93 “After the last presidential election, in 1996, the oligarchs captured Yeltsin, his successive governments, and the political process.” Lee S. Wolosky, “Putin’s Plutocrat Problem,” Foreign Affairs 79 (March–April 2000), 25. See more broadly Joel S. Hellman, Geraint Jones, and Daniel Kaufmann, “Seize the State, Seize the Day”: State Capture, Corruption, and Influence in Transition, Policy Research Working Paper 2444 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2000), 1.
94 Author’s interviews with Khodorkovskii (June 7, 2001), Fridman (September 21, 2001), and Potanin.
95 Yeltsin’s capacity in principle to dictate the terms was mentioned by every businessman I spoke to about 1996, and was especially stressed by Khodorkovskii, who felt Yeltsin was at first affronted by their offer. Yeltsin in his memoirs (Marafon, 103) emphasizes that the oligarchs took the initiative. “No one asked them, and there were no obligations incurred to anyone. They came to me not to defend Yeltsin but to defend their own businesses.”
96 Second Nemtsov interview.
97 The purpose of Dyachenko’s call was to inquire about the status of Yelena Masyuk, an NTV correspondent, and two crew members, who were kidnapped by a splinter group in Chechnya in May; NTV was to pay ransom for their release several weeks later. Berezovskii, speaking as deputy secretary of the Security Council, assured her that everything possible was being done to save them. The record of the conversation, “Zapis’ telefonnogo razgovora Borisa Berezovskogo s docher’yu Yel’tsina—Tat’yanoi D’yachenko” (Transcript of a telephone conversation between Boris Berezovskii and Yeltsin’s daughter, Tatyana Dyachenko), was leaked in June 1999. It is available at http://www.compromat.ru/main/berezovskiy/dyachenko.htm.
98 Berezovskii called her Tanya and, at one point, Tanyusha, a double diminutive. She called him Boris Abramovich and “you” in the second person plural, and also referred to third parties by name and patronymic.
99 Berezovskii admitted that he personally had not declared all his income and capital on his tax returns. Dyachenko seemed to accept his point that concealment would continue to be widespread. In that case, though, businessmen “should pay more on the basis of their declared capital,” that is, pay at a higher rate and on time.
100 Ul’yan Kerzonov, “Anatolii Chubais stremitsya k polnomy kontrolyu nad Rossiyei” (Anatolii Chubais is striving for complete control over Russia), Nezavisimaya gazeta, September 13, 1997. It was widely believed that Kerzonov was a pseudonym for Berezovskii. I heard of the role of the article in my third interview with Yumashev.
101 Potanin interview. I interviewed two other oligarchs who were present, Fridman and Khodorkovskii, and both shared his puzzlement.
102 His comments to Chubais and Nemtsov are related in “Boris Nemtsov—Yevgenii Al’bats o Yel’tsine.”
103 One of the authors, Al’fred Kokh, had been dismissed in August in connection with another scandal. Aleksandr Kazakov, Maksim Boiko, and Pëtr Mostovoi were fired in November. Hoffman (Oligarchs, 304) presents evidence that the book project was a device for transferring leftover funds from the 1996 campaign.
104 Yel’tsin, Marafon, 111.
105 Ibid., 104.
106 Second Nemtsov interview. As Pëtr Aven of Alpha Group put it, “There was a not very explicit but, I would say, implicit understanding that… you help us and we’ll help you.” Aven, interview with the author (May 29, 2001).
107 Hoffman, Oligarchs, 386.
CHAPTER SIXTEEN
1 Quotations from Boris Yel’tsin, Prezidentskii marafon (Presidential marathon) (Moscow: AST, 2000), 113, 119, 118.
2 Ibid., 118.
3 Yu, M. Baturin et al., Epokha Yel’tsina: ocherki politicheskoi istorii (The Yeltsin epoch: essays in political history) (Moscow: VAGRIUS, 2001), 778–79; Georgii Satarov, first interview with the author (June 5, 2000).
4 Yel’tsin, Marafon, 119–21. The serving ministers on Yeltsin’s list were Nikolai Aksënenko (railways), Vladimir Bulgak (communications), and Sergei Kiriyenko (fuel and energy). To legislators and other politicians on April 7, he mentioned as serious candidates Yurii Luzhkov (mayor of Moscow), Yegor Stroyev (governor of Orël province and chairman of the Federation Council), and Dmitrii Ayatskov (Saratov governor), as well as Bulgak, but said nothing about the others whom he later mentioned in the memoir.
5 Ibid., 120–21.
6 In 1984 Nikolayev, as commander of a motorized rifle division in the Urals Military District, spoke at a meeting organized by the Sverdlovsk obkom of the CPSU. First Secretary Yeltsin liked the presentation and said he had “a brilliant future.” Igor’ Oleinik, “Andrei Nikolayev: genshtabist v politike” (Andrei Nikolayev: a General Staff officer in politics), http://www.lebed.com/1999/art997.htm. In 1997 Nikolayev submitted his resignation to Yeltsin in an attempt to gain an expression of support. Yeltsin surprised Nikolayev by accepting: “I don’t like it when people pressure me in this way.” Yel’tsin, Marafon, 121.
7 Yel’tsin, Marafon, 121.
8 Sergei Kiriyenko, interview with the author (January 15, 2001). In 1994 Kiriyenko spoke as a banker at a dinner for Yeltsin hosted by Nemtsov. Yeltsin asked if he would like to move to Moscow but Nemtsov objected. In August 1997 Kiriyenko, in Nemtsov’s company, saw the president at Volzhskii Utës and was invited to dine with the family.
9 Yeltsin’s memoir descriptions of them are similar in many ways, but in volume three (Marafon, 121–22) he contrasts Kiriyenko’s practical experience with Gaidar’s lack thereof. He exaggerates the difference and also misleads in speaking of them as being of “a different generation.” They were born only six years apart, and when Gaidar was made acting premier in 1992 he was seven months older than Kiriyenko was when Yeltsin nominated him in 1998.
10 This is the sequence as reported in my interview with Kiriyenko, whose memory I trust most on these events. In Marafon Yeltsin said he met with Kiriyenko before Chernomyrdin. A recently adopted law on governmental organization specified that only a first deputy premier could be appointed as acting prime minister. Yeltsin was unaware of this detail and, after signing his initial decree, had to retrace his steps, make Kiriyenko a first deputy premier, and then promote him.
11 Quotation from Vladimir Zhirinovskii, interview with the author (January 22, 2002). That the Kremlin paid the LDPR money is widely believed in Moscow. Two persons who served in very high official posts in 1998 said in interviews that cash was provided from pro-government businesses and from a covert item in the federal budget.
12 Ivan Rodin, “Kommunisty predlagayut reshit’ uchast’ Dumy otkrytym golosovaniyem” (The communists suggest that the Duma make its decision by open vote), Nezavisimaya gazeta, April 24, 1998.
13 Baturin et al., Epokha, 754.
14 Only twenty-five voted against; almost 200 spoiled ballots, abstained, or stayed out of Moscow; twelve sent in written declarations in favor, which were not counted in the total. Since the ballot was secret, the party breakdown is not known with certainty. But journalists estimated twenty to twenty-five KPRF deputies broke with Gennadii Zyuganov to support Kiriyenko. See Ivan Rodin, “Duma progolosovala za Sergeya Kiriyenko i prodlila svoë sushchestvovaniye” (The Duma voted for Sergei Kiriyenko and prolonged its existence), Nezavisimaya gazeta, April 25, 1998; and David Hoffman, “Third Vote Confirms Kiriyenko as New Russian Premier,” The Washington Post, April 25, 1998.