That afternoon Yeltsin blazed away at the concourse in front of the White House, this time with loudspeakers to amplify his voice: “You can build a throne out of bayonets, but can you sit on it for long? I am convinced that there is not and will not be any return to the past. . . . Russia will be free!”90 By telephone and through mediators, he proselytized military officers, after which Generals Yevgenii Shaposhnikov and Pavel Grachëv, the commanders of the Soviet air force and airborne troops, agreed between them to have Shaposhnikov send two jets to strafe military vehicles in the Kremlin if the White House were stormed. The pop groups Helios, Mister Twister, Metallic Corrosion, and Time Machine rocked it up in the square. Poet Yevgenii Yevtushenko did a reading for the crowd, stand-up comedian Gennadii Khazanov performed impersonations of Gorbachev and Yanayev, and the master cellist and conductor Mstislav Rostropovich lionized the opponents of the coup and waved a Kalashnikov rifle. Tension was astronomically high that evening, when soldiers accidentally killed three young male civilians.91 Yeltsin was nonplussed that the coup makers did not attack or even seal off the White House: “How could Kryuchkov be so blockheaded as not to understand how dangerous such indecision could be?”92 The GKChP blinked first. At three in the morning of August 21, Kryuchkov decided not to storm the White House, concluding that the carnage would be politically unmanageable. The blockade was lifted in the afternoon and the troops began to evacuate Moscow. By midnight the putschists were behind bars—arrested by agents of the RSFSR procurator general—and Gorbachev, the emperor who had no clothes, was back from Foros, escorted by Vice President Rutskoi of Russia. Descending the stairs of the plane, Gorbachev thanked Yeltsin and, tone-deaf to the end, spoke of being “an adherent of socialism.” On August 24, at the funeral for the three young men who died, Gorbachev was ill at ease, while Yeltsin movingly asked the parents’ forgiveness for not saving their sons’ lives.
Russia had entered an intermezzo of duopoly, dvoyevlastiye, like between the February and October revolutions of 1917. One aspirant, Yeltsin, elected by the people, was ascendant; the other, Gorbachev, chosen by two now lifeless bodies (the Central Committee of the CPSU, which he dissolved on August 24, and the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies, which voted to shut itself down on September 5), was descendant.
Capitalizing on the legitimacy gap, Yeltsin compelled Gorbachev to annul his post-coup decrees on leadership of the national-security agencies and appoint men Yeltsin trusted. Gorbachev had made General Mikhail Moiseyev, who was complicit in the plot, acting defense minister on August 21. On August 22 Moiseyev was called to Gorbachev’s office and found Yeltsin next to the Soviet president and commander-in-chief. “Explain to him that he is not minister any longer,” Yeltsin barked at Gorbachev. “Gorbachev repeated Boris Nikolayevich’s words. Moiseyev listened in silence, and off he went.” The dovish Shaposhnikov, sight unseen by Yeltsin, was made minister of defense, and Vadim Bakatin, whom Gorbachev had fired as interior minister the winter before, was made chairman of the KGB.93 On September 1 a Shaposhnikov order cleared by Yeltsin abolished the political directorate of the armed forces, long an implement of party control.
With Gorbachev, Yeltsin went for the jugular in public on Friday, August 23, in the Russian Supreme Soviet. Gorbachev had been requested to make a statement and answer questions from the benches, which he did for ninety minutes. With a national television audience watching, Yeltsin sashayed up to Gorbachev and stuck in his face a transcript by Nikolai Vorontsov showing that most Soviet cabinet members backstabbed Gorbachev at a cabinet meeting on August 19. “Gorbachev kept his dignity when he was alone at the podium. But when Yeltsin came over, the effect was almost as if he crumpled.” 94 Yeltsin hectored Gorbachev into reading out quotations from the paper to the lawmakers. That done, Yeltsin asked members, “on a lighter note,” to watch him finalize Decree No. 79, suspending the organs of the Russian Communist Party. He scrawled his signature slowly for the delectation of the deputies. They applauded him and heckled the red-faced Gorbachev, who mumbled “Boris Nikolayevich” several times. As an Izvestiya reporter noted, in an eerie inversion of the taunting of October–November 1987, Yeltsin, had now selected Gorbachev for the part of “naughty schoolboy.”95
Brent Scowcroft, viewing the Supreme Soviet scene with President Bush in Kennebunkport, Maine, said it was “all over” for Gorbachev. “Yeltsin’s telling him what to do. I don’t think Gorbachev understands what happened.” Bush concurred: “I’m afraid he may have had it.”96 Scowcroft and Bush were correct. After the overmatch on August 23—Gorbachev called it sadistic in his memoirs—it was anticlimactic the next day when Gorbachev dissolved the Central Committee and resigned as general secretary of the party. Yeltsin’s Decree No. 90 on August 25 authorized the RSFSR Council of Ministers to seize all property of the CPSU and its Russian chapter. Yeltsin on August 26 publicly declined Gorbachev’s offer to make him a Hero of the Soviet Union. On August 31 Pravda, which had remained a much more conservative paper than Izvestiya, reprinted an International Herald Tribune cartoon of a smiling Yeltsin reaching down to pump the hand of a miniaturized Gorbachev; the tagline read, “Welcome back to power, Mikhail.”
The coup could not have been more destabilizing, and politics, economics, and culture converged more than ever on the constitutional question. The union treaty initialed in July was a dead letter. Only six union republics had been prepared to sign it, and, riddled with non sequiturs and ambiguities, it would in any event have been impracticable.97 As of August 19, two Soviet republics (Lithuania and Georgia) had announced their independence from the USSR. Between August 20 and September 1, nine (Estonia, Latvia, Armenia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan) followed their example. Tajikistan was to join the crowd in September, Turkmenistan in October, and Kazakhstan in December.
Gorbachev, his administration comatose (with no prime minister, parliament, budget, or bullion reserves), made a last-ditch effort to forge a treaty of union. The negotiating minuet started again at Novo-Ogarëvo, with the republic leaders sitting as the USSR State Council. Yeltsin was uncheerful about it and deputed two leading Russianists, Gennadii Burbulis and Sergei Shakhrai, to prepare working papers. The line had hardened. Earlier, Russia had been prepared to act as cash cow to the USSR and was “ready to cover any breach . . . even at the cost of its own ruination.” After the coup, this was impossible. “The republics had gone their disjunct ways and did not want to return to the old arrangement. The only possibility in these new conditions was an agreement among them in which Gorbachev would act as middleman.”98
Russia came out for a rump “union of states” or “confederation of states” rather than the “union state” Yeltsin had consented to in July. Gorbachev, who would have taken any form of union with a viable central authority, made the point to the State Council on November 14 that every time he agreed with one of Yeltsin’s suggestions Yeltsin would slow down his speech, as if he were asking himself why Gorbachev was acting so agreeably. Yes, Yeltsin said, he was always wary of Gorbachev. Gorbachev “laughed, but without merriment.”99 The talks went on against a backdrop of Russian appropriation of assets from the shell Soviet government. By the late autumn, Gorbachev and his men were accepting receivership as an improvement on insolvency.100 With Gorbachev caving in to most of Yeltsin’s constitutional demands, agreement appeared within reach, yet slipped away at a last Novo-Ogarëvo meeting on November 25. Yeltsin, fresh from a trip to Germany and to Soviet forces there, said he would be prepared to take a confederative agreement to the Russian parliament, only without an irrevocable endorsement from him as president. Gorbachev accused him of weaseling out of commitments. Feeling trapped, Gorbachev said people were whispering that he was a spent force, and the republic leaders seemed to be of the same opinion. In that case, he went on ominously, “Go ahead and agree among yourselves”—something Yeltsin had warned he might do in their tête-à-tête that summer. He would have no part of the “further chaos that would follow from this diffuse position.”101