Had the Soviet rules of the game still applied, Yeltsin’s political career would have been well and truly over. But the game was in kaleidoscopic motion, and soon was to provide undreamt-of opportunities outside the iron cage of the bureaucracy. His intuition in 1987 about which way the wind was blowing, the action of speaking out before the Central Committee, and Gorbachev’s overkill reaction to it constituted an inflection point in the breakup of the communist system. The juncture set up a robust alignment of political forces on the macro issue of how fast the system should change: Yeltsin in the van as the apotheosis of change, party conservatives in the rear, Gorbachev in the spongy middle. Successive crises and feedback loops were to fortify it even as the political spectrum was displaced in a more revolutionary direction. Originally limited to the elite, the fatal alignment would reproduce itself in the population when electoral freedom made it relevant to them, which in turn widened the fissures at the elite plateau. As one of the directors of Yeltsin’s eventual campaign for president of Russia was to remark in 1991, “This campaign began in 1987.”18
On November 19, 1987, a bulletin from the TASS news agency said Yeltsin had been appointed first deputy chairman of Gosstroi, the State Construction Committee of the Soviet Union. His blackest fears had gone unrealized. He was not to be banished to Ulan Bator or Addis Ababa, or to a muddy Soviet construction site, or to a cottage in Moscow oblast. The new position was a sinecure, on a rank with minister in the USSR government, and was at the summit of an industry Yeltsin had known since his twenties.
Licking his wounds, Yeltsin started work at Gosstroi on February 8, 1988. Once ejected from the Politburo, he kept the VIP flat on Second Tverskaya-Yamskaya but lost his bodyguards and was downgraded to a mid-sized Chaika limousine and a cramped dacha. Gosstroi was in a modern building on Pushkin Street, later to house the Federation Council, the upper house of the Russian parliament. Not what he was used to in space or conveniences, the office there was all he had.
The pressure on Yeltsin did not abate. The chief of Gosstroi, Yurii Batalin, a pipeline specialist and a Sverdlovsker with a UPI diploma, was under orders to report any wayward activity. The KGB eavesdropped on Yeltsin’s phone calls; plainclothes officers lurked in the foyer to see who was visiting.19 As he settled in, Yeltsin took lynx-eyed note of the surveillance: He would turn on the radio or pour water in the washbasin to muffle sensitive conversations. His first ever desk job bored him no end. He gave one visitor the impression that he was permanently stifling a scream.20 He was to write a memorandum to Prime Minister Ryzhkov proposing that Gosstroi be done away with as a fifth wheel and its significant functions transferred to other agencies.21 “My work with real, live people has been replaced by the office,” was his plaint later that year. “I shuffle papers.”22
Yeltsin was at sea psychologically for months. He took it hard when the February plenum of the Central Committee confirmed his demotion from the Politburo. His Gosstroi assistant, Lev Sukhanov, was stunned at his condition the next day: “When he got to work that morning, his face was vacant. It looked to me like the finale of a burial service staged by his Politburo colleagues. He suffered from all of this, but somehow found strength within himself and worked the entire day.”23 Yeltsin’s memoirs painted his Gosstroi entr’acte as “a nightmarish year-and-a-half” and “perhaps the most difficult days of my life.” All was “dead silence and emptiness” in the office. It was “torture” to watch his cream-colored Kremlin telephone in the hope of an expiatory call from Gorbachev. He felt like tearing it out of the wall, lest the appliance “spout new miseries” for him.24 Dejected at work, and with time on his hands, Yeltsin took up the game of tennis in 1988 and bought with cash savings his first automobile, a tiny, silver-colored Moskvich. Aleksandr Korzhakov, a KGB bodyguard to Yeltsin when he was Moscow party boss, helped teach him how to drive the vehicle. Yeltsin was a poor pupil who often mistook brake for gas pedal. “It was after this that my hair began to go gray,” Korzhakov says.25
Politically, until the elections for the Soviet parliament in the spring of 1989, Yeltsin was in a netherworld. He was banned from the Moscow media, and the only interviews he granted were to reporters from abroad and from the Baltic republics of the USSR. The chairman of the Party Control Commission, Mikhail Solomentsev, hauled him on the carpet in the spring of 1988 for contact with the foreign press. “He rudely cut me off,” says Solomentsev, “and asserted that he had no need to ask anyone’s permission, that he was a free man and had the right to give his opinion wherever he liked and to whomever he liked.”26 The interviews did subside for a spell. In May Yeltsin spoke with two Russian publications; the party Secretariat blocked publication. He then resumed interviews with the foreign media, going on the BBC in May and on the three American television networks in June.
The Nineteenth CPSU Conference in June–July 1988 was convened to showcase Gorbachevian political reform. Yeltsin, who could have sat in by right as a Central Committee member, held out for nomination by a territorial subunit of the party. Stymied in Moscow and in Sverdlovsk (where Gorbachev and Ligachëv had just made Leonid Bobykin, a competitor of Yeltsin’s, the first secretary), he snagged a ticket from Kareliya, a minority republic of the RSFSR located on the Finnish border. As in October, he had to exert himself at the conference to speak. Two notes to Gorbachev, in the chair, did not do the trick. On the fifth and last morning of the conference, July 1, Yeltsin announced to the Karelian delegation, seated to the back of the mezzanine, that he was taking the floor by storm, “like the Winter Palace” falling to the Bolsheviks and the workers in 1917. He trooped to the foot of the dais and stood there, staring at the presidium and brandishing his red card. Looking daggers, Gorbachev had a staffer tell him he would be recognized if he sat down and waited his turn. Yeltsin did so and was given the floor.27
The gatecrashing paid off. To the 5,000 conferees, Yeltsin gave a feisty fifteen-minute speech that he had massaged for weeks. Excerpts were broadcast on Soviet television, and it was published in the press. It contained no jabs at Gorbachev and few words about Yegor Ligachëv, with whom he said he had tactical differences only. But his wad of accusations got larger, as he added the need for transparency in the party’s finances and for a downsizing of the apparatus. Yeltsin was more recalcitrant than in 1987 on the issues of mass benefit from reform and the privileges of the well-fed Soviet elite. Perestroika had been configured “under the hypnosis of words” and had “not resolved any of the tangible, real problems of people”; to go on this way was to “risk losing grip on the steering wheel and on political stability.” On elitist patterns, where he had previously limited himself to those counter to party norms, he now hacked away at the norms per se. Communists’ monthly dues, he observed, paid for food packets for “the starving nomenklatura” and for “luxurious residences, dachas, and sanatoriums of such an amplitude that you are ashamed when the representatives of foreign parties visit.” All political initiatives, said Yeltsin, ought to be discussed without preconceptions and put to national referendums. The CPSU general secretary, the Politburo, and party officers down the line should be elected by the rank-and-file, restricted to two terms in office, and retired at sixty-five.28