*Ocherki istorii Leningradskoi organizatsii KPSS, I (Leningrad, 1962), 481. Bagdaev had in fact been charged by the Petrograd Committee of the Bolshevik Party with organizing the May 1 demonstration, which fell on April 18, the day the government’s declaration and note on war aims were delivered to Allied governments: Kudelli, Pervyi, 82.
*The American historian Alexander Rabinowitch, who adopts the Bolshevik thesis that the April demonstrations were a peaceful demonstration, avoids the problem by omitting in his citation of the above passage Lenin’s reference to “violent means”: Prelude to Revolution (Bloomington, Ind., 1968), 45.
*W. H. Chamberlin, The Russian Revolution, I (New York, 1935), 159. The First Peasants’ Congress, attended by over a thousand delegates, had in it twenty Bolsheviks: VI, No. 4 (1957), 26.
*The rivalry between trade unions and Factory Committees would recur twenty years later in the United States when plant-based unions, affiliated with the CIO, challenged the craft-oriented unions of the AFL. Here, as in Russia, the Communists favored the former.
*A set of documents, purporting to demonstrate direct German involvement in Russian events, 1914–1917, and known as the “Sisson Papers,” had surfaced in early 1918. They were published in the United States by the Committee on Public Information, War Information Series, No. 20 (October 1918), The German-Bolshevik Conspiracy. The German Government had at once proclaimed them a complete forgery (Z. A. B. Zeman, Germany, and the Revolution in Russia, 1915–1918, London, 1958, p. X.) See further George Kennan in The Journal of Modern History, XXVIII, No. 2, June 1956, 130–54. Their effect has been to discredit for many years the very notion of German financial and political support of Lenin’s party.
*Bernstein’s figure was confirmed by postwar researches in German Foreign Ministry Archives. Documents found there indicate that until January 31, 1918, the German government had allocated for “propaganda” in Russia 40 million deutsche marks. This sum was exhausted by June 1918, following which (July 1918) an additional 40 million marks were assigned for this purpose, although apparently only 10 million were spent, not all of them on the Bolsheviks. A German mark at the time bought four-fifths of a tsarist ruble and approximately two post-1917 rubles (so-called “Kerenki”). Winfried Baumgart, Deutsche Ostpolitik, 1918 (Vienna-Munich, 1966) 213–14, Note 19.
*B. Nikitin, Rokovye gody (Paris, 1937), 109–10. According to the author (107–8), Kollontai also served as an intermediary delivering German money to Lenin. Despite overwhelming evidence of German subsidies to Lenin from German sources, some scholars still find the notion unacceptable. Among them is as well-informed a specialist as Boris Souvarine: see his article in Est & Ouest, No. 641 (June 1980), 1–5.
*In his memoirs Brusilov claims to have known even as he assumed supreme command that Russian troops had no fighting spirit left in them and that the offensive would faiclass="underline" A. B. Brusilov, Moi vospominaniia (Moscow-Leningrad, 1929), 216.
*N. Sukhanov, Zapiski o revoliutsii, IV (Berlin, 1922), 319. Sukhanov did not provide the source of this information, but Boris Nikolaevskii, the Menshevik historian, deduced that it had to come from Nevskii: SV, No. 9–10 (1962), 135n. Tsereteli notes that although in 1922, when Sukhanov published his memoirs, all the principals were still alive and could have denied his account, none of them did so: I. G. Tsereteli, Vospominaniia o Fevral’skoi Revoliutsii, II (Paris-The Hague, 1963),185.
*Pravda, No. 80 (June 13, 1917), 2. This was a closed meeting and no other accounts exist. Tsereteli, however, affirms that the above citation from Pravda correctly renders his speech, with some minor, though not insignificant omissions: Tsereteli, Vospominaniia, II, 229–30.
*Lenin was aware as early as mid-May that the government intercepted his communications with Stockholm. On May 16 in the pages of Pravda he taunted the “servants of the Kadets” who, although “lording it over the Russo-Swedish frontier,” failed to catch all the letters and telegrams: Lenin, PSS, XXXII, 103–4. Cf. Zinoviev in PR, No. 8–9 (1927), 57.
*The best account of the role of the regiment in July, based on archival documents, is by P. M. Stulov in KL, No. 3/36 (1930), 64–125. Cf. Leon Trotsky, The History of the Russian Revolution, II (New York, 1937), 17.
*Raskolnikov in PR, No. 5/17 (1923), 60. Roshal was shot in December 1917 by anti-Communists. Raskolnikov, a party member since 1910 and in 1917 deputy chairman of the Kronshtadt Soviet, in the 1920s and 1930s held various Soviet diplomatic posts abroad. Recalled to Moscow in 1939, he refused to return and assailed Stalin in an open letter, following which he was declared “an enemy of the people.” He died later that year in southern France under highly suspicious circumstances.
*Vladimirova in PR, No. 5/17 (1923), 11–13; Ia. M. Sverdlov in ISSSR, No. 2 (1957), 126. The report of the government commission appointed to investigate the July riots, reprinted in D. A. Chugaev, ed., Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v Rossii v iiule g. (Moscow, 1959), 95–96, describes the Bolshevik speeches as much more militant.
*M. Kalinin in Krasnaia gazeta, July 16, 1920, 2. Since Lenin was not on the scene, Kalinin presumably refers to what he said the next day. Cf. a similar assessment by Raskolnikov in PR, No. 5/17 (1923), 59. The Bolshevik tactic was not lost on the Mensheviks. Tsereteli describes an incident that occurred in the afternoon of July 3 after Stalin had appeared before the Ispolkom to inform it that the Bolsheviks were doing all they could to stop the workers and soldiers from taking to the streets. Smiling, Chkheidze turned to Tsereteli, “Now the situation is clear.” “I asked him,” Tsereteli continues, “in what sense he considered the situation clear.” “In the sense,” Chkheidze responded, “that peaceful people have no need to enter into a protocol a statement of their peaceful intentions. It appears that we will have to deal with a so-called spontaneous demonstration which the Bolsheviks will join, saying that the masses cannot be left without leadership.” Tsereteli, Vospominaniia, I, 267.
*Sukhanov, Zapiski, IV, 511–12. After Sukhanov had published these recollections in 1920, Trotsky vehemently repudiated them and so did, at Trotsky’s prodding, Lunacharskii. Lunacharskii wrote Sukhanov a letter denouncing his statement as utterly baseless and warning that its publication could have for Sukhanov, “as a historian, an unpleasant consequence” (ibid., 51411.-51511.). Sukhanov, however, refused to recant, insisting that he accurately recalled what Lunacharskii had told him. Yet that same year Trotsky himself admitted in a French Communist publication that the July affair had been intended as a power seizure—that is, the establishment of a Bolshevik government: “We never doubted for a moment that those July days were a prelude to victory”: Bulletin Communiste (Paris) No. 10 (May 20, 1920), 6, cited in Milorad M. Drachkovitch and Branko Lazitch, Lenin and the Comintern, I (Stanford, Calif., 1972), 95.
†fNikitin, Rokovye gody, 133, gives the lower figure, Istoriia Putilovskogo Zavoda, 1801–1917 (Moscow, 1961), 626, the higher. Trotsky’s estimate of 80,000 (History, II, 29) is sheer fantasy.