Solomon Yatanahu studied the debriefing reports on the Saudi airfield reconnaissance. It had been known for some time that the Saudis had a capable F-20 force, trained by American and British instructors. Given the background of the instructors, it was to be expected that the Tigersharks would put up a good fight. Yatanahu knew as well as anyone that much of the Israeli fighter doctrine had been absorbed from exchange tours with U.S. Navy squadrons. Unlike most Arab air forces, which adopted Soviet-style formations and tactics, the Saudis had flown loose deuce, employing fluid tactics.
Reading the pilots' comments, Yatanahu noted that the biggest problem was simply seeing the F-20. He could well understand it. Yatanahu had been an exchange pilot at Nellis Air Force Base in the 1970s, flying against the F-5Es of the' aggressor squadrons in the Nevada desert. The Tiger II could not outperform the F-15 and F-16 in most regimes, but with enough F-5s on hand, it was almost impossible for other pilots to keep a safe lookout through 360 degrees. The little F-5 was murderously hard to see, and the F-20 was the same size with 70 percent more thrust!
The school solution was to engage the Northrops at long range with radar-guided missiles. The Israelis had more success with the Sparrow than its American designers had, partly because of far greater institutional experience. The Heyl Ha'Avir remained on combat status every day of the year. But the Israelis were unconcerned with the artificialities which dogged the Americans. Superb military intelligence allowed the Israelis to engage radar targets beyond visual range with little concern about hitting a friendly.
Even so, Yatanahu knew that the simple weapons work best.
Sparrows and other radar missiles were complex and expensive, so the heat-seekers were the weapon of choice. His own experience was typical. Of the eight Syrian and three Egyptian aircraft he had shot down, Yatanahu used Sidewinders or Israeli-built Shafrirs on all but three. Like most fighter pilots, he was emotionally inclined to use his cannon because it was personally more satisfying. "No kill like a gun kill," the Americans always said. But the heat seekers were accurate and efficient. Though Yatanahu loved to tell about his gun kills, he acknowledged the infrared missile was the champion MiG destroyer.
The colonel knew that the Saudis and their advisers would anticipate the Sparrow option and would work to deprive the Israelis of it. As yet, electronic countermeasures had not been a big factor in air-to-air combat. The F-20s facing his squadrons across the Jordanian border came without radar for the most part. The colonel knew also that there would be a reason. This so-called Tiger Force would seek to engage in close-in maneuvering, the "knife fight" where the radar missile could not be used. He fervently hoped the Israeli scientists and engineers were working on a means to negate the various U. S., French, and Soviet jammers now available to all major Arab air forces.
The politicians in Tel Aviv were maintaining their hard line, so there would be another war. The time had passed for negotiation. Yatanahu did not set policy. But there had to be a better way.
Solomon Yatanahu was an agnostic. He would not openly deny the existence of a god-that was contrary to Israeli military law. But he had doubts. In his lifetime he had seen enough misery inflicted upon innocents-especially children-that he had to question the mercy, and therefore the existence, of a supreme being. He acknowledged that this earth also was a place of much beauty, at least as much in the sky as on the ground, so perhaps-just perhaps-there was some sort of ordered plan.
Long ago Yatanahu had decided that if he were a praying man, he would pray for more wisdom in the world. He considered it insane to pray for anything like peace, particularly in his part of the globe. That was the trick, he decided: not to pray for the absolute best that could happen, but to pray for the best that was possible.
DAMASCUS, 15 September-The governments of Syria, Iran, Iraq and Libya issued a joint communique today, demanding that Israel withdraw from occupied Jordan. Though no specific timetable was advanced, the message stated that if "good faith negotiations" were not forthcoming "in due course," a military solution would be employed by the Arab powers.
While not formally parties to the communique, in separate statements the governments of Egypt and Saudi Arabia went on record as supporting the call for Israeli withdrawal from Jordan. The Saudi foreign ministry in Riyadh went even further, adding that prolonged failure at negotiating a settlement to the lingering crisis could result in a declaration of war against Israel.
John Bennett read the article in his air-mailed copy of the London Times. He wondered what he might have set in motion following his conversation with Safad Fatah, but the question did not bother him. He had told Bear Barnes, "At least if our guys go to war, they'll be entitled to whatever protection the law allows."
But the Tiger Force CO had little time for philosophizing. He had been busy coordinating RHAW acquisition with Riyadh, obtaining a mixture of American and French electronic "black boxes" for his F-20s. There would not be enough to equip every Tigershark, but at least each flight leader could be so equipped. He knew that if the Israelis came across the border again, they would come in strength with full support-including radio jamming and electronic deception. He also knew the Royal Saudi Air Force had configured several Tornadoes for the same role, with modifications to the E-3s to back up ECM operators.
Overall, Bennett expected the respective electronic warriors to cancel out one another. The air battle would be decided on the basis of the human eye and the human heart. And he would not have it any other way.
Brilliant motes of light flashed across the high plateau, 248 times faster than a supersonic aircraft. Forty-two F-15s, F-16s, Phantoms, and Kfirs-all bearing the blue and white Star of David-were supported by the powerful airborne jammers of other aircraft orbiting across the Jordanian border. The attackers' targets were four Tiger Force fields-those considered to pose the greatest threat to Israeli frontiers after the initial clash two weeks before.
The Heyl Ha'Avir plan was a classic. It relied upon simplicity, speed, and as much surprise as possible. From Wadi al Qalibah to the New Badanah strip farther east, the Israeli aircrews had been carefully briefed on times, routes, and altitudes to each Saudi field. Unlike most Israeli blitzes, this one had not been rehearsed as thoroughly as possible, but the timing and heavy radio and radar jamming were enough to encourage mission planners for a good chance of success.
Leaving the Jordanian-Saudi border, most of the Israeli jets were twelve to fifteen minutes from their targets. Monitoring Saudi radar frequencies revealed which operating bands were most likely to be used, and therefore it was possible to cloud the screens with hundreds of false targets. The "snow" on radar scopes washed out the true blips, most of which were below the ground-based radar horizon anyway. Similarly, voice communications circuits were jammed by electronic noise which made extended conversation nearly impossible.
Ed Lawrence had Black Squadron at Orange Base that morning, doubling up with Ahnas Menaf's unit. The policy was to rotate the various squadrons between different bases to prevent the Israelis from gaining a clear picture of the air defense net. The two COs were in the operations shack when the low-frequency walkie-talkie circuit came alive.