“My country is under nuclear attack,” the president said. “The situation has already gotten out of hand.”
“I am attempting to prevent an escalation,” Turgenev said softly.
“I understand that,” the president said. “And the United States has no intention of escalating this conflict, if that can be prevented. We’re preparing to intercept the warheads now. If we’re successful, and there are no further attacks, your government and mine can consider how to proceed. But if nuclear warheads fall on American soil, the United States will retaliate in kind.”
“I see,” the Russian president said. “May I at least ask that you confine your counterstrikes to targets in Kamchatka?”
“Of course,” President Chandler said. “Our retaliation will be directed against the rogue element who launched this attack, not against your country. Will that be satisfactory?”
“I don’t know, sir,” the Russian president said. “I will convey your message to my government. Let us hope for the best.”
“Yes,” said the president. “Let’s do that.”
He replaced the telephone receiver gently in its cradle, and looked up at Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. “Give me a status update, General. Where are we with this?”
General Gilmore checked the latest printouts in his striped folder. “Mr. President, our ground-based Midcourse Defenses at Fort Greely and Vandenberg are preparing to launch EKVs,” he said. “We’re going to try to intercept the incoming missile over the Pacific.”
From earlier briefings, the president knew that an EKV was an Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle: a ground-launched missile designed to intercept a ballistic warhead in flight, and destroy it before it could reenter the atmosphere.
“Understood,” he said. “What are our chances of successfully intercepting the warheads in space?”
General Gilmore adjusted his black-rimmed glasses. “Frankly, Mr. President, the odds are not great. Our Ballistic Missile Defense System is still only partially operational. Some of the significant technologies are either still under development, or not fully tested. The system has demonstrated fairly good results against single-warhead test missiles that closely simulate the type likely to be employed by Iran or North Korea. But multiple warheads … MIRVs are a different matter. They’re significantly more difficult to intercept.”
“Because it’s harder to hit three targets than it is to hit one?”
“Not three targets, sir,” the general said. “Seven.”
The national security advisor frowned. “Seven? I thought this missile only carried three warheads.”
“That’s correct,” said General Gilmore. “But the R-29 was designed to deliver up to seven warheads. When the START agreement was ratified, the Russians reduced the payload to three warheads, to comply with the terms of the treaty. They replaced the other four with decoys that mimic the size, shape, weight, and movement of the real thing. They even copied the thermal signature and tumble pattern. We can tell the decoys from the real ones in a laboratory, but there’s no way to spot the difference while they’re falling out of the sky at mach twenty-five. Only three of the reentry vehicles from that missile are going to be real nukes, but we have no way of knowing which three.”
“So we have to go after all seven,” Brenthoven said.
“Unfortunately,” the general said. “We can either shoot them all down before they reach their targets, or wait until they hit the ends of their trajectories and see which ones don’t detonate.”
President Chandler shook his head. “And we waste just as much energy taking out the decoys as we do killing the real warheads?”
The general nodded. “Yes, sir. That’s pretty much the whole idea behind MIRV technology … to complicate the hell out of the problem of intercepting ballistic missiles.”
The president smiled weakly. “Sounds like the Russians have done a pretty good job of that.”
“That’s not the half of it, sir. The R-29R was engineered by the Soviet Union at the height of their Cold War paranoia. It may be a few years old, but it’s a tricky son-of-a-bitch.”
The general’s eyes narrowed a fraction. “The warhead section, or what the engineers call the bus, has a four-chamber liquid fuel rocket engine. Every time it launches a warhead or a decoy, it maneuvers before it launches the next one. Moving at multi-mach speed, even a relatively small amount of vertical or horizontal displacement can create a significant amount of lateral vector, sending each warhead or decoy on a different trajectory — toward a different target. And to just to make things really confusing, the R-29R spits out plenty of anti-radar chaff to confuse our sensors and interceptor missiles.”
“You make it sound impossible,” the president said.
“It’s not impossible, sir,” the general said. “But the odds are not in our favor. Since we can only bring a relatively small number of EKVs to bear, there’s a strong possibility that one of the warheads will slip past our interceptors. If we’re really unlucky, they might all get through.”
The president swallowed. “Understood. What’s our fallback plan if any of the warheads evade our EKVs?”
“Then it’s the Navy’s turn at bat, sir,” General Gilmore said. “The Aegis cruiser, USS Shiloh, is operating off the California coast. The ship has the Ballistic Missile Defense upgrades to its SM-3 missile systems. If the EKVs fail, the ship will attempt to intercept the warheads in the late stages of the midcourse phase, shortly before the warheads reenter the atmosphere.”
“And how do our chances look with that?” the president asked.
The general shook his head. “It’s a coin toss, sir. The Navy’s systems have had even less testing than the land-based systems. The CNO seems to think pretty well of them, but it’s difficult to know if that’s a dispassionate evaluation, or just pride of ownership.”
The president drummed his fingers on the mahogany tabletop. “And if the Navy’s missiles can’t get all the warheads, what then?”
“That depends on where the individual warheads are targeted, sir,” the general said. “When the reentry vehicles go into the terminal phase of their trajectories, one or more of them might pass within range of a Patriot III battery. If so, the Army will get a crack at shooting them down. The good news is that the Patriot III missile system is the most thoroughly developed and tested component of our Ballistic Missile Defense System. It’s had a good operational track record against short-to-medium range tactical missiles in the Middle East. The bad news is that we haven’t got nearly enough coverage. There aren’t enough Patriot batteries deployed in the western states to cover half the cities or military bases. If some of the incoming nukes are targeted on unprotected areas, they’re going to get a free ride to the target.”
The general’s voice didn’t change, and his tone carried no trace of derision. But he undoubtedly knew that his Commander in Chief had cut spending for additional Patriot batteries from the last two annual defense budgets.
At the time, the decision had seemed both right and obvious. It had looked like an easy opportunity to fulfill the public trust and reduce some of the strain on the wallet of the American taxpayer. After all, nobody was crazy enough to launch a nuclear missile at the United States.
President Chandler glanced up at the slender red line on the geographic display. It flashed and grew longer.