as railroad stations, telephone centers, supply depots, arsenals, the doors to all of which stood wide open. The streets flowed with blood, but there was no leadership …*
But in the ultimate analysis the Bolshevik failure seems to have been caused by factors other than inadequate forces or bad planning: contemporaries agree that the city was theirs for the asking. Rather, it was due to a last-minute failure of nerve on the part of the commander in chief. Lenin simply could not make up his mind: according to Zinoviev, who spent these hours by his side, he kept wondering aloud whether this was or was not the time to “try,” and in the end decided it was not.170 For some reason he could not summon the courage to make the leap: possibly the dark cloud which hung over him of government revelations about dealings with the Germans held him back. Later, when both of them sat in jail, Trotsky told Raskolnikov, in what Raskolnikov took to be veiled criticism of Lenin: “Perhaps we made a mistake. We should have tried to take power.”171
When these events were taking place, Kerensky was at the front. The frightened ministers did nothing. The roar of thousands of armed men in front of Taurida, the sight of vehicles with soldiers and sailors racing to unknown destinations, the knowledge of being abandoned by the garrison filled them with a sense of hopelessness. According to Pereverzev, the government was effectively captive:
I did not arrest the leaders of the uprising on July 4, prior to the publication of documents, only because at that moment they already in effect had under arrest a part of the Provisional Government in Taurida Palace, and could have arrested Prince Lvov, myself, and Kerensky’s deputy without any risk to themselves, if their determination matched even one-tenth their criminal energy.172
In this desperate situation, Pereverzev decided to release part of the information at his disposal on Lenin’s German connections, hoping that it would unleash a violent anti-Bolshevik reaction among the troops. He had urged two weeks earlier that this information be made public, but the cabinet overruled him, on the grounds (according to a Menshevik newspaper) that “it was necessary to display caution in a matter concerning the leader of the Bolsh[evik] Party.”173 Although Kerensky was later to accuse Pereverzev of an “unpardonable” mistake in having released the facts on Lenin, he himself, having learned on July 4 of the disturbances, urged Lvov to “speed up the publication of information in the possession of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.”174 After checking with Colonel Nikitin and General Polovtsev, Pereverzev invited to his office over eighty representatives of military units stationed in and around Petrograd as well as journalists. This occurred around 5 p.m., as the disturbance at Taurida was coming to a head and a Bolshevik coup seemed but minutes away.* In order to save the most damning material for the prospective trial of the Bolshevik leaders, Pereverzev released only fragments of the evidence at his disposal, and the least credible part at that. It consisted of a shaky account by Lieutenant D. Ermolenko, who reported that while a prisoner of war of the Germans he had been told that Lenin was working for them. This hearsay evidence did a great deal of harm to the government’s case, especially with the socialists. Pereverzev also released some of the information on Bolshevik financial dealings with Berlin by way of Stockholm. He unwisely asked G. A. Aleksinskii, a discredited onetime Bolshevik Duma deputy, to attest to the veracity of Ermolenko’s account.175
54. P. N. Pereverzev.
Karinskii, a friend in the Ministry of Justice, instantly warned the Bolsheviks what Pereverzev was about to do,176 whereupon Stalin asked the Ispolkom to stop the spread of “slanderous” information about Lenin. Chkheidze and Tsereteli obliged, telephoning the editorial offices of the Petrograd dailies to request, in the name of the Ispolkom, that they not publish the government’s release. Prince Lvov did likewise; so did Tereshchenko and Nekrasov.* All newspapers but one honored the request. The exception was the mass-circulation Zhivoe slovo, which appeared the next morning with banner headlines—LENIN, GANETSKII & CO. SPIES—followed by the account of Ermolenko and details concerning the moneys sent by the Germans to Kozlovskii and Sumenson through Ganetskii.177 The report was endorsed by Aleksinskii. Broadsheets containing this information were posted throughout the city.
The revelations about Lenin and the Germans, spread by the regimental emissaries whom Pereverzev had briefed, had an electrifying effect on the troops: little as most of them cared whether Russia was ruled by the Provisional Government in partnership with the Soviet or by the Soviet alone, they felt passionately about collaboration with the enemy. The suspicions which lingered around Lenin because of his journey across enemy territory made him highly unpopular with the troops: according to Tsereteli, Lenin was so hated by the men in uniform that he had to ask the Ispolkom for protection.178 The first to reach Taurida were units of the Izmailovskii Guards; they were followed by elements of the Preobrazhenskii and Semenovskii, the latter marching to a military band. Cossack units also turned up. At the sight and sound of approaching troops, the mob in front of Taurida fled pell-mell in all directions, some seeking safety in the palace.
At this moment, inside Taurida a discussion was underway between the Ispolkom and the Bolshevik factory “representatives.” The Mensheviks and SRs were playing for time, hoping that the government would come to their rescue. The instant loyal troops made their way into Taurida, they threw out the Bolshevik motion.179