The Soviet Union, suddenly confronted by U.S-China rapprochement, saw that its global strategic position was weakened. Because Nixon and Kissinger had leveraged China, the Russians hedged. Expecting Soviet support when the U.S. Navy mined its harbors on 8 May 1972, Hanoi was shocked when the Soviets only issued a few protests and proceeded with plans to welcome Nixon to Moscow. Militarily, Hanoi now faced the might of the U.S. Seventh Fleet and U.S. Air Force in combination with the sudden loss of the dependable support of its longtime Chinese and Russian allies.
The U.S. strategy of detente, combined with the containment strategy of the 1970s, made holding South Vietnam no longer critical as the containment line of the Soviet Union had moved a thousand miles north to the Mongolian border. Circumstances had changed. The Americans fighting in Vietnam had held communism in check until the firmness of our military posture and the adroitness of our diplomacy had exploited the endemic fissures in the Communist hegemony and shifted the world’s balance of power in our favor.
RETURNING TO WASHINGTON
In the spring of 1973, I heard rumors, through letters from friends in Washington, that I would be leaving the Seventh Fleet before long to become commander in chief, Pacific Fleet with a fourth star. This certainly would be a wonderful job, and if one had to leave Seventh Fleet, Hawaii was a great assignment in command of all of the Navy in the Pacific. Therefore it was with something of a surprise and a bit of a shock when I received a personal message from the CNO, an electrically transmitted radio message known as “special category exclusive.” This meant the message was exclusively for the addressee and was not to be distributed any further. In his message, Admiral Zumwalt said that he was recalling “Jimmy” back to Washington to be his vice chief of naval operations, with the implication that this was to position me for consideration as a potential candidate to relieve him when he retired in 1974. This particular comment could not have been a nicer gesture on the part of the CNO, and it did ease the disappointment in not getting a full two years in the Seventh Fleet.
19
Chief of Naval Operations
As I was ushered into the Oval Office, I saw President Nixon sitting behind the famous desk. He seemed to be waiting for me because there were no papers cluttering the top, as one might expect. Nixon stood up and walked around in front of the desk, and Secretary of the Navy John Warner, who had accompanied me into the office, introduced me simply as “Admiral Holloway.” The president graciously asked me to sit down, pulled up a chair next to me, and motioned for John Warner to join us. The president started the conversation by asking me my United States Naval Academy class and then some other routine questions about my experience in World War II and my more recent time in Vietnam. The conversation continued for five minutes or so with the president asking me questions about my career and family life and very politely listening to my responses. Then he almost abruptly stood up and said to me, “Admiral, I know you will make a good CNO, you have excellent recommendations.” He took me by the arm and we walked to the door, pausing for a moment so the photographer could catch the three of us in a photo opportunity. When we arrived at the threshold of the Oval Office, the president paused again, turned to face me directly, and said, “Admiral, get some discipline back in the Navy. I’m an old Navy man and very proud of my service, and I don’t like what I see going on in the Navy today.” With that he shook my hand and we were ushered out by a Marine aide.
The president’s comment concerning my qualifications for CNO was the first mention, on the part of any of my seniors, that I had been selected to relieve Admiral Zumwalt. When Secretary Warner had called me in the morning, I had been working at my standup desk in the office of the vice chief of naval operations. “Get your cap,” he had said, “we’re going to make a trip to the other side of the river. Meet me at the Mall entrance.” Secretary Warner was waiting when I got to his car, and we drove to the White House, where I suspected that I might be meeting the president to have him pass judgment on me. But I did not expect a decision on anyone’s part until President Nixon had had an opportunity to discuss the matter with SecNav and SecDef. As we left the meeting, Secretary Warner appeared to be delighted by the way things had gone. I sensed that he had been supporting my candidacy for CNO.
When we reached his official car he told the driver to take us to the Metropolitan Club, which is the premier watering hole for the power structure in Washington, D.C. As we headed for the dining room, John Warner said, “I think this calls for a celebration. They have the best shad and roe in town.” It was the first time I had been inside this revered establishment, and I was suitably impressed. It was particularly thoughtful of John Warner to entertain me there as his guest. At the time, I was too overwhelmed to even imagine that in fifteen years I would be elected president of the Metropolitan Club.
VICE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATION
Admiral Zumwalt had brought me back to Washington from command of the Seventh Fleet to serve as his vice chief of naval operations with a promotion to four stars. Bud Zumwalt was a Naval Academy classmate of mine and we had also been together in the class of 1962 at the National War College. We had gotten to know each other very well during that year at NWC, and the four of us, the Zumwalts and Holloways, became close friends. And that is how Bud Zumwalt had treated me during his first three years as CNO. When I arrived in Washington in July 1973 for the vice chief of naval operations job, Bud and Mouza Zumwalt were effusive in their welcome to Dabney and me. Bud was particularly painstaking in his briefings to ensure that I understood the situation in the Pentagon and in Washington, and he was completely candid in discussing the personalities of the major players in town with whom we would be doing business.
For me, my role and my responsibility were clear. I was the CNO’s alter ego, with no agenda or initiatives of my own. It was my job to see that his policies were forcefully implemented. I would adopt the classic approach, the same relationship as an executive officer toward his commanding officer. The CNO would consult with me on matters of Navy policy and management, giving me an opportunity for input and comment. It was understood that I should be very frank in my views, which would always be offered in private. When the CNO had arrived at a decision, I simply adopted his position as my own and did my very best to ensure its implementation in just the way Bud would want it done. This was not difficult for me: It was the Navy way. I had been in the same situation many times in my naval career, at both ends of the stick.
As it turned out, there was very little disagreement between us. Most of Bud’s controversial decisions concerning Z-grams and the Navy’s chain of command had been made the first three years of his tenure and at this point were established as part of the regime.