59. Kornilov feted on his arrival at the Moscow State Conference: August 14, 1917.
Viewed dispassionately, the outpouring of sympathy for the commanding general was an expression of unhappiness with Kerensky’s leadership, not a symptom of the “counterrevolution.” The country yearned for firm authority. But the socialists were insensitive to this mood. Better versed in history than in practical politics, they firmly believed that a conservative (“Bonapartist”) reaction was inevitable.* As early as August 24–25, before anything had happened to justify it, the socialist press spoke of counterrevolution: on August 25, the Menshevik Novaia zhizn’ announced, under the heading “Conspiracy,” that one was in full swing and expressed the hope that the government would prosecute it with at least as much zeal as it had displayed against the Bolsheviks.26
Thus, the plot was written: it only remained to find the protagonist.
In the middle of August the Germans launched the expected assault on Riga. The undisciplined and politicized Russian troops fell back and on August 20–21 abandoned the city. To Kornilov this was ultimate proof that Russia’s war effort had to be urgently reorganized, or else Petrograd itself would soon share Riga’s fate. To understand the atmosphere in which the Kornilov affair unfolded, the military backdrop must never be left out of sight: for although contemporaries as well as historians have treated the Kornilov-Kerensky conflict exclusively as a struggle for power, for Kornilov it was first and foremost a critical, possibly final effort to save Russia from defeat in the war.
In the middle of August, Savinkov received from reliable French intelligence sources information that the Bolsheviks planned another putsch for the beginning of September: the information was published on August 19 in the daily Russkoe slovo.* The date coincided with what headquarters believed to be the next phase of German operations, an advance from Riga on Petrograd.27 The origin of this intelligence is not known: it appears to have been faulty for there is nothing in Bolshevik sources to indicate preparations for a coup at this time. Savinkov conveyed this intelligence to Kerensky. Kerensky seemed un-fazed: then, as later, he thought a Bolshevik coup a figment of his opponents’ imagination.28 But he quickly realized the utility of information on an alleged Bolshevik putsch as an excuse to disarm Kornilov. He requested Savinkov to proceed immediately to Mogilev to carry out the following missions: (1) liquidate the officer conspiracy at headquarters reported on by Filonenko; (2) abolish the Political Department at Army Headquarters; (3) obtain Kornilov’s consent to have Petrograd and its environs transferred from his command to that of the government and placed under martial law; and
(4) request from General Kornilov a cavalry corps for the purpose of imposing martial law in Petrograd and defending the Provisional Government from any and all assaults, and, in particular, from an assault of the Bolsheviks, who had already rebelled on July 3–5 and who, according to information of foreign intelligence, are once again preparing to rise in connection with German landings and an uprising in Finland.29
This fourth task particularly deserves being kept in mind because Kerensky’s subsequent claim that Kornilov had sent the cavalry against Petrograd to overthrow his government would provide grounds for charging the general with treason.
The purpose of Savinkov’s mission to Mogilev was to abort a counterrevolutionary conspiracy allegedly being hatched there and to do so under the pretext of preparations against a Bolshevik putsch. Kerensky later obliquely admitted that he had asked for military units—that is, the Third Cavalry Corps—to be placed under his command because he wanted to be “militarily independent of headquarters.”30 Withdrawing the Petrograd Military District from Kornilov’s command served the same end.
Savinkov arrived in Mogilev on August 22 and stayed there until August 24.31 He began his first meeting with Kornilov saying that it was essential for the general and the Prime Minister, for all their differences, to cooperate. Kornilov agreed: while he considered Kerensky weak and unfit for his responsibilities, he was needed. He added that Kerensky would be well advised to broaden the political base of the government by bringing in General Alekseev and patriotic socialists like Plekhanov and A. A. Argunov. Turning to Kornilov’s reform proposals, and assuring him that the government was prepared to act on them, Savinkov produced a draft of the latest reform project. Kornilov found it not entirely satisfactory because it retained the army committees and commissars. Would these reforms be acted on soon? Savinkov responded that the government did not want as yet to make them public for fear of provoking a violent reaction from the Soviet. He now informed Kornilov that the government had information that the Bolsheviks were planning fresh disturbances in Petrograd at the end of August or the beginning of September: the premature release of the military reform program could spark an immediate uprising of the Bolsheviks, in which the Soviet, which also opposed military reforms, could make common cause with them.
Savinkov next turned to the subject of measures to deal with the anticipated Bolshevik coup. The Prime Minister wished to withdraw Petrograd and its suburbs from the Petrograd Military District and place it under his direct command. Kornilov was displeased by this request, but yielded. Since one could not predict the reaction of the Soviet to the proposed military reforms and in view of the anticipated Bolshevik putsch, Savinkov went on, it was desirable to reinforce the Petrograd garrison with reliable combat troops. He requested Kornilov in two days to move the Third Cavalry Corps from Velikie Luki to the vicinity of Petrograd, where it would come under the government’s command; as soon as this was done, he was to notify Petrograd by telegraph. If necessary, he said, the government was prepared to carry out “merciless” action against the Bolsheviks and, should it side with them, the Petrograd Soviet as well. To this request Kornilov readily assented.
Kornilov also agreed to ask the Union of Officers at headquarters to move to Moscow, but he refused to do away with the Political Department. He further promised to liquidate any anti-government plots at headquarters that might come to his attention.32
In the morning of August 24, as he was about to depart for Petrograd, Savinkov made two additional requests. Although Kerensky would later make much of Kornilov’s failure to carry them out, it is known from Savinkov’s recollections that they were made on his own initiative.33 One was that General Krymov be replaced as commander of the Third Corps before its dispatch to Petrograd: Krymov’s “reputation,” in Savinkov’s opinion, could create “undesirable complications.” The other was that the Native Division be detached from the Third Corps on the grounds that it would be embarrassing to have Caucasian natives “liberate” the capital of Russia.
Did Kornilov see through Kerensky’s deception? From his words and deeds one would have to conclude that he took the Prime Minister’s instructions at face value, unaware that the true object of Kerensky’s apprehension was not the Bolsheviks but he himself. As they were saying goodbye, Kornilov assured Savinkov that he intended to support Kerensky because the country needed him.34 For all his faults, Kerensky was a true patriot, and to Kornilov patriotic socialists were a valuable asset.