Documents from the Lost City
It is hard to believe silence in relation to so big a place as New York. You can hear a single truck coming for miles on the New York State Thruway. And that is usually a military truck. I cannot help wondering what it will be like here when even the soldiers are gone.
The documents I have gathered for this section are related to the management of the human withdrawal from New York. In an odd way I find their crisp tone reassuring. After the first panic, we did our leaving well. We were told that the city picked up tens of thousands of shoes in the days after Warday. But later there were staged withdrawals and organized retreats from Dead Zone to Red Zone to Orange Zone to elsewhere.
Beyond those early assessments, there really isn’t much documentation about New York. I would have liked to include some sort of a list of paintings or books or valuables still in the city, or perhaps an evaluation of the present condition of buildings. Such documents did not present themselves.
I could have listed the orders of the day for the New York Military District, for every day since they have been here.
But those orders aren’t important. The remaining valuables aren’t even too important. There is no document that describes the emptiness of this city, no more than there is one to describe the immense complexity of the mind that caused it.
Nineveh, Babylon, and Rome each bustled a time in the sun. So also, New York. Nobody ever called it an eternal city, it was too immediate for that.
But we all thought it was one.
004 1500 ZULU April 92
PHILADELPHIA HDQ. RECONPAC 34AQ
CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
You are hereby instructed that reconnaissance by RADPAC on 4/2/93 mandates following RADZONE assignments for New York area:
1.0 DEAD ZONE:
Original North/South strike centers from Bayville—Hempstead—Bellmore remain lethal and off limits to all personnel for foreseeable future. Radioactive levels remain at 300–500.
2.0 RED ZONE:
Eastern limit now set at Highway 27 with all entries to Dead Zone closed and monitored by electronic surveillance.
Eastern boundary now set at Highway 110 with similar observation. Radioactivity levels vary. Damage not rectifiable.
Looting reported by aerial reconnaissance. Shoot-to-kill order still in force.
1.0 ORANGE ZONE:
Radioactivity localized to standing structures and untreated ground surfaces. Highway 678 in Queens still usable with protected vehicles. No local traffic allowed. Eastern perimeter temporarily set at Highway 111.
The Brooklyn—Bronx—Manhattan areas remain under ORANGE ZONE designation. Radioactivity levels are negligible but damage is still largely uncorrected. Regular looting reported despite assignment of National Guard units. All major access points controlled as per continuing order.
4.0 BLUE ZONE:
New Jersey area to Hudson remains under control of 8th Army units. Radioactivity levels non-life-threatening.
New Assignments due 5 May 93.
ORDER END. STOP. RPX.54.30
DECLASSIFIED
5.25.92
NORAD HQ. ACTING DESK FOR WAR ASSESSMENT
NOVEMBER 6, 1988
1. RADCON SURVEY. Between 12/1/88 and 12/3/88, RADCON procedures were implemented to map the New York City Area in an effort to assess the nature and extent of the USSR attack on this target. RADCON implemented at Level Three employs aerial surveys and radiologic sampling.
As of 12/3/88, Level Four earth-sampling and ground surveys were impossible to implement.
2. SOVIET TARGETS. Aerial mapping reveals three strikes in a NE–SW line, though preconflict data suggest that an additional 3–5 warheads were directed at the same general area. Atmospheric sampling confirms total radiologic levels to be consistent with a 6–7 warhead attack strategy. Data indicate that the additional warheads detonated over water south of Long Island. The three successful land targets were NORTHEAST, Glen Cove; CENTRAL, a point one-half mile west of Elmont; and SOUTHWEST, Oceanside.
3. SOVIET STRATEGY. The nature of the Soviet attack plan is not known at this time, though it is probable that the intended target was the Manhattan Island area. Lack of precise target control may have occurred, or the Soviets may have been unable to complete their full attack. Two other urban targets were struck on 28 October in other parts of the United States.
4. ATTACK STRENGTH. Radiologic surveys suggest that three thermonuclear warheads in the 9–10-megaton range detonated with high simultaneity.
This prevented predetonation from first blast production of extraneous radiation such as neutrons, gamma and X-rays, etc.
5. BLAST PARAMETERS. Two warheads detonated at an altitude designed to maximize ground effects. The airburst explosions occurred between 8,000 and 8,250 feet and produced fireballs approximately 3.5 miles in diameter each. The third warhead was detonated at the surface.
Overall blast effects were constrained by the moderate variance in terrain, although the general flatness of the area encouraged destructive yield. Blast waves as measured in pounds per square inch, or PSI, varied by distance and terrain:
| One Mile: | 200+ PSI |
| Two Miles: | 45+ PSI |
| Three Miles: | 25+ PSI |
| Four Miles: | 16+ PSI |
| Five Miles: | 12+ PSI |
| Ten Miles: | 4+ PSI |
| Fifteen Miles: | 2.2+ PSI |
| Twenty Miles: | 1.5+ PSI |
It may be noted, for example, that reinforced concrete buildings can be destroyed by pressures of 14–16 PSI.
As a result of the high explosive yield, winds are calculated to have been over 2,000 mph at one mile from point of detonation; over 300 mph at five miles; over 125 mph at 10 miles; and over 50 mph at 20 miles. Physical damage from blast waves was amplified by the airborne dispersion of broken objects and particles.
Also, because of the close proximity of detonations—the warheads detonated between 1 and 3 miles of each other—the overall blast effects were intensified.
6. THERMAL EFFECTS. Over 25 percent of the total blast effects were produced as heat. Thermal effects on 28 October were lessened because the attack occurred during daylight with few clouds. Nearly 100 percent of the thermal energy produced was dissipated within 60 seconds.
Such radiation is produced in two waves, or pulses. Theoretically, at the high MT range, individuals have several seconds between the first pulse of thermal energy, which contains approximately 20 percent of the total energy emitted, and the second pulse. At 10 MT, the New York civilian population had 3.2 seconds to take protective action.