On the basis of such flimsy evidence, Kerensky decided on an open break with Kornilov. When Lvov belatedly turned up, he had him placed under arrest.† Ignoring Savinkov’s pleas that before doing anything precipitous he communicate once again with Kornilov to clear up what in Savinkov’s mind was an obvious misunderstanding, Kerensky called a cabinet meeting for midnight. He told the ministers what had transpired and requested “full authority”—that is, dictatorial powers—to enable him to deal with the military coup d’état. The ministers agreed that one had to stand up to the “general-conspirator” and that Kerensky should enjoy full powers to deal with the emergency. Accordingly, they tendered their resignations, which Nekrasov interpreted to mean that the Provisional Government had, in effect, ceased to exist.54 Kerensky emerged from the meeting as nominal dictator. After the cabinet adjourned at 4 a.m. on August 27, no more regular cabinet meetings were held, decisions from now until October 26 being taken by Kerensky acting alone or in consultation with Nekrasov and Tereshchenko. In the early hours of the morning, either with or without the approval of the ministers—most likely on his personal authority—Kerensky sent Kornilov a telegram dismissing him and ordering him to report at once to Petrograd. Until his replacement had been named, General Lukomskii was to serve as Commander in Chief.* By breaking with Kornilov, Kerensky could pose as champion of the Revolution: according to Nekrasov, during the night meeting of the cabinet, Kerensky said, “I will not give them the Revolution”55—as if it were his to give or keep.
While these events were taking place, Kornilov, ignorant of Kerensky’s interpretation of their brief exchange, proceeded with preparations to help the government suppress the anticipated Bolshevik rising. At 2:40 a.m. he cabled Savinkov:
The corps is assembling in the environs of Petrograd toward evening August 28. Request that Petrograd be placed under martial law August 29.56
If any more proof is needed that Kornilov did not engage in a military putsch, this cable should furnish it: for surely if he were ordering the Third Corps to Petrograd to unseat the government, he would hardly have forewarned the government by telegraph. It is even less credible that he would have entrusted his alleged coup to a subordinate. Zinaida Gippius, pondering the mystery of the Kornilov Affair a few days after its occurrence, asked herself the obvious question: “How was it that Kornilov sent his troops while he himself sat quietly at headquarters?”57 Indeed, had Kornilov really planned to topple the government and take over as dictator, a man of his temperament and military presence would certainly have commanded the operation in person.
The receipt at 7:00 a.m. on August 27, at headquarters of Kerensky’s cable dismissing Kornilov threw the generals into complete confusion. Their initial reaction was that the cable had to be a forgery, not only because its contents made no sense in view of the Kerensky-Kornilov talk ten hours earlier but also because it was improperly formatted, lacking ihe customary serial number and bearing only the signature “Kerensky,” without the title. It also had no legal force, since by law only the cabinet had the authority to dismiss the Commander in Chief. (Headquarters, of course, did not know that the previous night the cabinet had resigned and Kerensky assumed dictatorial powers.) On further thought the generals concluded that the message perhaps was genuine, but that Kerensky had sent it under duress, possibly while a prisoner of the Bolsheviks. From such considerations, Kornilov refused to resign and Lukomskii to assume his duties “until the circumstances had been fully clarified.”58 Convinced that the Bolsheviks were already in control of Petrograd, Kornilov, ignoring Kerensky’s instructions to the contrary, ordered Krymov to speed up the advance of his troops.59
To clarify any confusion that may have arisen in Petrograd in connection with Kornilov’s answer to Lvov’s questions, whom no one in Mogilev as yet suspected of being an impostor, Lukomskii sent the government a telegram in his own name, reaffirming the need for strong authority to prevent the collapse of the armed forces.60
That afternoon Savinkov, as yet ignorant of Lvov’s machinations but suspecting some monumental mistake, contacted Kornilov. Vasilii Maklakov stood by and toward the end joined in the conversation.61 Referring to Lukomskii’s latest telegram, Savinkov protested that on his visit to Mogilev he had never raised political matters. In response, Kornilov for the first time mentioned Vladimir Lvov and referred to the three options which Lvov had laid out before him. He went on to say that the Third Cavalry Corps was being moved toward Petrograd on instructions of the government, as conveyed by Savinkov. He was acting entirely loyally, carrying out the government’s orders. “Deeply convinced that the [dismissal] decision, entirely unexpected to me, had been taken under pressure of the Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies … I firmly declare … that I will not leave my post.” Kornilov added that he would be happy to meet with the Prime Minister and Savinkov at his headquarters, confident that “the misunderstanding could be cleared up through personal explanations.”
At this point, the breach was still mendable. Had Kerensky displayed the same circumspection in dealing with charges against Kornilov and held out for “documentary evidence” that would prove his “treason in final form,” as he had done the month before in the case of Lenin, all that happened would have been avoided. But while Kerensky feared to repress Lenin, he had no interest in conciliation with the general. When Miliukov, upon being informed of the course of events, offered his services as mediator, Kerensky responded that there could be no conciliation with Kornilov.62 Kerensky rejected a similar offer from the Allied ambassadors.63 People who saw Kerensky at the time thought he was in a state of complete hysteria.64
All that was needed to prevent a complete break between the Provisional Government and the generals was for Kerensky or his proxy to ask Kornilov point-blank whether he had authorized Lvov to demand dictatorial powers. Savinkov urged him to do so, but Kerensky refused.65 Kerensky’s failure to take this obvious step can be explained only in one of two ways: that he was in a mental condition in which all judgment had deserted him or else that he chose deliberately to break with Kornilov in order to assume the mantle of the Revolution’s savior and in this manner neutralize the challenge from the left.
Having learned from Kornilov of Lvov’s actions, Savinkov rushed back to the Prime Minister’s office. He ran into Nekrasov, who told him that it was too late to seek a rapprochement with Kornilov because he had already sent to the evening papers the Prime Minister’s statement charging the Commander in Chief with treason.66 This was done despite Kerensky’s promise to Savinkov that he would delay release of this document until after he had had a chance to communicate with Kornilov.67 A few hours later, the press published in special editions a sensational communiqué bearing Kerensky’s signature, said to have been drafted by Nekrasov.68 Golovin believes that Nekrasov released it deliberately before Savinkov had had a chance to report on his conversation with Kornilov.* It read: