Christmas Day was, according to Reilly, a very quiet affair, as were the New Year celebrations at the Kuban Club in Ekaterinodar.32 In complete contrast, however, Hill recalls that they celebrated New Year at the Palace Hotel in Rostov, and refers in graphic detail to:
…a large ballroom which had a balcony round it, divided into boxes. In the centre of the ballroom a beautiful fountain played. The tables were thronged by queerly assorted, oddly dressed men and women. Beautiful women wore threadbare blouses, down-at-heel shoes, yet on their fingers displayed rings or on their necks colliers that would have made even a Cartier’s assistant’s mouth water. Others, with the air of duchesses, wore luxurious fur coats, which as a rule they took good care to keep fastened, for in most cases anything worn beneath was scanty and painfully shabby. One girl I especially remember was particularly well dressed, yet she wore hand-knitted socks and bark sandals.33
Reilly and Hill were apparently decked out in full evening dress. Everyone, to Hill’s recollection, seemed to be enjoying themselves although Reilly particularly disliked the ‘old regime formalities’, such as the band’s impromptu habit of striking up numerous national anthems, which obliged all present to stand rigidly to atten-tion. After one such rendition, Hill observed Reilly with interest ‘as he sipped Turkish coffee, took an occasional drink of iced water, and with precision smoked one Russian cigarette after another’.34
Many hours and drinks later, Hill recalls feeling ‘desperately tired’, and making his way to his bedroom where he got into his pyjamas. Faintly, from below, he heard the band playing. Responding to the strains of The Old Hunters’ March, he put on his dressing gown and went downstairs, where ‘something’ possessed him to lead the band and a crowd of revellers on a march ‘up and down the corridors and stairs, into the attics and through the kitchens of the Palace Hotel’.35
Which is the correct recollection? How could they each be in two separate locations, celebrating New Year, when the one thing they do agree on is that they celebrated New Year together? Although an initially perplexing conundrum, the answer is a very simple one. Until the Bolsheviks took power, Russia was using a calendar that was thirteen days behind that used in Britain and indeed most other places in the world. The Bolsheviks decreed that Russia should fall into line with everyone else. The Whites, who controlled the zone Reilly and Hill were in, opposed everything the Bolsheviks did on principle, and stubbornly carried on with the old Russian calendar. Reilly had a small English Letts pocket diary, and recorded all the events which took place while he was in Southern Russia on a daily basis, following on from their departure from London. Rather like the man who does not adjust his watch when moving from one time zone to another, Reilly had simply carried on regardless. Hill, by contrast, was going by the calendar in use in the area at the time, and so a thirteen-day time gap exists between the two sets of recollections. Proof of this theory is to be found in Reilly’s diary, where on the 13 January he refers to ‘great NY celebrations, everyone getting horribly drunk – Hill leading band in dressing gown. Old regime all over’.36
It is equally clear from his diary that Reilly set about his task of collecting information about the Black Sea coast and South Russia with enthusiasm, arranging a whole series of meetings with political and military leaders in the area in order to draft his dispatches. On 27 December he had met Denikin’s Minister for War, Gen. Lukomsky, and had ‘a long conversation’ with him. From his very first report Reilly nailed his colours firmly to Denikin’s mast, stating that ‘the Volunteer Army represents the only concrete dependable force and living symbol of Russian unity’ whose success or failure would be determined by the extent of Allied support.37 On New Year’s Eve he sent off the report along with a letter to Nadine. The New Year celebrations were noted as being very tame.
By the time of his second dispatch it was noted that ‘the prevailing atmosphere is not a healthy one, neither for the political stability of the Kuban territory nor for the Volunteer Army which is still greatly dependent upon the territory’s resources and upon its support in men’.38 On 5 January he met with Gen. Poole, who had recently returned from the battle front, and noted that ‘our ideas are practically in agreement’.39
Those ideas formed the nucleus of his next despatch, which advised that:
…the military situation of the Volunteer Army is extremely serious, the question of its equipments, provisioning, armaments and of its technical means cannot be characterised otherwise than appalling (I am borrowing this definition from a conversation with Gen. Poole); the question of the urgency of Allied assistance becomes therefore more important than the question of its extent.40
It also mentions arms to carry on the fight, ‘Whippet tanks, and bombing planes’, as well as clothing.41 Reilly estimated that the Red Army would be quite a formidable force by the spring of 1919 with more than a million men in the field. He expressed the view, however, that the task of overcoming them would be ‘a comparatively easy one’. He believed that ‘Bolshevik armies will not stand up to regular troops’, and that this would be even more the case ‘if the latter are technically equipped’, and stated that he thought that ‘it will be fateful for Russia and probably Europe if this task is not accomplished by next summer’. As painful experience would show, however, Denikin and his army would find overcoming the Bolshevik troops to be anything but easy.
In terms of political analysis, Reilly claimed that the reformist objectives of the National Centre were in harmony with Denikin’s ultimate objectives. ‘Although in the main lines the political tendencies of the commander-in-chief and his council are identical with those of the National Centre, still monarchist aspirations are strong in some political coteries close to the commander-in-chief’. This was typical of a good number of statements made by Reilly. Like the Delphic Oracle of Ancient Greece, he often couched his pronouncements with qualifications and get-out clauses. In this case he identified generals Lukomsky and Dragomirov as ‘convinced monarchists’, both of whom held sway with Denikin in political matters. Reilly concluded his second dispatch almost prophetically, asserting that ‘there can only be one opinion on the urgent necessity of worldwide propaganda against Bolshevism as the greatest danger that ever threatened civilisation’.42 Clearly feeling ‘very pleased at the success of number 2’,43 Reilly got to meet Denikin and his key advisors on 10 January. The following day he was to quote Denikin’s views directly:
People think that in order to pacify Russia, all one has to do is to take Moscow. To hear again the sound of the Kremlin bells would, of course be pleasant, but we cannot save Russia through Moscow. Russia has to be reconquered as a whole, and to do this we have to carry out a very wide-sweeping movement from the south, moving right across Russia. We cannot do this alone. We must have the assistance of the Allies. Equipment and armament alone are not sufficient; we must have Allied troops which will move behind us, holding territories which we will reconquer, by garrisoning the towns, policing the country and protecting our lines of communication.44
It is worth noting that Denikin uses the word reconquer as opposed to liberate in this interview with Reilly, which is an indication in itself of his outlook. It also highlights one of the main reasons for his ultimate failure to win widespread trust and support among the general population.