By the time this was all realized by the higher ups in both governments, the 25th Brigade was nearing the Sunda Strait, and the Japanese were hastily preparing to launch a series of blows that were intended to deliver the real prize in this region, the resource rich island of Java.
In sharp contrast to the divided and sometimes chaotic dispositions of the Allies, the Japanese war machine continued to move with a single minded purpose, and ruthless efficiency. The forces they had arrayed to strike the barrier islands would form nearly three full divisions, a force the size of the army that had conquered Malaya. A full regiment of the 38th Division was already on Sumatra, forcing scattered British and Dutch units there to flee south to Oosthaven and get aboard any ship available in the harbor to make good their escape to Java. Among them was a small detachment of light tanks, the British 3rd Hussars, and it would soon employ the services of the Orcades to make the trip over to Batavia.
For the attack on Java, the entire 2nd Infantry Division would form the Western pincer aimed at Batavia, and it would be reinforced with a fourth regiment, the 230th ‘Shoji Detachment’ from 38th Division. This force was covered by the light carrier Ryujo returning from the Malacca Strait, light cruisers Natori, Yura, and Sendai, along with three destroyer divisions, (12 ships), and mine sweepers. Beyond this, the entire 7th Heavy Cruiser Squadron was present with Kumano, Mikuma, Mogami, and Suzuya.
The Eastern Task force would bring the entire 48th Division to attack central Java west of Surabaya, again augmented by a fourth regiment, the 229th Regiment of 38th Division. It would be covered by light cruisers Naga, Kinu, and Jintsu, another dozen destroyers, and the 5th Heavy Cruiser Division with Haguro, Nachi, Ashigara, and Myoko.
Yet that was not all. The Japanese were leaving nothing to chance here, and after its successful covering for Operation R at Rabaul, 5th Carrier Division sailed under Admiral Nagumo to support the attack on the barrier islands. This would bring the new fleet carriers Zuikaku and Shokaku into the Arafura Sea, escorted by battleships Kirishima, Kongo and Haruna. Another three heavy cruisers led the way, Atago, Maya and Takao, and the force was screened by light cruiser Abukuma with another ten destroyers.
All told, the Japanese were sending three carriers, three battleships, eleven heavy cruisers, seven light cruisers, 34 destroyers, four minesweepers and a number of auxiliaries. It was an overwhelming naval presence, and the reason why the Japanese advance had been unchecked up until that moment. It would also be backed up by no fewer than 420 aircraft based on land and sea. When it came to planning and execution, there was no quibbling, no equivocation, no misread orders at cross purposes, and nothing more than a skillful concentration of force and will that had produced one victory after another.
Against this irresistible force, the British would throw the best they had available, Admiral James Somerville with three of their new fleet aircraft carriers, cruisers Exeter, Cornwall, Emerald and Enterprise, with destroyers Jupiter, Electra and Encounter. The battleship Royal Sovereign had been joined by Ramillies, but those two ships would remain on duty as convoy escorts.
Soon the tide would break upon the distant shoreline of the barrier islands, and the last line of defense shielding Australia from possible attack. There, on the largest island rampart of Java, Bernard Montgomery, pleased to take the moniker of ‘Rock of the East’ upon himself, would hastily organize his defense. He had stopped Rommel at Tobruk, just barely, and then stopped Yamashita on Singapore. Now it was his to hold or lose this last bastion of Allied strength in the Pacific.
The Japanese plan was straightforward and strategically sound. Even as Prime Minister Curtin had argued his homeland was the only suitable base of supply that could host, sustain and build up a credible war fighting machine against Japan, the Japanese also saw Australia as the one place the Allies could use to mount a counteroffensive. Port Darwin was the closest location where sufficient port and airfield capacity permitted this, and the daring bombing raid that struck there was the prelude to operations now underway.
The decision had been made to sever the lines of communication between Port Darwin and Java, which would mean the Allies would then have to rely on the much more distant port of Perth for logistical support of the island. It was 1,750 miles from Perth to Java, but the route to Darwin was 400 miles shorter, and it was also much closer to resources in eastern Australia. The Japanese had two objectives in mind, both considered valuable for one reason only—their airfields.
The first was Bali, hugging Java’s easternmost coast, and with a good airfield at Denpasar. The second was the large island of Timor, with good operational fields at both Dili and Kupang. Once taken, these islands would effectively cut off all forces in the archipelago between them, allowing the Japanese to occupy them at their leisure. These operations were principally intended to secure the left flank of the planned invasion of Java, and they would begin with a scrappy, if chaotic naval duel off Bali on the pitch black of a rainy tropical night.
Chapter 11
The airfield at Kendari on the southeast coast of the Celebes was the largest and most modern base in the region, placing Japanese aircraft in good positions to operate over Java. It had but one liability, that being frequent and persistent fog and rain. To assure uninterrupted air support for “Operation J,” the Japanese therefore decided to invade and occupy Bali for its small but useful airfield at Denpasar. They would do so about a week later than these events transpired in the old history, but the outcome would be remarkably true to those events.
For this mission, a single battalion of the 48th division, the 3rd Battalion of 1st Formosa Regiment, was designated the Kanemura Detachment. It was hoped that this small force could slip in quietly undetected, but it was soon spotted and word was flashed to the local naval commander on the scene.
Rear Admiral Karel Doorman was determined to put his patchwork fleet to good use that day. Familiar with the Dutch East Indies from his youth when he served aboard survey vessels mapping the waters there, he eventually returned after the Great War and an abortive stint as a pilot. So it was off to the navy, where he was posted at Batavia, eventually working his way up to command the cruiser squadron composed of Sumatra and Java. Today he was aboard De Ruyter, a light cruiser of about 6,600 tons, with seven 5.9-inch guns and ten 40mm Bofors.
The first sign of a Japanese invasion fleet had been spotted in the Java Sea, but after his abortive attempt to impede the Japanese invasion of Sumatra a few days earlier, his little fleet was now divided into two widely dispersed groups. He had taken the light cruisers Java and his flagship De Ruyter down through the Sunda Strait to the relative safety of the port at Tjilatjap. That was where he was now, along with destroyers Piet Hein, and two American DDs, the John D. Ford and Pope. The Admiral was hoping to have better luck when he got the news that an operation was now underway against Bali, and decided to launch a two pronged attack.