Most of this is to be taken with a grain of salt. We know that Yeltsin and a Sverdlovsk confrère compared notes on the Moscow job a few days before the Politburo meeting. On that occasion, Yeltsin was champing at the bit and agreed with the suggestion that “for the second time only the Urals can save Moscow”—the first being in World War II, when munitions factories were evacuated there and it became an arsenal for the country.31 The transcript in the archives for the Politburo session of December 23 shows unequivocally that Yeltsin took the change in stride and said nothing about other likely appointees. Gorbachev was quoted, in the tradition of the spoken word taking precedence over the written, as having talked the position over with him. The only other members who spoke on the motion, all briefly and all in favor, were Gromyko, now head of the executive board of the Soviet parliament; Solomentsev of the control commission; Vitalii Vorotnikov, the prime minister of the RSFSR and its representative on the Politburo; and Viktor Grishin, the incumbent Moscow leader.
Gorbachev opened with word that he had received a letter of resignation from Grishin and wanted him to be given an honorific post as adviser to Gromyko:
GROMYKO: It should say in the text of the resolution that comrade Grishin will be assigned to the group of advisers.
SOLOMENTSEV: That’s right.
VOROTNIKOV: Yes, it has to be written up like that.
GORBACHEV: If the comrades have no objections, I am available to take part in the plenum of the Moscow gorkom of the CPSU. Now, let us talk about who should be the candidate for the post of gorkom first secretary. The question is about the party organization of our capital. This makes it appropriate to recommend for this post someone from the Central Committee who has work experience in a major party organization and knows about the economy, science, and culture. There is a suggestion that we recommend comrade B. N. Yeltsin.
VOROTNIKOV: Good idea.
SOLOMENTSEV: Sure.
GORBACHEV: I have had a conversation with comrade Yeltsin. He understands the place and significance of the Moscow party organization, how thorny and complex work as first secretary of the Moscow city committee would be. The capital, after all, is the capital. It is our administrative, economic, scientific, and cultural center.
GROMYKO: In population size alone, Moscow is like a real country. VOROTNIKOV: Yes, a country like Czechoslovakia.
GORBACHEV: Do the comrades have any other suggestion?
MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO: No.
GORBACHEV: In that case, comrade Yeltsin, we will be recommending you as first secretary of the Moscow party committee.
The retirement of Grishin from the Politburo and Yeltsin’s shedding of his duties in the Secretariat were to be straightened out at the next plenum of the Central Committee. Grishin was given a minute to offer unctuous thanks to Gorbachev, and then all eyes turned to Yeltsin:
YELTSIN: Five and a half months ago, I was elected a secretary of the Central Committee. I exerted every effort to master my new duties. Now I am being given an extraordinary assignment. I shall do all I can in order to participate actively in every innovation taking place in the party and the country, in dealing with the problems Mikhail Sergeyevich has been speaking about. I will try to justify your confidence.
GORBACHEV: We certainly hope so, or else we would not be making such a decision. Do we all approve of this motion?
MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO: We approve. The motion was adopted.32
At 8.7 million people, Yeltsin’s new domain was the megalopolis of the USSR. Moscow was, as Gorbachev said, the hub of government, business, education, science, and culture—in the Soviet constellation of things, it was Washington, New York, Boston, and Los Angeles rolled into one. Unlike other Soviet cities, it answered to the central authorities and not to the province around it. Its party boss was the senior local politico in the power structure and sat on the highest councils of the CPSU. Among the major figures who had held its first secretaryship in the past were Vyacheslav Molotov, Lazar Kaganovich, and Nikita Khrushchev. The office building of the Moscow party committee was 6 Old Square, cheek by jowl with the Central Committee reception at 4 Old Square; the two had been built around 1910 as matching luxury apartment houses for the Moscow bourgeoisie. Yeltsin was to make it onto the second tier of the Politburo as a candidate (nonvoting) member on February 18, 1986, which was when he officially left the Central Committee Secretariat so as to concentrate on Moscow. Moving up from a Volga sedan to a ZIL-115 limousine, he was now one of the fifteen or twenty most powerful people in the second most powerful country in the world.33 Under Brezhnev-era understandings on continuity in office, he would have occupied it carefree for two decades.
Control of Moscow was as sensitive an issue as any in Soviet politics in 1985–86. Viktor Grishin, a phlegmatic, half-educated mainstay of the Brezhnev Politburo now in his seventies, had been its first secretary since 1967 and had promoted the capital under his hand as the “model communist city.” His authority had been sapped by a string of scandals, exposed by Ligachëv and others, alleging falsification and thievery in Moscow’s trade and housing networks. Grishin sealed his fate in 1984–85 with an inapt play to present himself as the deathbed pick of Chernenko for general secretary.34
The selection of Yeltsin to dislodge the antediluvian Grishin was, once again, contested. The disapproval came this time not from a relic of the past like Tikhonov but from the likes of Nikolai Ryzhkov, the youngish technocrat who, with Gorbachev behind him, had supplanted Tikhonov as Soviet prime minister in September 1985. Ryzhkov, born in 1929 in Ukraine, was well acquainted with Boris Yeltsin. A UPI alumnus who made his career in Sverdlovsk, he had been director of Uralmash, the Urals Heavy Machinery Works, and sat on the oblast party committee from 1971 to 1975, when Yeltsin was head of the obkom construction department. Although Yeltsin had personal respect for him and the two talked civilly until 1990, Ryzhkov thought Yeltsin was egocentric and quarrelsome and that, as head of department, he had improperly “commanded” Uralmash to carry out tasks the party apparatus wanted done.35 Not being on the Politburo until some weeks after Yeltsin was brought to Moscow, Ryzhkov was out of the loop on that decision. Now that he was chairman of the government and a full member of the Politburo, he could not be circumnavigated. In a colloquy at Old Square before the December 23 meeting, Gorbachev and Ligachëv asked him if he approved of Yeltsin being made the Moscow party chief. Ryzhkov did not mince words. Yeltsin, he warned, while well and good for a party department or one of the construction ministries, could not be entrusted with a more sensitive, political mission. Yeltsin was by nature cut out for brawls. “He will chop wood,” said Ryzhkov, using a rural maxim as warning, “and it will be your elbows that will smart.” Not wanting a fight, he agreed to keep mum in the Politburo unless a fellow member asked his opinion, which none was to do. Some years later, Gorbachev would admit to him that he rued the day he snubbed Ryzhkov’s advice about Yeltsin.36
Ryzhkov’s doubts were about Yeltsin’s character and style, not about policy or obeisance to the regime. No one, not even Yeltsin, saw him as a prospective apostate and leader of the opposition. In December 1985, like Ryabov in his day, Gorbachev considered Yeltsin a force he could tame. Yeltsin knew the terms of the bargain: “I understood perfectly that I was being used to knock down the Grishin team.”37