On November 25 the leaders of the EU’s 27 other member countries formally agreed to the terms of a withdrawal deal that May claimed “delivered for the British people” and set the United Kingdom “on course for a prosperous future.” Under the plan Britain was to pay some $50 billion to the EU to satisfy its long-term financial obligations. Britain’s departure from the EU was to come in March 2019, but, according to the agreement, the U.K. would continue to abide by EU rules and regulations until at least December 2020 while negotiations continued on the details of the long-term relationship between the EU and the U.K.
The agreement, which was set to be debated and voted upon by the House of Commons in December, still faced strong opposition in Parliament, not only from Labour, the Liberal Democrats, the SNP, Plaid Cymru, and the DUP but also from dozens of Conservatives. At the same time, the call for holding another referendum on Brexit was growing louder, though May remained adamant that the will of the British people had already been expressed. A major sticking point for many of those who opposed the agreement was the so-called Northern Ireland backstop plan. Formulated to help maintain an open border between Northern Ireland and EU member Ireland after Brexit, the “backstop” stipulated that a legally binding customs arrangement between the EU and Northern Ireland would go into effect if the U.K. and the EU could not reach a long-term agreement by December 2020. Opponents of the backstop argued that it set up the potential for regulatory barriers between Northern Ireland and the rest of the U.K., effectively establishing a customs border down the Irish Sea. Objections to the Irish backstop and a challenge to May’s leadership
The issue grew more heated in the first week of December after the government was forced to publish in full Attorney General Geoffrey Cox’s legal advice for the government on the Brexit agreement, which had initially been reported to Parliament in overview only. According to Cox, without agreement between Britain and the EU, the terms of the backstop plan could endure “indefinitely,” with the U.K. legally blocked from terminating the agreement without EU approval. This contentious issue was front and centre as the House of Commons began five days of debate leading up to a vote on the Brexit agreement that was scheduled for December 11. Facing the likelihood of a humiliating rejection of the agreement by the House of Commons, May dramatically interrupted the debate after three days, on December 10, and postponed the vote, pledging to seek new assurances from the EU regarding the backstop. The opposition responded by threatening to hold a vote of confidence and to call for an early election.
A challenge to May’s leadership was quickly mounted within the Conservative Party, and, after more than the required 15 percent of the parliamentary party (48 of 317 MPs) requested a vote on her leadership of the party, a secret ballot vote was held on December 12, 2018. May received the votes of 200 MPs, more than the 159 votes she needed to survive as leader. Although, according to Conservative Party rules, she could not be challenged as leader for another year, it remained to be seen whether May would still face pressure to relinquish power. Parliamentary rejection of May’s plan, May’s survival of a confidence vote, and the Independent Group of breakaway MPs
Responding to May in a joint letter, European Council Pres. Donald Tusk and European Commission Pres. Jean-Claude Juncker indicated that, if the backstop had to be invoked, they would strive to limit its application to the “shortest possible period.” However, this pledge satisfied few of the agreement’s critics. When debate on the agreement resumed on January 9, Corbyn argued not only for rejection of the agreement but also for an early general election. On January 15 the agreement was overwhelmingly rejected by a vote of 432–202 (the worst defeat for a government initiative in modern British parliamentary history), and Corbyn tabled a vote of confidence in the government, which May survived the next day, 325–306, having held onto the support of the DUP and many Conservatives who had deserted her in the agreement vote.
The longer the issue of Brexit remained unsettled, the more it became the fulcrum on which British politics turned. Political pundits began to note that opinions on May’s proposed version of Brexit and Brexit in general cut across ideological lines. Both Labour and the Conservative Party were riven by internecine conflict over Brexit. In February eight MPs withdrew from the Labour Party, citing their disappointment in Corbyn’s leadership on the issue as well as concerns over alleged anti-Semitism within the party, a criticism that was at least partly tied to Corbyn’s sympathy for Palestinian concerns. Only days after their departure, three moderate Tories left the Conservative Party, protesting that it had been hijacked by the European Research Group, a faction of right-wing hard-line Brexiters whom the departing MPs accused of acting as a party within the party. Joining together as the Independent Group, these breakaway MPs from both parties began taking steps toward formally constituting a new political party. Meanwhile, in early March, Tom Watson, the deputy leader of the Labour Party, convened a meeting of Labour MPs and members of the House of Lords—many of whom felt that Corbyn had taken the party too far leftward—to consider an alternative vision for the party. Parliament rejects May’s plan again
Against this backdrop, May continued negotiations with European leaders in an effort to win concessions that would garner wider support within Parliament than the terms of her earlier, shunned Brexit plan did. On the eve of a scheduled meaningful vote in the House of Commons on her revised plan, May secured new promises of cooperation on the backstop plan from EU leaders. A “joint legally binding instrument” was agreed to under which Britain could initiate a “formal dispute” with the EU if the EU were to attempt to keep Britain bound to the backstop plan indefinitely. A “joint statement” was also issued that committed the U.K. and the EU to arriving at a replacement for the backstop plan by December 2020. Finally, the U.K. put forth a “unilateral declaration” stressing that there was nothing to prevent Britain from abandoning the backstop if negotiations on an alternative arrangement with the EU were to collapse without the prospect of resolution.
In advance of the vote in Parliament, Attorney General Cox issued his opinion that while the new assurances reduced the risk of the U.K.’s being indefinitely confined by the backstop agreement, they did not fundamentally change the agreement’s legal status. In the vote on March 12, the House of Commons once again rejected May’s plan, though by a smaller margin than its earlier defeat, 391–242. The next day the House of Commons voted 312–308 against leaving the EU without a deal in place. On March 14, by just two votes, May survived a vote that would have taken control of Brexit away from her and handed it to Parliament. In a letter to EU leaders on March 20, she requested that the date of Britain’s departure from the EU be delayed until June 30. In response the EU announced its willingness to extend the Brexit deadline until May 22 but only if Parliament had accepted May’s withdrawal plan by the week of March 24. “Indicative votes,” May’s pledge to resign, a third defeat for her plan, and a new deadline
Hundreds of thousands of demonstrators took to the streets of London on March 23 to demand that another referendum on Brexit be held. On March 25 the House of Commons voted 329–302 to usurp control of Parliament’s agenda from the government in order to hold “indicative votes” on alternative proposals to May’s plan. Eight of those proposals were put to a vote on March 27, but none was able to gain the support of the majority, though a plan to seek to create a “permanent and comprehensive U.K.-wide customs union with the EU” came close, falling sort by just six votes.