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President Todd studied the video image on the screen at the front of the White House Situation Room. It was remarkably clear, considering the vast distance it was being transmitted from, let alone the conditions.
There was no doubt. The image was of a medium-range intercontinental missile, topped with a heavy warhead.
“We have to guess at what’s in the warhead,” said Jonathon Reid, narrating the impromptu slide show from Room 4 at the CIA campus in Virginia. “But given everything else we’ve found, I really don’t think there’s much doubt.”
The image was coming from the Owl that Danny and Hera had launched. The weapons analysts at the CIA had identified the missile in the video as a member of the No-Dong A family, a North Korean weapon capable of carrying a nuclear warhead 2,000 to 2,900 miles.
“A small number were supposedly lost during testing and destroyed, according to the official antiproliferation documents,” said Reid dryly. “I would suggest that the documents are not entirely correct.”
“Do we have any indication of a target?” asked Todd.
“None,” said Reid. “But I think we can assume it’s Israel. It would be in retaliation for the strike on the plant in the Sudan.”
“I don’t think we have the whole picture here,” said Secretary of State Alistair Newhaven. “I agree that Israel is the logical target if this is being loaded with a nuclear warhead. But I think we’re leaping to conclusions.”
“They’re not going to spell out their intentions,” said Herman Edmund, the CIA director. “Clearly, the missile is going to be launched. And only a fool would think the warhead won’t be nuclear.”
“They’re trying to disrupt the Iranian president’s rapprochement with the U.S.,” said Secretary of Defense Lovel. “I’ve warned about this for months.”
Lovel had taken a hard line against Iran since the beginning of the administration.
“If that’s the case,” said Newhaven, who agreed with the theory, “then it argues that the missile isn’t nuclear. It’s a demonstration of their ability, but not a suicidal attack. Any nuclear attack would be suicidal, and the Iranians are not suicidal.”
“Not all Iranians,” said Lovel. “But maybe just these ones.”
“Mr. Reid, when will the missile launch?” asked President Todd.
“Again, we have no direct intelligence on their intentions. Typically, it can take anywhere from a few hours to a dozen to prepare for a launch, depending on the personnel and conditions.”
“Most likely it will be at the far end of the spectrum,” said Michael Bacon, the National Security Advisor. “At least twelve hours, if not longer. The Iranians in the past have taken upward of a day to prep their launches once they’ve reached the ready stage, and I doubt we’re dealing with a crack crew here.”
“I’m not sure about that,” said Reid. “In theory, the missile could be fueled very quickly, especially if the safety protocols were disregarded.”
“This isn’t the main government force here,” said Bacon. The information gathered by Whiplash and NSA intercepts seemed to indicate that the missile had been developed by a small group within the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, possibly one at odds with the organization’s legitimate leadership. “If they’re a splinter group, they’re not going to have the same level of expertise.”
“On the contrary,” said Reid. “They’ll be highly motivated and competently trained. They may be the elite of the elite.”
“I still believe there’s time to demand that the Iranian government take action,” said the Secretary of State. “That’s a better solution in the long run.”
“Nonsense,” said Bacon.
“We cannot let them point a missile at Israel — at anyone,” insisted Lovel. “Especially after they’ve declared that they don’t have any.”
“But this isn’t the government,” said Newhaven. “It should be handled in a completely different way. If their government stops it—”
“Would they? And in the meantime, we’re risking a nuclear catastrophe,” said Lovel. “Millions of people will be killed.”
“That’s not my point. I’m not in favor of not acting. I’m just saying that we should first encourage the Iranians to move, then act if they don’t. If we have twelve hours—”
“Gentlemen, let’s not get sidetracked here,” said the President. “We are going to remove this threat. We are going to assume it is real. And we are not going to rely on the Iranians. That would be too risky. All that will do is make our mission harder.” She looked to the right, at the screen showing the Pentagon ready room. “How long before the bombers are ready?”
“We can have planes in the air within the hour,” said the Defense secretary. “A pair of F-15Es are being loaded with weapons in Saudi Arabia as we speak. They’ll have four F-15Cs as escorts, along with two F-16s for antiair suppression as necessary. Additional Navy flights will be available from the Gulf. We’re still working on some of the support details.”
“How long before they reach Iran?” asked the President.
“Roughly an hour after they take off,” added Lovel. “With the Iranian air defense system not on high alert, their task is…robust, but not impossible.”
“What if they’re on alert?” asked Reid.
“Then things become trickier. Their aircraft and surface-to-air missiles will be ready to launch. We’ll have a second package of attack and fighter aircraft ready to go as a backup. But our people have trained for this. We will accomplish the mission, Mrs. President. I’m confident.”
“What happens when we bomb the warhead?” asked the President.
Lovel turned to an Air Force general who was an expert on nuclear accidents. The general began by citing a study that had been done in 1975. To everyone’s relief, Todd cut him short.
“General, the executive summary,” she said.
“Yes, ma’am. Sorry. Predicting with one hundred percent certainty is impossible. But — if the warhead is constructed properly, there will be little harm to it. The rocket fuel and the oxidizer explode, of course. You have a fire, etcetera.” The general waved his hand, dismissing the cataclysm.
“What about the explosive lens around the bomb?” asked the Secretary of State.
The general gave him a condescending smile. “We don’t really know what sort of design they’ve used, Mr. Secretary. Now I agree with you that it’s very likely that they’ve followed the North Korean mode. However—”
“Short answer, please,” said the President impatiently.
“All nuclear weapon designs do contain explosives. However, as a general rule, they can’t just explode. But if that were to happen, almost surely the warhead won’t be ignited.”
Reid noted the disclaimer — almost surely — but said nothing to the others. The CIA had concluded that the explosives would survive a bomb strike without igniting, citing accidents in the 1950s.
“The worst case scenario — short of something we don’t know about with the material,” said the general, referring to the uranium, “would be the explosives in the design getting on fire. But even if that happened — and I have to say it’s highly unlikely — even if that happened, the weapon would not go critical.”
“We have to recover the material once the missile is destroyed,” said Todd. “How do we go about that?”
“I don’t know that that’s feasible,” said Lovel.
“Will the material be scattered?” Todd asked.
“No ma’am,” said the weapons expert. “I mean, again to give you a definitive answer would require quite a lot of study, but the nature of—”