“This is pretty interesting,” Director Cherry replied. “President Kalinin has provided a detailed data dump on the SVR and FSB Spetsnaz units: numbers, training, armament. It pretty much validates our intel and fills in a few holes, especially concerning Zaslon, the SVR’s highly trained Spetsnaz unit.”
“It’s what we needed to know,” Dunnavant said. “We need to understand the forces available on both sides, so we can plan accordingly.”
“What are we looking at?” the president asked.
Dunnavant replied, “There are no regular military units in Moscow. General Andropov has sent all combat-ready units to the front line. The distribution of the various Spetsnaz units, as well as their loyalty, is a bit murkier, but Director Cherry has insight.” He looked to Cherry.
Cherry answered, “Russia’s Main Intelligence Directorate, the GRU, has assigned two Spetsnaz brigades to Moscow. As the foreign intelligence agency of Russia’s armed forces, the GRU is staffed with numerous military personnel and is commanded by an Air Force general. President Kalinin would know better, but I agree with his assessment: the GRU Spetsnaz units will follow General Andropov’s orders. That means you’re going to have to deal with two Spetsnaz brigades once the assault on the Ministry of Defense building is discovered.”
Dunnavant said, “That pretty much forces our hand. The SVR has only one Spetsnaz unit, Zaslon. It’s five hundred strong per President Kalinin, with only one hundred presently in Moscow. That’s not enough to cordon off the area surrounding the Ministry of Defense building and prevent GRU reinforcements from breaking through. Kalinin prefers we keep the mission held close for obvious reasons, limiting participation to the SVR. But we need the three FSB Spetsnaz units.”
The president asked Cherry, “What’s your assessment of the FSB risk?”
Cherry replied, “The SVR and FSB were main directorates within the KGB before it was dismantled after its participation in the 1991 Soviet coup. Both organizations report directly to President Kalinin, so both should be loyal to him. The difference is that Kalinin is a former SVR director and is good friends with Josef Hippchenko, the current SVR director, while the FSB director is a holdover from Putin’s days. Kalinin isn’t sure if he can be trusted. There’s no indication he’s in on the coup, nor anything to confirm he isn’t. That’s a problem for us, because the only way the mission will succeed is if the FSB Spetsnaz units assist, and we have the element of surprise on our side.”
The president asked, “How do we determine whether the FSB can be trusted?”
“Ask Hippchenko,” Cherry replied. “He’s been in Moscow since the coup occurred and undoubtedly has his finger on the pulse of all critical issues. Even though the SVR’s charter is foreign intelligence, they do a lot of domestic surveillance as well. He should be able to provide a decent evaluation.”
The president nodded his understanding, then looked to the screen on the far wall. “Admiral Walker, what’s your assessment of mission success?”
“It’s risky, sir. We don’t have enough intelligence to adequately plan the assault. We don’t have schematics of the Ministry of Defense building after its renovation and we have no idea of internal security aside from what Kalinin provided, which is sketchy at best. We’d be going in blind for the most part.”
“I understand we’re going in with limited intelligence. But is it probable the mission will succeed?”
“It’s possible, sir, but I recommend we proceed only if we obtain adequate intelligence. Going in without building schematics and the ability to pass through security perimeters without setting off alarms is a potential disaster.”
The president’s chief of staff, Kevin Hardison, said, “I hate to play devil’s advocate, but if we return Kalinin to power, there’s no guarantee he’ll pull his troops back to Russia.”
“Do you have a better plan?” Dunnavant asked. “One that doesn’t involve a full-scale continental war?”
“I don’t,” Hardison said. “I’m just pointing out there’s a lot of risk involved to achieve an uncertain outcome.”
Director Cherry joined in. “If the SVR commits, it’s likely they’ll have the intelligence we need and methods to bypass some of the security systems.”
The president asked, “What if we go with a partial plan? What if we extract President Kalinin to someplace safe where he can make a public appeal to Russian citizens, explaining there’s been a military coup? He can then order all troops to return to Russia.”
“We looked at that,” Dunnavant answered, “but we don’t think it will work. The Russian officer corps heavily stresses loyalty up the military chain of command, but that loyalty doesn’t extend to the president like it does here. Although we think that approach would work if you made a similar appeal to the U.S. military, we doubt if Kalinin’s appeal, made from exile, would be effective.
“President Kalinin is right,” Dunnavant added. “He has to appear back in control, having defeated the coup, for the individual units to disregard the orders of their superior officers.”
After absorbing everyone’s remarks, the president said, “Here’s what we’re going to do. We’ll proceed with the SEAL mission on three conditions: if Hippchenko agrees to support, if he thinks we can trust the FSB, and if he’s got the intel we need. Any objections?”
There were none, and the president asked, “How do we contact Hippchenko without tipping off the GRU? We should probably avoid official channels.”
“I agree,” Cherry said. “We can call him on his personal cell phone.”
“Good idea,” the president said. “Let me know when you run his number down.”
“That’s easy,” Cherry said. “I’ve got his number in my contact list.” Cherry pointed to the door; they’d placed their cell phones in lockers outside the Situation Room, since they weren’t allowed in classified meetings.
Hardison asked, “You’ve got his number on your cell phone?”
Cherry shrugged. “We talk.”
“About what?” Hardison asked.
“About stuff,” Cherry replied with an edge to her voice, making it clear it was none of Hardison’s business.
The president glanced at the Moscow clock on the wall. It read 4:30 p.m. “Let’s give Hippchenko a call.”
80
YASENEVO, RUSSIA
It was late afternoon in the Moscow suburbs when Josef Hippchenko, seated at his desk in the Y-shaped headquarters of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service, scrolled through the afternoon update on his computer. Russia’s military and political landscape were in upheaval, and Hippchenko was proceeding cautiously as events unfolded, analyzing the issues extensively.
Although the SVR focused primarily on issues beyond Russia’s borders, one of its mandates included the authorization to Implement active measures to ensure Russia’s security. The authorization was broadly worded, deliberately using the term active measures, which was a Soviet term for political warfare. Although the SVR’s political warfare was supposed to be waged against other countries, the recent turn of events within Russia left Hippchenko pondering his options.
Hippchenko’s personal cell phone vibrated. He retrieved it from his jacket pocket and checked the number on the display.
Unknown.
He pressed the Accept button. “Director Hippchenko.”
“Good afternoon, Director Hippchenko. This is the president of the United States.” The man paused, waiting for a response.
“One moment, please,” Hippchenko replied.