The breach within the Allied command structure prompted the American Chief of Staff General George Marshall to pass on the British complaints to Eisenhower for his further consideration. Having received Marshall’s telegram, Eisenhower contacted the American military representative in Moscow, General John R. Deane to enquire if it was not too late to delay sending the message concerning his strategic intentions to Stalin. Much to his relief, Deane confirmed that the message had not yet been sent. In the meantime, the anticipated riposte by the American Chiefs arrived in the form of a combative message supporting Eisenhower’s new strategy. The tone of the message was such that there could be no doubt about the future direction of strategy. It stated that:
…Eisenhower is the best judge of the measures which offer the earliest prospect of destroying the German armies or their power to resist… His strategic concept is sound from the overall viewpoint of crushing Germany as expeditiously as possible and should receive full support.
With the support of General Marshall and the American Chiefs, Eisenhower presented Churchill, Montgomery and the British Chiefs with a fait accompli. Neither British, nor American forces would be going to Berlin.
On the evening of 31 March, Eisenhower’s delayed message was at last handed over to Stalin, who after reading it, conferred with Marshal Georgy Zhukov, General Aleksei I. Antonov and General Sergei M. Shtemenko. Whilst Stalin considered that Eisenhower’s planning ‘seemed good’, there remained serious doubts as to the real intentions of the Western Allies. Only the day before, General Antonov had sent a barbed message to General Deane, berating the Americans for supposedly misleading the Soviet High Command (Stavka). To understand the degree of mistrust, it is worth quoting the message in extensio:
On February 20 of this year I received a message from General Marshall that the Germans were deploying two groups for a counter-offensive on the Eastern Front: one in Pomerania for an attack against Thorn and another in the Vienna – Moravska – Ostrava area for an offensive towards Lodz. The southern group was to include the SS 6th Panzer Army. A similar report was received on February 12 from the head of the army section of the British military mission Colonel Brinkman.
I am extremely grateful to General Marshall for the information intended to help attain our common goals which he so graciously offered us. However, I am compelled to inform him that the military actions on the Eastern Front failed to confirm the information communicated, because the fighting has shown that the main group of German troops, including the SS 6th Panzer Army, was deployed not in Pomerania and not in the Moravska – Ostrava area, but in the Lake Balaton Region. From here, the Germans advanced with the aim of reaching the Danube and force-crossing it south of Budapest. This fact shows that the information General Marshall has used did not correspond to the actual course of events on the Eastern Front in the month of March.
It is not to be deduced that certain sources of that information were specifically intended to confuse the Soviet High Command and in doing so divert attention away from the area the Germans were preparing for their main operation on the Eastern Front.
Despite the above, I request General Marshall, if possible, to continue communicating available information concerning the enemy. I regard it as my duty to send this message to General Marshall exclusively so that he would be able to draw the relevant conclusions regarding the source of that information…
Whilst Antonov’s message betrays the depth of suspicion in the Soviet camp, Stalin nonetheless agreed with the general thrust of Eisenhower’s plan, as he too believed in the probability of a German last-stand in Bavaria. Stalin remained convinced however that his allies were deceiving him. Now it was time to carry out some deceptions of his own.
Stalin’s reply to Eisenhower was delivered by General Deane on 1 April. In his reply, he praised the idea of a junction of attacking forces in the Erfurt – Leipzig – Dresden area as conforming entirely with plans drawn up by the Stavka:
Your plan to cut the German forces by joining up the Soviet forces with your forces entirely coincides with the plan of the Soviet High Command. I agree with you also that the place for the joining up of your forces and the Soviet forces should be in the area Erfurt – Leipzig – Dresden. The Soviet High Command considers that the main blow of the Soviet forces should be delivered in that direction. Berlin has lost its former strategic importance. The Soviet High Command therefore plans to allot secondary forces in the direction of Berlin.
That same day, General Antonov delivered his report on the plan for the Berlin offensive. The ‘secondary forces’ involved would consist of no less than three Red Army Fronts with a combined strength of 2,700,000 troops (including the Polish 1st Army), 6,250 tanks and self propelled guns, 41,600 artillery pieces and 7,500 aircraft. Stalin’s determination to take Berlin set in motion a contest between Zhukov and Konev following his changes to the previously agreed boundaries between the two Fronts. Whilst Zhukov had been given the honour of taking Berlin, Stalin also opened up possibilities for Konev by saying:
In case the enemy puts up stiff resistance on the eastern approaches to Berlin, which will undoubtedly happen, and the First Byelorussian Front is delayed, the First Ukrainian Front is to be ready to attack Berlin from the south with the tank armies.
During the early hours of 2 April, Stalin signed the directive for the 1st Belorussian Front’s operations. Following the necessary changes to the Stavka plan which took into account the boundary changes between the two main Fronts involved, Stalin signed the directive for the 1st Ukrainian Front’s operations the following day. The enforced delay in the 2nd Belorussian Front’s operations meant that Zhukov’s forces would advance towards Berlin with an open flank. Zhukov later recorded his thoughts about the impending operation:
Of course, it would have been better to wait five or six days and begin the Berlin operation with three Fronts simultaneously. However, in view of the existing military-political situation, the Stavka could not put off the operation until a later date. We had very little time left before April 16 and very many measures to be urgently taken. Troops were to be grouped, extensive logistical support provided for, and large-scale operational, tactical and special preparations of the Front carried out for an exceptionally important and unusual operation such as the taking of Berlin.
Zhukov flew to his command the day after receiving Stalin’s directive and immediately began to prepare for the attack which it was anticipated would lead to the capture of Berlin and a junction with Allied forces on the Elbe within 12-15 days.
The British Chiefs were still not satisfied with the decision to leave Berlin to the Red Army. On 3 April, they met to discuss the situation. This meeting led to the drafting of a message which stressed ‘the desirability of Anglo-American forces capturing Berlin as soon as possible’ being sent out to their American counterparts the following day. Churchill finally put the matter to rest, as he realised, more than the British Chiefs did, that the American position was unshakeable. In a message to President Roosevelt he acknowledged the position regarding Berlin and made assurances that it did not in any way affect his relationship with Eisenhower: