Submarines receive satellite position fixes only when surfaced or at periscope depth. While fully submerged, its position is determined by two inertial navigators, which calculate the submarine’s position by analyzing the acceleration and velocity vectors as the submarine moves through the water.
The submarine’s current position, as calculated by the inertial navigators, could be incorrect by several meters or even more, resulting in a corresponding error in the warhead aim points. A Trident missile takes a star fix during flight, but the new navigation upgrade developed by Curtain Labs took advantage of GPS satellites, updating the missile just after it emerged from the water, further improving missile accuracy. This improved accuracy was crucial, Dunnavant explained. It had to do with hardened targets.
When attacking underground bunkers designed to withstand a nuclear blast, warhead accuracy could make the difference between target destruction and survival. As a result of the Curtain Labs navigation upgrade, combined with the new super-fuze technology controlling the timing of warhead detonation, Trident missiles were now capable of destroying all known hardened targets.
Dunnavant then provided a summary of what everyone already knew: the Russians had compromised America’s nuclear deterrence, able to crash B-2 bombers and alter American nuclear missile flight paths. Finally, he arrived at the salient topic of today’s brief — the proposed solutions.
“Clark Curtain Labs, which developed the navigation upgrade for all three legs of our nuclear triad, will produce new navigation upgrades for our B-2 bombers. That should take only a few weeks, but twenty bombers are insufficient to guarantee mutual assured destruction, the cornerstone of nuclear deterrence. We need to restore our land- and sea-based missile systems to service. Waiting to replace the navigation circuits in every missile will take too long.”
Dunnavant turned to the two Curtain Labs employees. “Diane Traweek and Steve Kaufmann from Curtain Labs have a proposal that, if it works, will immediately restore full nuclear deterrence. Go ahead, Miss Traweek.”
“Mr. President, thank you for the opportunity to brief you. As Secretary of Defense Dunnavant said, the solution to the B-2 problem is straightforward and relatively quick. Curtain Labs will manufacture new circuit cards, verifying all microprocessors conform to the certified engineering samples. Addressing the missile inventory is more complicated, as I understand you want a timelier fix than the two to three years it would take to replace the navigation circuits in every missile. Steve Kaufmann, our lead software engineer on this project, has a unique proposal worthy of consideration.”
All eyes turned to Kaufmann, who swallowed hard. He opened his folder and passed out copies of his brief, then began.
“Mr. President, thank you for inviting me to brief you on my idea. If you take a look at the first page of the brief, you’ll see a schematic of the navigation circuit. The microprocessor with the circle around it is the culprit. The chip’s programming leaves the circuit port open after the precision navigation update, which occurs right after the missile clears the water. The Russians then take advantage of this open port, transmitting an updated starting point for the missile, altering its flight path. When trying to address what the Russians have done, the main problem is that this chip self-destructs after it receives the order to send an updated position, which means we can’t countermand it. This problem, however, is also the solution.”
There were confused expressions around the table before Kaufmann explained. “Basically, if we pretend to be the Russians and order the chip to send a navigation update before launch, it will then self-destruct, making it unavailable to the Russians. The missile will then ignore any attempted interference. However, there are a couple of issues to consider.”
Kaufmann turned to the next page of the brief, containing another schematic. “We’ll have to connect a device to each missile prior to launch and activate this chip. The software is simple as is the device. We just need to connect to the missile umbilical and send a signal to the navigation card. The chip will send a position update, which the missile will ignore since it hasn’t spun up yet, and then the chip will self-destruct. At that point, the missile can no longer be meddled with.
“The drawback is that the precision navigation update after launch will be disabled, but that’s not really a big deal as far as I know. You’d be returning the missiles to the accuracy they previously had.”
Dunnavant amplified Kaufmann’s assessment. “Eliminating the precision navigation update will only slightly reduce warhead accuracy. The impact is that our entire nuclear arsenal won’t be hard-target capable. But as Kaufmann mentioned, we’ll be back where we started, with twenty percent of our nuclear arsenal having hardened-target capability. All we’d have to do is revert to the previous war plan — or develop a new one, allocating the proper missiles to hardened targets.”
When he finished, Dunnavant asked, “Does anyone have any questions?”
Vice Admiral Rhodes looked up from Kaufmann’s brief. “You’re telling me that you want us to authorize a process where Billy-Bob the missile-man hooks up a homemade contraption built in a lunchbox to every one of our nuclear missiles prior to launch. Are you nuts?”
Kaufmann glanced at Lyman with an I told you so expression.
Lyman jumped in. “Actually, Admiral, the device we’d be using is less complicated than a cell phone.”
“Well then,” the Admiral replied sarcastically. “Why didn’t you say so at the beginning? Can you do it with an iPhone? There’s an app for that, right?”
Diane Traweek, Clark Curtain Labs CEO, replied, “Admiral, we can put our proposal through whatever testing regimen you desire.”
Dunnavant interjected, addressing Admiral Rhodes. “We can’t spend the decade the military typically takes to develop and field new technology. I propose we have SSP give the design the once-over. If you can convince yourselves it will perform the required function without unintended consequences, we’ll load a new missile with dummy warheads and give it a go.”
“We have one other problem,” Admiral Rhodes replied, “a significant one. The only way we’ll know this solution works is to have the Russians try to alter the missile flight path. That means you’ll have to inform them of the test launch and challenge them to affect it. You’ll be revealing that we’re working on a solution, and if it fails, we’ll have an enormous egg on our face.”
Dunnavant replied, “I don’t think it will be a surprise to the Russians that we’re working on a solution. But I agree that we have a conundrum. We don’t want to test the solution in front of the Russians until we’re certain it will work, but the only way to be certain it works is to test the solution in front of the Russians.”
The president asked Kaufmann, “Are you sure this will work? And that the signal you’ll be sending into the missile won’t have unintended consequences?”
Kaufmann was sure it would work, but the tricky part was knowing for certain that the electrical signal wouldn’t interact with other circuity in unexpected ways. Nuclear missile electronics were complicated and the ramifications if something went wrong could be catastrophic. However, he knew the navigation upgrade better than anyone, including its interfaces, and had thought through the issue extensively.
“I’m positive, Mr. President. This solution will address the problem safely.”