The admiral pressed another button, and the remote in his hand projected a laser pointer, which he directed toward the screen.
“The submarine rounded the southern tip of the Kamchatka peninsula, and transited through the Kuril island chain into the Sea of Okhotsk, the large body of water shown on this map. The Sea of Okhotsk is to the immediate south of Siberia, and it shares the extreme cold of the Siberian winter.”
The CNO clicked the remote again, and the map on the screen was replaced by an aerial photograph of a rugged icescape. “At this time of year, the northern eighty percent of the Sea of Okhotsk is completely iced over, and the ice pack is heavy. It’s possible that Governor Zhukov timed his coup with this in mind. The Sea of Okhotsk is to the immediate west of the Kamchatkan peninsula, allowing Zhukov to hide his missile submarine under the Siberian ice pack, and still effectively keep it in his backyard.”
The admiral looked at the faces around the table. “The Delta III class submarine carries sixteen nuclear missiles, each of which is armed with three 200 kiloton warheads. That’s about three times the firepower needed to destroy every city in the western United States. So the deployment of submarine K-506 constitutes an imminent threat to our national security, as the events of the last few hours have proven.”
The CNO returned to his chair and nodded toward the national security advisor. “Before I continue, I’d like to ask Mr. Brenthoven to give us a short synopsis of the diplomatic situation.”
Brenthoven stood up. “Thank you, Admiral.” He straightened his tie. “I met with Ambassador Kolesnik shortly after the missile submarine put out to sea. On the instructions of President Chandler, I proposed that the United States and the Russian Federation share diplomatic and military resources in dealing with the problem. But our overtures toward a joint solution were rejected.”
Brenthoven glanced down at his notes. “The government of the Russian Federation insisted that the coup in Kamchatka and the deployment of the K-506 were internal Russian matters. Speaking through his ambassador, President Turgenev declined all offers of diplomatic assistance, and he specifically refused to allow American military participation.”
“I pointed out that the striking range and firepower of the R-29R missiles put the entire western United States in danger of nuclear attack. Ambassador Kolesnik assured me that there was no danger to the U.S. He reminded me that Delta III class submarines, which they refer to as the Kal’mar class, do not have ice penetration capability. They weren’t built with the proper hull configuration, or the right kind of structural reinforcements needed to punch through ice. He assured me that if that submarine tried to break through the ice, its hull would be sliced open and it would sink like the Titanic. He promised me that the Russian Navy would keep the K-506 trapped under the ice pack, where it could not fire its missiles, and they would destroy the sub long before it posed a threat.”
Brenthoven nodded toward the admiral and sat down. “As we all know, that’s not exactly how things worked out.”
Admiral Casey stood up again and pressed a button on his remote. The photo of the ice pack was replaced by the map. A red circle appeared, near the northeast corner of the Sea of Okhotsk. A label next to it displayed the latitude and longitude: 58.29N / 155.20E.
“Three and a half hours ago,” the admiral said, “the submarine in question launched an R-29R series nuclear missile from this approximate position. The launch was detected by a U.S. Air Force Eagle Eye surveillance satellite. The launch and missile trajectory were confirmed by PAVE PAWS radar installations at Beale Air Force Base, California, and Clear Air Force Station, Alaska.”
“The R-29R missile is a MIRV, which is to say that it carries multiple warheads that can be directed at geographically-separated targets. The missile variant we’re up against carries three nuclear warheads, and four decoy warheads that simulate the radar, infrared, and flight characteristics of the real warheads in every respect. It’s impossible to tell the real warheads from the decoys until they hit their targets, so we had to attempt intercepts on all seven warheads.”
He clicked the remote, and a map of the Pacific ocean appeared, with Siberia and Kamchatka near the left edge, and the western United States near the right edge. A curved red line stretched from the left side of the map to the right, climbing from its start point west of Kamchatka to an apex near the top of the map, and then curving back down to a point in the ocean, just west of the California coast line. At irregular intervals along the curve, thinner red lines arched out, each at a different angle, but all pointed in the general direction of the American coast. Clusters of blue lines sprouted from locations in Alaska and California. At various places on the map, each blue line intersected with a red line. In some cases, the red and blue lines terminated at the point of intersection. In other places, the colored arcs simply crossed, each continuing on its way, past the spot where intersection should have occurred.
“Seven ground-based interceptor missiles were launched from the western U.S.,” the admiral said. “Three from Vandenberg Air Force, and four from the Army missile complex at Fort Greely. Between them, the ground-based interceptors knocked out three of the inbound warheads.”
Four gray lines appeared on the screen, sprouting from what appeared to be the open water of the eastern Pacific. Three of these new lines converged with red lines and terminated them. The fourth gray line ended abruptly, well short of intersection with the remaining red line. The last red arc continued uninterrupted to a spot in the ocean near the California coast.
“The cruiser, USS Shiloh, launched two pairs of sea-based interceptor missiles against the remaining warheads, destroying three out of four. The fourth warhead, as you know, impacted in the ocean and detonated about a hundred miles west of San Diego. Based on satellite imagery and seismic readings, we estimate the yield at approximately 200 kilotons. Just about exactly what we would expect to see out of an R-29R warhead.”
He keyed the remote again. On the screen, six dashed red lines appeared, each attached to one of the interrupted arcs that represented an intercepted missile. All six of the dashed lines curved down to points in the ocean, at varying distances from the California coast.
“This is a projection of the unfinished trajectories of the six warheads that were intercepted. Based on their position and movement vectors at the moment of intercept, these are the calculated impact points for each warhead if we had not managed to knock them down. You’ll note that all seven warheads, including the six we intercepted and the one we missed, would have fallen in the ocean. In other words, we don't think that any of the warheads were aimed at targets on U.S. soil.”
He paused a second, to let the impact of that statement to sink in. “The analysts at the Office of Naval Intelligence offered three possible interpretations of this information. I present them in no particular order. First, the missile might have suffered a mechanical failure that threw the warheads far enough off course to miss their respective targets. Second, the crew of K-506 may lack the expertise to successfully program the P-29R missile guidance package. And third, it’s possible that Governor Zhukov, despite his heavy-handed threats, lacks the will to attack American targets with nuclear weapons. Each of these three theories had supporters at ONI and in the Pentagon. Many of the people looking at this problem felt that one of the three was likely to be the answer. That is, until we discovered this …”