Following Savinkov’s departure, Kornilov issued orders to General Krymov, whom he retained in his post:
1. In the event you receive from me or directly on the spot information that the Bolshevik uprising has begun, you are to move without delay with the corps to Petrograd, occupy the city, disarm the units of the Petrograd garrison which have joined the Bolshevik movement, disarm the population of Petrograd, and disperse the Soviet.
2. Having carried out this mission, General Krymov is to detach one brigade with artillery to Oranienbaum; following the arrival there, he is to demand of the Kronshtadt garrison to disarm the fortress and relocate to the mainland.35
The two assignments implemented Kerensky’s instructions. The first—to dispatch the Cavalry Corps to Petrograd—followed the request delivered orally by Savinkov. The second—to disarm Kronshtadt—was in line with Kerensky’s orders issued on August 8 but never carried out.36 Both missions were to protect the Provisional Government from the Bolsheviks. Kornilov may be said to have shown insubordination in retaining Krymov as commander of the Third Cavalry Corps: in justification, he explained to Lukomskii that the government feared Krymov would be too harsh in dealing with the rebels, but it would be grateful to him when it was all over.37 Lukomskii wondered whether the instructions brought by Savinkov were not some kind of trap: Kornilov dismissed these doubts, saying that Lukomskii was “too suspicious.”38
At this time, Kornilov was approached by officers who said they had in Petrograd 2,000 men willing to help suppress the Bolsheviks. They requested from Kornilov 100 officers to lead them: Kornilov promised to provide these men. He said that all should be in readiness by August 26, the earliest of the dates for the anticipated Bolshevik coup, so that when the Bolsheviks rose, at the approach of Krymov’s cavalry the volunteers could seize Smolnyi, the seat of the Soviet.39
60. Vladimir Lvov.
Savinkov reported to Kerensky on August 25 that all his instructions would be carried out.
At this point, an incident occurred which transformed the discord between the Prime Minister and the Commander in Chief into an open rift. The catalyst was a self-appointed “savior” of the country, a kind of stormy petrel, named Vladimir Nikolaevich Lvov. Forty-five years old, from a wealthy landowning family, a man of burning ambitions but no commensurate talents, Lvov had led a restless life. Having studied philosophy at St. Petersburg University, he enrolled at the Moscow Theological Seminary, then pursued desultory studies and for a while contemplated becoming a monk. He eventually chose politics. He joined the Octobrists, and served in the Third and Fourth Dumas. During the war, he belonged to the Progressive Bloc. Owing to wide social connections, he got himself appointed Procurator of the Holy Synod in the First Provisional Government, a post he held until July 1917, when he was dismissed. He took the dismissal badly and harbored a grudge against Kerensky. He is said to have had considerable personal charm, but was regarded as naïve and “incredibly frivolous”; George Katkov questions his sanity.40
In August, Lvov joined a group of conservative intellectuals in Moscow who wanted to save Russia from looming collapse. The country had had no real cabinet since early July, when Kerensky assumed dictatorial powers. Like Kornilov, Lvov and his friends felt that the Provisional Government needed to be strengthened with representatives of business and the armed forces. It was suggested to him that he convey these views to Kerensky. The initiator of the move seems to have been A. F. Aladin, one of those mysterious figures in the Russian Revolution (such as N. V. Nekrasov and V. S. Zavoiko) who exerted great influence without ever emerging from the shadows. A Social-Democratic revolutionary in his youth, Aladin led the Trudovik faction in the First Duma. After its dissolution, he moved to England, where he remained until February 1917. He was close to Kornilov. Affiliated with the group was I. A. Dobrynskii, a Red Cross official, and Lvov’s elder brother, Nicholas, a prominent Duma deputy and leading figure in the Progressive Bloc.
According to Lvov’s recollections (which, however, have been characterized as entirely unreliable), during the week of August 17–22, following the State Conference, he heard rumors of conspiracies at headquarters to proclaim Kornilov dictator and him Minister of the Interior.* He claimed he felt it a duty to inform Kerensky. The two met on the morning of August 22. Kerensky says that he had many visits from would-be saviors of the country and paid little heed to them, but Lvov’s “message” carried a threat which gained his attention.† According to Kerensky, Lvov told him that the base of public support for the government had eroded to the point where it had become necessary to bolster it by inviting into it public figures who enjoyed good relations with the military. He claimed to speak on behalf of these figures, but who they were, he refused to say. Kerensky subsequently denied having given Lvov authority to negotiate in his name with anyone, saying that before he could “express an opinion” on Lvov’s remarks he had to know the names of his associates. He specifically denied discussing the possibility of Lvov’s going to Mogilev to consult Kornilov.41 According to Kerensky, after Lvov left his office he gave the conversation no more thought. There is no reason to doubt Kerensky, but it is not improbable that, consciously or not, he gave Lvov the impression that he wished to know more, using him, if not as a proxy, then as an intelligence agent to learn whether there was any substance to persistent rumors of anti-government plots in Mogilev.‡
Lvov returned at once to Moscow to report to his friends on the talk with the Prime Minister: the interview had been successful, he told them, and Kerensky was prepared to discuss a reorganization of the cabinet. On the basis of Lvov’s account, Aladin drafted a memorandum:
1. Kerensky is willing to negotiate with headquarters;
2. the negotiations should be conducted through Lvov;
3. Kerensky agrees to form a cabinet enjoying the confidence of the country and the entire military;
4. in view of these facts, specific demands must be formulated;
5. a specific program has to be worked out;
6. the negotiations must be conducted in secrecy.*
This document suggests that in reporting the conversation with Kerensky, Lvov exaggerated the Prime Minister’s interest in his proposal.
Accompanied by Dobrynskii, Lvov went to Mogilev. He arrived on August 24, just as Savinkov was departing. Since Kornilov was too busy carrying out Kerensky’s instructions to receive him, he checked in at a hotel, where he claimed to have heard rumors of Kornilov’s plot to kill Kerensky. Horrified, he decided to protect the Prime Minister by pretending to act on his behalf and negotiate a reconstitution of the cabinet. “Although Kerensky had not given me specific authority to conduct negotiations with Kornilov,” he recounted, “I felt that I could negotiate in his name inasmuch as, in general, he was agreeable to the reorganization of the government.”42 He saw Kornilov late that night and again the following morning (August 25). According to Kornilov’s deposition and the recollections of Lukomskii, who was present, Lvov identified himself as a representative of the Prime Minister on an “important mission.”43 With reckless lack of caution, Kornilov neither requested to see Lvov’s credentials nor asked Petrograd to confirm his authority to speak for the Prime Minister, but immediately entered with him into the most sensitive and potentially incriminating political discussions. His mission, Lvov said, was to learn Kornilov’s views on how to assure firm government in Russia. In his own opinion, this could be accomplished in one of three ways: (1) if Kerensky assumed dictatorial powers; (2) if a Directory was formed with Kornilov as a member; (3) if Kornilov became dictator, with Kerensky and Savinkov holding ministerial portfolios.44 Kornilov took this information at face value because he had been officially told some time earlier that the government was contemplating a Directory modeled on the English Small War Cabinet to improve the management of the war effort.45