The one technology that was most frequently extolled by the charlatans of the science of nuclear power was the gas-cooled reactor, which had been under extensive development by the Airborne Nuclear Reactor Program (ANRP) sponsored by the U.S. Air Force. The program was cancelled after two decades of high-priority research by the government and the nuclear industry because of the lack of any real promise of a practical operational system.
Admiral Zumwalt seldom asked me, as vice chief, to comment on these contractor reactor proposals, largely because he did not want to put me on the spot of supporting the Rickover position vis-à-vis what Bud wanted to believe, that there could be a cheaper, lighter reactor system for naval ships as promised by the contractor’s representatives. Frankly, it was very helpful of him, and it kept me out of a difficult position. On my part, I simply steered completely clear of Admiral Rickover during my days as vice chief, and the KOG was astute enough not to rock the boat. Actually, there were no material or compelling policy issues in the area of nuclear propulsion that required resolution at this time. The Navy and the CNO were fully committed to nuclear power in all carriers and submarines by this date.
On one occasion, Bud did discuss with me a proposal by his special staff group that the Navy program the construction of a fleet of catamaran troop transports that would be powered by gas-cooled reactors that could drive these vessels across the ocean at a speed of seventy knots. I was able to persuade Bud that the technology for a seventy-knot oceangoing catamaran or surface-effect ship was definitely not in hand in the immediate future (he didn’t trust the advice of the Naval Ship Systems Command admirals, considering them too conservative and risk-averse) and that a nuclear reactor capable of generating the power that would enable any seagoing vehicle to attain such high speeds would be so heavy that there would be very little room left for troops.
As a matter of record, I have always held the view that Admiral Rickover has been unjustly accused of being overly conservative in his reactor design. Initially, he had gone forward with two basic engineering design concepts: the pressurized water reactor, which eventually came to be used in all nuclear submarines — ours, our allies, and the Soviets — and an alternative design, the liquid sodium reactor. This used sodium as the coolant and the energy transfer medium from the reactor to the steam plant. The sodium reactor was installed in the submarine Seawolf and in my opinion, as a line officer who happens to have a degree in nuclear design engineering, the sodium cooled reactor would have been almost impossibly complex to design and build and terribly complicated to operate. The fact that Admiral Rickover not only made it work, but that it was installed on an operating, fleet-deployed submarine for two years, is most remarkable. Fleet experience conclusively demonstrated that it was inferior to the pressurized water reactor. When Seawolf came in for its first nuclear refueling, the pressurized-water reactor replaced the liquid sodium reactor as the submarine’s power plant. I have often used this as an example of why Rickover should not be accused of avoiding certain technologies because they were too difficult. Rickover was willing to take on all reasonable concepts, regardless of the technical and engineering difficulties, solve the problems, and make them work. He could then reject without criticism those concepts that were proven inferior from operational experience.
During this time, Secretary of Defense Jim Schlesinger was deciding who would take Bud’s place as CNO that June. Zumwalt had brought me into the Pentagon hierarchy with four stars to make me eligible for consideration for the job of CNO and made it clear that I would be acceptable to him. I believe he favored as CNO Adm. Worth Bagley, who he felt would be better suited to continue the momentum of the Zumwalt reforms, but Bud was scrupulously fair to me as a candidate. Admiral Moorer, who was then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, made it clear that he supported me for CNO. Secretary Schlesinger went through a fairly exhaustive vetting process with all of the candidates. He would call me to his office about once a week, usually in the afternoon, for a cup of coffee and just talk. Normally these conversations were on matters of broad policy or somewhat abstract issues. One of his favorite topics was the possibility of employing nuclear weapons to demonstrate resolve without initiating a general nuclear war. He introduced matters of judgment, rather than subjects to determine where I stood on various issues. I found the exchanges stimulating and I very much enjoyed these sessions.
CHANGE OF COMMAND
I relieved Admiral Zumwalt as CNO at a splendid change-of-command ceremony held in Tecumseh Court in front of the main entrance to Bancroft Hall, the architectural as well as the sentimental focal point of the Naval Academy. Secretary of Defense Jim Schlesinger was the senior official presiding.
During my first interview with the press after becoming CNO, the obvious question was asked: “What changes are you going to make in the Navy?” My answer was, “There is a traditional expression from the sailing Navy that the oncoming officer of the deck should not change the set of the sails in the first fifteen minutes of his watch. I’m going to wait a while before I consider changing the set of the sails.” This was more than just an adage; I considered it the only wise course. There was still a lot of post-Vietnam turmoil in the Navy at that time. Quite a few people, mostly within the retired, senior officer, and chief petty officer communities, still did not approved of Zumwalt’s changes to the existing — and considered traditional — Navy way of doing things. There were also a lot of people who approved of Zumwalt’s more liberal policies and were equally concerned that I would change things back to the way they had been. We had to get these differences under control, to heal and unify the Navy. The Navy didn’t need more changes at that time.
Shortly after I relieved Admiral Zumwalt as CNO, Nixon resigned as president and was succeeded by Gerald Ford. For many years Ford had been chairman of the House Appropriations Committee and served on the Armed Forces Subcommittee. So he had an extensive exposure to the DoD budget and the character of the four services. Jerry Ford had a warm rapport with the people in uniform and well understood the correct relationships between flag officers and their civilian seniors.
Ford had served in the Navy during World War II, spending 18 months on the carrier Monterey, a cruiser hull converted to a light aircraft carrier. He remained on board until the carrier returned to CONUS for repairs in 1944 after suffering severe damage in a typhoon. The CVLs had the speed and deck space to handle the high-performance aircraft that enabled them to steam with the fast carrier task forces of Admirals Spruance and Halsey, TF 38 and TF 58. Lieutenant Ford had reported on board the Monterey at its commissioning as gunnery officer, and by the time he had been detached, he had earned nine battle stars on his Asiatic-Pacific campaign ribbon. He had earned the distinction among his fellow officers on board as being the designated officer of the deck during general quarters, an assignment of special responsibility that is indicative of the high professional respect he had earned as a young Naval Reserve officer. On several occasions Ford alluded to his days on board the Monterey and the great satisfaction that he had enjoyed in his brief but exciting tour of duty conning the carrier through the great carrier air battles against the Japanese in the Pacific.
One of the first of the foreign heads of state to pay an official visit to President Ford was the chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Helmut Schmidt. The Fords entertained their German guests in Washington and Chancellor Schmidt responded with a cocktail party in Baltimore, Maryland, a comfortable drive for Washington guests and a nice change from the standard Washington venue of the visitor’s national embassy.