Christine understood the issue and its impact quite well, having spent two years as the Director for Nuclear Defense Policy prior to her assignment as the president’s national security advisor. Given that today’s situation involved agency intelligence gathered on a foreign country, Christine was involved due to her current assignment as CIA director.
“Iran has just received a shipment of one thousand advanced gas centrifuges from Russia,” she explained. “It triggers the breakout-time trip wire.”
Christine passed out paper copies of her brief to the attendees, then took a moment to recap the efforts to limit Iran’s ability to build nuclear weapons, since the current cabinet members might not have been familiar with the details.
“The president and several previous administrations adopted a policy and implemented sanctions to limit the breakout time — the time it would take Iran to produce enough weapon-grade uranium for a single nuclear weapon — to a minimum of twelve months. Despite sanctions, Iran’s enrichment efforts had significantly reduced that time interval. To reset the breakout time back to the one-year requirement, George W. Bush authorized a cyber-warfare operation code-named Olympic Games, which sabotaged Iran’s uranium enrichment efforts by infecting Iran’s centrifuge-control software with a virus called Stuxnet. The virus caused the rotors to overspeed, destroying the centrifuges.
“President Obama continued the program, destroying over one thousand of Iran’s most advanced centrifuges before the Iranians eventually detected and deleted the software virus. With Stuxnet neutralized, more direct action was taken by the first Trump administration with Israeli assistance, planting an explosive device in Iran’s centrifuge fabrication facility at Natanz, which destroyed their centrifuge manufacturing capability.
“These measures kept Iran’s breakout time at greater than twelve months and bought us enough time, we believed, to deal with Iran’s construction of a replacement centrifuge fabrication facility in their new underground complex at Natanz. That assessment has just changed with Russia’s shipment of one thousand gas centrifuges to Iran. Not only is the quantity a concern, but these centrifuges are eight times more efficient than anything Iran has fabricated to date. The quantity and quality of these new centrifuges, once fully operational, will reduce Iran’s breakout time to approximately two weeks.”
“My God!” Secretary of State Perini exclaimed. “Twenty-six nuclear weapons per year.”
“That’s correct,” Christine replied, “assuming Iran has a sufficient stockpile of low-grade uranium to enrich. We believe they have enough uranium for fifty nuclear weapons.”
“What are our options?” the president asked.
“Another cyberattack such as the Stuxnet virus is unlikely to succeed. The Iranians have implemented significant cyber-warfare prevention measures that have eliminated all known virus-introduction mechanisms. Destroying the new centrifuge fabrication facility will be much harder than before since the new facility is being built inside Iran’s new underground complex at Natanz, as opposed to the previous aboveground facility.”
“What about the MOP?” Vice President Tompkins asked, referring to the Air Force’s thirty-thousand-pound bunker-busting bomb with a unique fuze design, detonating only after coming to a stop, allowing the ordnance to penetrate deep below the surface before exploding.
Acting Secretary of Defense Seuffert replied, “That depends on how deep underground the new Iranian complex is.”
“Turn to page five,” Christine said, directing the group to a satellite view of the mountain complex.
“The new complex is built into Kūh-e Kolang Gaz Lā, sometimes referred to as Pickaxe Mountain. Based on the location of the entry tunnels in the side of the mountain, we believe there are two main levels within the complex. If the entrance tunnels are built horizontally, that places one level at two hundred fifty feet beneath the mountain surface and a lower level almost five hundred feet deep. The two levels could be even deeper if the tunnels slope downward from the entrance instead of staying level.”
Seuffert shook his head. “Not even a one-two punch with the MOP would destroy a reinforced concrete complex that deep.”
“What other options do we have?” the president asked. “We can’t let these centrifuges operate for long.”
There was momentary silence in the Situation Room. The issue of Iran’s uranium enrichment had come up during previous White House meetings, and the president’s position had been consistent up to now. He had been reluctant to implement sabotage, preferring diplomacy instead, since Iran could just replace whatever had been destroyed, simply delaying the inevitable unless a diplomatic solution was forged. However, Iran seemed intent on developing nuclear weapons, and Russia’s supply of advanced centrifuges had changed the calculus.
“I think it’s time for direct intervention,” Seuffert offered, “but a covert mission. Something that can’t be directly traced back to the United States.” He glanced at Christine, who took the cue.
“We can put together a CIA mission with former special operations personnel — all civilians, no active-duty military. A clandestine insertion into the Natanz facility to destroy the centrifuges.”
The president canvassed the others present, obtaining their opinion on the recommendation. After receiving universal concurrence on a covert sabotage mission, the president announced his decision.
“Draft a plan and brief me when you’re ready.”
28
LANGLEY, VIRGINIA
The morning traffic in the District had already begun to thicken when Jake Harrison pulled out from the parking garage near his temporary agency-provided lodging at the Hotel Washington, only a block from the White House. After heading north on the George Washington Parkway in Virginia, he took the exit for the George Bush Center for Intelligence, where a gate guard verified he was on the authorized visitor list, then waved him through.
Harrison pulled into the main parking garage, then entered the lobby of the CIA Original Headquarters Building, taking the elevator to the seventh floor. After informing the director’s secretary that he had arrived, he was asked to wait in a conference room down the hall. Three others soon arrived: CIA Director Christine O’Connor, Deputy Director Monroe Bryant, and the new member of the seventh-floor oligarchy whom Harrison was meeting for the first time — Deputy Director for Operations Frank McKinnon.
“Welcome back, Jake,” Christine said as she took her seat at the head of the table.
Bryant and McKinnon likewise welcomed him back to the agency. The conference room door opened again and two women entered. The first was Deputy Director for Analysis Tracey McFarland, carrying two manila folders. The second was a woman Harrison hadn’t expected to see again — his previous partner, Khalila Dufour — an attractive six-foot-tall Arab with straight black hair falling across her shoulders.
Khalila had been assigned to assist Harrison during his two previous stints in the CIA, accompanying him whenever leads took him to the Middle East. Khalila’s contacts in the region and linguistic skills were the best the agency had to offer.
McFarland greeted Harrison after taking her seat, but Khalila said nothing after settling into her chair, offering only a brief glance in his direction. It seemed that her typical aloofness hadn’t changed, but Harrison detected a notable improvement in her demeanor. Instead of sitting with her arms folded across her chest, projecting a why-am-I-here attitude as she had done in previous meetings, she presented a respectable, business-like persona. He followed her gaze toward the new DDO.