GORBACHEV: Boris Nikolayevich! In this case we will not have a federation. . . .
YELTSIN: We will deposit [the funds] in one bank and hand them over to you.
GORBACHEV: No, no. . . . There needs to be a federal tax.
YELTSIN: Not on every enterprise, no way. We are ruling that out.
GORBACHEV: In this case we will not have a federation.
YELTSIN: Why not? Why not?
GORBACHEV: In this case we will not have a federation.
YELTSIN: That is a federation.
GORBACHEV: We need a federal tax. . . . You want on every question to force us to our knees.
YELTSIN: It is you who wants to force us to our knees.68
Gorbachev yielded on taxation after Yeltsin called his bluff on a threat to pull out of Nine Plus One. “Do not,” Yeltsin upbraided Gorbachev privately, “take things to the point where we have to decide this question without you.”69 To increase Russian autonomy and defang the CPSU, Yeltsin on July 20 issued Decree No. 14, proscribing any party from having cells or operations within organs of government in the RSFSR. Gorbachev seemed powerless to do anything about it.
A draft treaty for a Union of Sovereign States was initialed by the Novo-Ogarëvo working group on July 23, published on August 15, and its signing fixed for August 20. It largely embodied Russian preferences on taxation, natural resources, and the lesser republics within the RSFSR (they were to sign only as subunits of Russia). The center would still have the power to declare war and manage the military, but even foreign policy and public safety were to be subject to joint jurisdiction. In recognition of Russia’s new global stature, President Bush, in Moscow for a summit with Gorbachev, was received by Yeltsin in his new Kremlin office on July 30. To Soviet and foreign correspondents after the meeting, Yeltsin talked up the treaty and the July 20 decree. At the state dinner in the Kremlin, he tried unsuccessfully to upstage Gorbachev by making a beeline for Barbara Bush and escorting her from receiving line to table. Gorbachev also reports Yeltsin pouting over not being seated at the head table at a dinner at Spaso House, the U.S. ambassadorial residence, and pressing a conversation on George Bush.70 The previous evening, Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and Nursultan Nazarbayev, the party prefect and now president of Kazakhstan, had met at Novo-Ogarëvo and agreed that Nazarbayev would replace Pavlov as prime minister after the treaty signing, the vice presidency would be dissolved, and other heads would roll. The KGB, whose chief, Vladimir Kryuchkov, was one of those to be demoted, bugged their nocturnal conversation. Yeltsin warned Gorbachev that the walls had ears; Gorbachev did not believe him but acknowledged in his memoirs that Yeltsin had it right.71
The misbegotten coup d’état of August 19–21, 1991, whisked the rug out from under Gorbachev, the Communist Party, and the Soviet state. It was sprung by the conservatives with whom he had aligned himself in 1990–91 and was timed to forestall the signing of the union treaty. Confining Gorbachev to his summer residence at Foros, Crimea, the eight principals inundated Moscow with armor (about 750 tanks and vehicles) and troops, declared Gennadii Yanayev acting president, and appointed themselves a Public Committee for the State of Emergency, a condition they promulgated for a period of six months. As Yeltsin observed in Notes of a President, the committee, or GKChP, was a motley crew. It “had no leader. There was no authoritative person whose opinion would be a watchword and a signal to act.”72 Prime Minister Pavlov found refuge in the bottle; Kryuchkov of the KGB pulled strings behind the scenes; Vice President Yanayev spoke for the GKChP, ashen-faced and with trembling hands. Others represented the higher party apparatus and the military-industrial and agrarian complexes.
The worst oversights were vis-à-vis the born leader who was president of Russia. The fumbling plotters had puzzled at length about Gorbachev but gave little thought to Yeltsin or to his Russian administration. In February 1991, after Yeltsin’s public demand for Gorbachev to resign, a KGB colonel contacted Pavel Voshchanov, a journalist who accompanied Yeltsin on the U.S. trip in 1989, to ask for a meeting with Yeltsin to discuss how he and Yanayev could work together “to save the country.” Voshchanov took the message to Yeltsin, who said, “Let’s see what they are going to do, but we will not have any contact with this hoodlum [shantrapa].”73 The question resurfaced in a conversation on August 7 or 8 between Kryuchkov and the Politburo member and Moscow first secretary, Yurii Prokof’ev, who had delivered a diatribe against Yeltsin at the plenum removing him from the Moscow post in November 1987 and would give the GKChP qualified support. Prokof’ev pushed for a change of heart on Yeltsin: “Now [he told Kryuchkov] the main figure is not Gorbachev, in that Mikhail Sergeyevich has lost all of his authority, but Yeltsin. He is popular and the people support him. This is the figure on whom the problem will hinge.” Betting that Yeltsin’s authoritarian leanings and the animosity he nursed toward Gorbachev would be enough to make him putty in their hands, Kryuchkov “said roughly this: We will reach an agreement with Yeltsin, we will fix this problem without taking any measures beforehand.”74
Yeltsin had been to see Nazarbayev for talks in Alma-Ata, Kazakhstan, since August 16. Acting on a premonition, he delayed his return on Sunday, August 18, by four hours (he swam in a mountain stream and attended a concert). He had the pilots land at Kubinka, a military field some miles out of Moscow. Had they put down wheels as scheduled at Vnukovo airport, he said in an interview, he would have been arrested and shot by order of Kryuchkov, and the violence used as cover for a nationwide wave of repression. The claim about a plan to shoot him is not made in Yeltsin’s memoir account and seems implausible.75 A post-coup inquiry turned up evidence that KGB officials intended to divert his aircraft to another landing strip, at Chkalovsk, and to detain him there for a conversation with Defense Minister Dmitrii Yazov and then “negotiations with the Soviet leadership.” At Kryuchkov’s direction, Viktor Grushko, his first deputy, chaired a meeting on this stratagem at one P.M. on August 17, in which Deputy Defense Minister Vladislav Achalov made it clear that force would have to be used, but, because of uncertainty about Yeltsin’s reaction, was unable to pull the others along. “After the landing [at Chkalovsk], the chief of the airport, on the pretense of delays on the part of those welcoming [the travelers], was to invite B. N. Yeltsin into another room, where Yazov would talk with him. In the course of the meeting, Achalov said that paratroopers and the Alpha Unit [of the KGB] would have to neutralize the guard of the RSFSR president, so as to exclude undesirable excesses such as taking a stand or the use of weapons. Since the participants in the meeting were unable to come to conclusions about how Yeltsin would react to this and what kinds of actions he would take in response, no final decision was made.” And none would be made.76
One of the kingpins of the coup, Oleg Baklanov, notified Gorbachev at Foros on August 18 that they had already arrested Yeltsin, and then modified his story to say they would do so shortly. The available documentation shows Yeltsin to have been high on the general list of seventy persons the GKChP marked for roundup once the tanks went into action. Sixty Alpha rangers were sent in the wee hours of August 19 to the enclosure of RSFSR government dachas in the village of Arkhangel’skoye-2, where Yeltsin slept the night. They had orders to take him alive and hold him on an island at the Zavidovo wildlife reserve ninety miles north of Moscow. Yeltsin was woken up shortly after six in the morning and huddled with his political team, most of whom had been staying at dachas within strolling distance. After first preferring to call a two-hour “precautionary strike” by workers, he moved to more radical tactics. The group put together an anti-coup appeal “To the Citizens of Russia,” which Yeltsin’s daughters typed up in the dacha kitchen and Ivan Silayev telephoned in to the Russian White House. One of its recommendations was for a general strike of indefinite duration.77