The first test case came when the position of president of the Naval War College opened up. This was a three-star billet and required a very special kind of naval officer, one with both operational experience and a clearly intellectual cast of mind. The CNO and the SecNav quickly came up with their candidate, Rear Adm. James Stockdale, a hero of the Vietnam War who as prisoner of war had organized the prison camps to require the U.S. prisoners of war to resist any interrogation that exceeded the degree permitted by the Geneva Conventions. In retribution for his courageous leadership in defying his captors, he was so severely beaten that he suffered crippling injuries that personally affected his posture and his gait. His disabilities were clearly evident to anyone who met him. Furthermore, Stockdale had gained considerable public recognition because he had received the Medal of Honor, been featured in several television specials, and had written a book that was on the New York Times’ bestseller list. All of these had emphasized the debilitating injuries he had suffered because of his leadership of the prisoners of war.
The names of four nominees were sent down to the OSD, but even then, the dossiers and the career summaries were clearly in favor of Stockdale, who had gained his reputation as an operator commanding a carrier air wing in combat in Vietnam flying from the USS Oriskany, as well as a reputation among his peers as an honest intellectual, based on his two years of postgraduate study after the Naval Academy, at Stanford University.
The secretary of defense informed me that his first choice for the position of Naval War College president was Rear Admiral Stockdale and that he would be interviewed by the secretary or assistant secretary for that position. Stockdale was duly scheduled, and he reported for his interview in blue service uniform with his full array of ribbons. The interview took about forty-five minutes, and at its conclusion, the gentleman who had conducted the interview, who was not Secretary of Defense Brown (he had been otherwise engaged), was thoughtful enough to call me to say that he had met with Admiral Stockdale, had been quite impressed by him, and thought he would be an excellent choice as the president of the NWC. The Navy should go ahead and write orders assigning him to that job. Then, as the conversation ended, the interviewer said, “Jim, one thing, though, why does he walk so funny and drag his arm that way?”
So much for a senior government executive being able to size up a stranger’s suitability to fulfill a senior military flag assignment in a critical and demanding position.
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE BROWN AND NUCLEAR CARRIERS
In February 1977 I was in my third year as chief of naval operations, working for my third president, Jimmy Carter, and my third secretary of defense, Harold Brown. President Carter, who considered himself an expert in naval matters in spite of his very limited duty in the Navy, was not favorably disposed toward aircraft carriers. In getting ready for the FY 79 budget, I was scheduled to testify before the Military Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee of the Senate, a very small but powerful committee on the Hill. The session was scheduled for 1000, and I was told that Secretary of the Navy Graham Claytor and Secretary of Defense Brown would accompany me to this hearing. I’m not sure if the three of us had been invited as a group, or it was their decision to appear with me to make sure I said the right thing.
I was told by the SecDef’s office that the subject of an aircraft carrier probably would come up and that Brown wanted to reaffirm to me that the president’s position was that there were no plans in the administration for the immediate construction of a new aircraft carrier, certainly not in the 1979 budget, and that the program in the future (at some unspecified time) would be for a small, nonnuclear carrier. If I were asked a question on aircraft carriers, that was to be the guidance for my response.
On the day of the hearing, Secretary Claytor, with whom I had a very pleasant and straightforward relationship, asked me to ride over to the Senate in his sedan. I knew it would be an opportunity for us to talk, and I was not keen on letting myself in for any additional instructions. True gentleman that he was, Graham Claytor on the trip over never brought up the subject of the testimony to be given at the hearings. We did talk about the state of the Navy in general, but there was no pressure from him for me to provide any set answers for the Committee.
In the course of the hearings, for which there had been only an innocuous statement prepared for submission for the record, one of the senior senators said, “Admiral, I do not see an aircraft carrier in this budget, aren’t you concerned about this?” My response was that the budget I submitted to the SecNav included a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, but it had been taken out during the budget review. The senator then said, “Well if you had your way, would you like to see a carrier in the president’s budget?” I said yes.
Then the senator turned to the secretary of defense and said, “What are your feelings about including a carrier in this FY 79 budget?”
“We don’t share Admiral Holloway’s view,” Secretary Brown said. “You must understand he is only the chief of naval operations and we have to look at the bigger picture. It is our position that we don’t need another carrier now, but that we are not ruling out a carrier in the future.”
“What kind of a carrier would that be?” the senator asked.
“We think it should be a much smaller carrier and without nuclear power and probably designed for V/STOL aircraft only,” Brown responded.
“Admiral Holloway,” the senator said, “how do you feel about Secretary Brown’s position? Now I want the truth.”