50 Third Yeltsin interview.
51 Chernyayev, Shest’ let, 177.
52 I have long thought of Yeltsin’s manner as feline. I am indebted to Jonathan Sanders for suggesting Gorbachev’s as canine.
53 Yel’tsin, Ispoved’, 22. These words are omitted from the English-language edition of the memoir.
54 Boldin, Krusheniye p’edestala, 328.
55 “Plenum TsK,” 241.
56 Vorotnikov, A bylo eto tak, 170, records this aspect of the scene with clarity.
57 Ryzhkov interview.
58 Yakovlev, Sumerki, 406.
59 “Plenum TsK,” 257. Yakovlev’s soft criticism of Yeltsin was for “conservatism”—which he made, he says (Sumerki, 405–6) to throw conservatives off the scent and ease their alarm at the moderate changes Gorbachev was committed to making.
60 “Plenum TsK,” 242–43.
61 In a mirror image of the collective attitude toward him, Yeltsin in his account of the day (Ispoved’, 135–36) refused to give the speakers he knew well credit for any but the most ignoble motives. “We had worked together side by side and, it would seem, eaten a pood of salt together. But each one was thinking of himself and considered this a chance to earn a few points for good behavior.”
62 “Plenum TsK,” 251–52 (Konoplëv), 253–54 (Ryabov). Yeltsin was especially unkind to Ryabov in his memoir, saying he spoke “to lay down some path for himself upward, if not for his future [assignments] then at least for his pension” (Ispoved’, 135). Yeltsin saw Ryabov when he visited France in May 1990. On the Aeroflot flight back to Moscow, he asked Ryabov, in full hearing of others, why he said what he did in 1987. Ryabov answered that he had nothing to be sorry for and was sticking to his opinion. Pilar Bonet, “Nevozmozhnaya Rossiya: Boris Yel’tsin, provintsial v Kremle” (The impossible Russia: Boris Yeltsin, a provincial in the Kremlin), Ural, April 1994, 25.
63 “Plenum TsK,” 254–57 (Ryzhkov), 262–63 (Yakovlev), 273–76 (Solomentsev), 259 (Vorotnikov), 261–62 (Chebrikov).
64 Ibid., 280 (Gorbachev and Yeltsin), 249 (Vladimir Mesyats on immaturity), 265 (Shevardnadze), 245 (Shalayev), 244 (Manyakin), 280 (Gorbachev).
65 Ibid., 279–81. That Gorbachev was open to compromise is the interpretation of Politburo member Vorotnikov (A bylo eto tak, 169) and, without comment on the penalty to be paid, of Gorbachev himself (Zhizn’ i reformy, 1:373).
66 Politburo transcript, October 31, 1987 (AGF, KDPP, 2:648–49).
67 Details here from Aleksandr Kapto, Na perekrëstkakh zhizni: politicheskiye memuary (At life’s crossroads: political memoirs) (Moscow: Sotsial’no-politicheskii zhurnal, 1996), 185–87; Vorotnikov, A bylo eto tak, 173–74; and Gorbachev, Zhizn’ i reformy, 1:373.
68 “Plenum TsK,” 286.
69 Chernyayev, Shest’ let, 176–78.
70 Third Yeltsin interview.
71 Matlock, Autopsy on an Empire, 116.
72 Yel’tsin, Ispoved’, 138. The medical evidence is given in Gorbachev, Zhizn’ i reformy, 1:374; and Chazov, Rok, 221–23. Both are unfriendly witnesses, but Chazov is no better disposed toward Gorbachev than toward Yeltsin. The reliable Vorotnikov attests (A bylo eto tak, 174–75) that Gorbachev shared the facts of the slashing incident with members of the Politburo on November 9 and that Viktor Chebrikov of the KGB verified them. According to Chazov, Yeltsin offered the doctors the farfetched explanation that he cut himself accidentally when leaning on the scissors. Gorbachev repeats this story and another Yeltsin is said to have told about being knifed by an assailant on the street.
73 Interviews with Aleksandr Korzhakov (January 28, 2002) and Valentina Lantseva (July 9, 2001).
74 Chazov, Rok, 225.
75 Third Yeltsin interview and comments by Naina Yeltsina during it.
76 Although the Leningrad group did not want to come into conflict with the Soviet center, members of it advocated creation of a Russian branch of the Communist Party, and some advocated transfer of the capital of the RSFSR to Leningrad. See David Brandenberger, “Stalin, the Leningrad Affair, and the Limits of Postwar Russocentrism,” Russian Review 63 (April 2004), 241–55.
77 Aleksandr Korzhakov, Boris Yel’tsin: ot rassveta do zakata (Boris Yeltsin: from dawn to dusk) (Moscow: Interbuk, 1997), 65; Chazov, Rok, 224–25; Boris Yel’tsin, Prezidentskii marafon (Presidential marathon) (Moscow: AST, 2000), 53.
78 Mikhail Poltoranin, interviewed in Prezident vseya Rusi (The president of all Russia), documentary film by Yevgenii Kiselëv, 1999–2000 (copy supplied by Kiselëv), 4 parts, part 2.
79 All quotations from “Energichno vesti perestroiku.”
80 Yurii Belyakov, the second secretary, and Yurii Karabasov, the gorkom’s secretary for ideological matters, also spoke, and were less forgiving than Nizovtseva. All three secretaries stressed the costs to them and to the Moscow organization of Yeltsin’s refusal to consult them before making his attack. Belyakov, whom Yeltsin recruited from Sverdlovsk, did credit him for his hard work and leadership, but this, Belyakov said, made the boss’s change of position even harder to take. And Yeltsin’s name was now being used by “dubious elements,” at home and abroad, to stir up scandal.
81 Comment by Naina Yeltsina during my third interview with Boris Yeltsin: “They all said, ‘Well, the system made us cripples,’ that is, they all considered this [the attack] incorrect.”
82 Poltoranin in Prezident vseya Rusi. Gorbachev’s actions are not mentioned in the official account. He said in his memoirs (Zhizn’ i reformy, 1:375) that some of the speeches at the plenum had left him with a bad taste in his mouth. He also commended Yeltsin for taking the punishment and behaving “like a man.”
83 Poltoranin in Prezident vseya Rusi. Before that, Gorbachev evidently came over and comforted him.
84 Second Yeltsina interview.
85 Poltoranin interview.
CHAPTER SEVEN
1 Boris Yel’tsin, Ispoved’ na zadannuyu temu (Confession on an assigned theme) (Moscow: PIK, 1990), 142–43.
2 Erik H. Erikson, Young Man Luther: A Study in Psychoanalysis and History (New York: Norton, 1962), 100–101.
3 A first-mover advantage is that achieved by the first firm to offer a new product or service, or by the first player to enter into some other kind of competition for resources. There is considerable controversy over the magnitude of the advantage in specific contexts. See Herbert Gintis, Game Theory Evolving: A Problem-Centered Introduction to Modeling Strategic Behavior (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); and Martin J. Osborne, An Introduction to Game Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).
4 Yu, M. Baturin et al., Epokha Yel’tsina: ocherki politicheskoi istorii (The Yeltsin epoch: essays in political history) (Moscow: VAGRIUS, 2001), 53. On the forgeries, petitions, and rallies, see also Andrei Goryun, Boris Yel’tsin: svet i teni (Boris Yeltsin: light and shadows), 2 vols. (Sverdlovsk: Klip, 1991), 2:7; Nikolai Zen’kovich, Boris Yel’tsin: raznyye zhizni (Boris Yeltsin: various lives), 2 vols. (Moscow: OLMA, 2001), 1:336–37; Leon Aron, Yeltsin: A Revolutionary Life (New York: St. Martin’s, 2000), 220–22; and Lev Osterman, Intelligentsiya i vlast’ v Rossii, 1985–1996 gg. (The intelligentsia and power in Russia, 1985–96) (Moscow: Monolit, 2000), 31.