Jewish self-affirmation, protest, and massive migration to Israel (about 235,000 emigrants up to 1985, some 10 per cent of the total Jewish population of the U.S.S.R., with many more applying) - together with the permitted emigration of some non-Jews - represented another development to disturb the post-Stalin Soviet scene, a development closely linked to the intellectual opposition, although also quite distinct. One suspects that the decision to let numerous dissatisfied Soviet citizens leave, while solving the immediate problem of dealing with those people as well as responding in a conciliatory way to world public opinion, potentially raised more questions for the Soviet system than it settled. It is apparently among many Soviet Jews that the alienation from the established order was especially thoroughgoing, as in the anecdotal story of the Moscow Jew who was accused of receiving a letter from a brother in Tel Aviv, although
he had claimed that he had no relatives abroad. He explained: "You don't understand: my brother is at home; I am abroad."
The post-Stalin relaxation of restrictions appeared especially striking in an area that spans domestic and foreign policies: foreign travel and international contacts in general. Modifying the former Draconian regulations, which had made a virtually impenetrable "iron curtain" between the Soviet people and the outside world, Soviet authorities began to welcome tourists, including Americans, and allow increasing numbers of their citizens to travel abroad. Always strong on organization, they proceeded to arrange numerous "cultural exchanges," ranging from advanced study in many fields of learning to motion pictures and books for children. Soviet scientists, scholars, athletes, dancers, and musicians, not to mention the astronauts, drew deserved attention in many countries of the world. At the same time Soviet citizens welcomed distinguished visitors from the West and vigorously applauded their performances. In 1976, following the Helsinki agreements of the preceding year, foreign travel and cultural exchange gained further strength, supplying the U.S.S.R. with more international contacts than had been the case at any time since the discontinuation of the N.E.P. Bit by bit, the Soviet Union was becoming better acquainted with the West and the world.
Foreign Relations
Soviet foreign policy after Stalin's death also continued to follow the established pattern in many respects as the U.S.S.R. and the Communist bloc faced the United States and its allies. No conclusive agreements on such decisive issues as control of atomic weapons, general disarmament, or Germany were reached between the two sides. Crises in widely scattered areas appeared in rapid succession. The Soviet Union made a special effort to profit by the emancipation of former Asian and African colonies from Western rule. Yet the post-Stalin policy, especially as developed by Khrushchev, also had its more conciliatory side. The new party secretary elevated the fact of coexistence of the two worlds into a dogma and asserted that all problems would be solved without war. The apparent contradiction of the two approaches probably stemmed from a real inconsistency in Khrushchev's thinking rather than from tactical considerations. It reflected further the dilemma faced by aggressive communism in an age of hydrogen warfare. Brezhnev was to pursue the substance, if not the flamboyant style, of his predecessor's foreign policy, engaging in an enormous arms race and pushing hard Soviet influence and interests in Europe, Asia, the Near East, Africa, and elsewhere, while emphasizing at
the same time detente with the United States and the march of history towards peaceful evolution and international cooperation.
Stalin's death and Malenkov's assumption of the leading role in the Soviet Union marked some lessening of international tensions as well as some relaxation at home. The new prime minister asserted that all disputed questions in foreign relations could be settled peacefully, singling out the United States as a country with which an understanding could be reached. In the summer of 1953 an armistice was finally agreed upon in Korea. In the spring of 1954 an international conference ended the war in Indo-China by partitioning it between the Communist Vietminh in the north and the independent state of Vietnam in the south. Although the Soviet Union had not participated directly in the Indo-Chinese conflict, that local war had threatened to become a wider conflagration, and its termination enhanced the chances of world peace. In January 1954, the Council of Foreign Ministers of the four powers, inoperative for a long time, met in Berlin to discuss the German and Austrian treaties, but without result. The Soviet Union joined the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, or UNESCO, and the International Labor Organization, or ILO, that April. Malenkov spoke of a further improvement of international relations and of a summit meeting.
That a policy of even moderate relaxation had its dangers for the Soviet bloc became, however, quickly apparent. In early June 1953, demonstrations and strikes erupted in Czechoslovakia, assuming a dangerous form in Pilsen - or Plzen - where rioters seized the city hall and demanded free elections. In the middle of the month East Berlin and other centers in East Germany rose in a rebellion spearheaded by workers who proclaimed a general strike. Soviet troops re-established order after some bitter fighting. Beria's fall that summer might have been affected by these developments, for the police chief had stressed relaxation and legality since the death of Stalin. Malenkov's resignation from the premiership in February 1955 ended the role of that former favorite of Stalin on the world scene.
Bulganin, who replaced Malenkov as head of the government, became the most prominent Soviet figure in international affairs, although he usually traveled in the company of and acted jointly with the Party chief, Khrushchev. Molotov, in the meantime, continued in charge of the foreign office. "B. and K." diplomacy, as it came to be known, included much showy journeying on goodwill missions in both Europe and Asia. The Soviet Union paid special court to India and other neutralist countries, which had formerly been condemned as lackeys of imperialism. At the same time the two Soviet leaders claimed to be ready to settle the points at issue with the United States and the West. And, indeed, in May 1955 the great
powers managed to come to an agreement and conclude a peace treaty with Austria, which included the permanent neutralization of that state as well as certain Austrian payments and deliveries to the U.S.S.R. in recompense for the Soviet return of German property in Austria to the Austrian government. The height of the detente was reached at the summit conference in Geneva in July 1955. While no concrete problems were solved at that meeting, the discussion took place in a remarkably cordial atmosphere, with both Bulganin and Eisenhower insisting that their countries would never engage in aggressive action. The following month Soviet authorities announced a reduction of their armed forces by 640,000 men. In September the U.S.S.R. returned the Porkkala base to Finland and concluded a treaty of friendship with the Finns for twenty years. Yet in the autumn of 1955, as soon as the ministers of foreign affairs tried to apply the attitude of accommodation and understanding expressed by their chiefs to the settlement of specific issues, a deadlock resulted, with Molotov not budging an inch from the previous Soviet positions and demands. The "spirit of Geneva" proved to be an enticing dream rather than a reality.
Since the rapprochement between the U.S.S.R. and the West failed to last, the polarization of the world continued. Following the Communist victory in northern Indo-China, the Manila pact of September 1954 created the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, or SEATO. Great Britain, France, Pakistan, and Thailand joined the four countries already allied, the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines, to establish a new barrier to Communist expansion in Asia. In Europe, West Germany rose steadily in importance as an American ally and a member of the Western coalition. The Soviet Union in its turn concluded the so-called Warsaw Treaty with its satellites in May 1955 to unify the Communist military command in Europe.