So the message was reformatted as an implementing policy directive and sent out before the weekend. It was not necessary to consult with the SecNav or SecDef, as it was the CNO’s prerogative to establish the operating procedures of naval forces. The message conveyed the following philosophy:
1. The Battle Force organization of the fleet will reflect the mission, functions, roles, and employment of the U.S. Navy. Primary among these considerations is the maintenance of maritime superiority for the United States and its allies in the face of a growing threat at sea. The organization will be responsive to the changing balance of maritime power. It must reflect the current tactical and strategic concepts of the U.S. Navy.
2. To paraphrase the mission of the Navy as expressed in Title 10 of the U.S. Code, it is to conduct prompt and sustained combat operations at sea in support of national policies. In effect, it is to assure the continued maritime superiority for the United States. This requires that the Navy be able to defeat, in the aggregate, all potential threats to our continuing free use of the high seas. Thus the basic function of the U.S. Navy is sea control, which connotes control of designated sea areas and the associated airspace and underwater volume. It does not imply simultaneous control of all the earth’s ocean area but is a selective function exercised only when and where needed. Sea control is achieved by the engagement and destruction of the hostile aircraft, ships, and submarines (or by the deterrence of hostile action through the threat of destruction) that threaten the seaborne forces and resources of the United States and its allies. Sea control is a prerequisite to all other naval operations and tasks, such as amphibious warfare or support of ground forces ashore.
3. The operating forces of the U.S. Navy are to be restructured through the operational organization of the fleet for the prompt and efficient accomplishment of the tasks imposed by the Navy’s mission, functions, and roles as delineated by the national military strategy into battle groups.
4. The operation of the U.S. Navy will continue to be under the chain of command from the president and the secretary of defense through the JCS to the commanders of the Unified and Specified Commands and be administered by the naval component commanders, who are the commanders in chief, Atlantic and Pacific Fleets. The component commanders’ operating forces will be the numbered fleets, composed of operationally ready warships that represent a deployable capability to accomplish all general purpose naval warfare tasks. Within the numbered fleets, carriers, cruisers, destroyers, frigates, and submarines will constitute the afloat forces through which hostile naval forces will be engaged in battle at sea. In the numbered fleets these warships will be organized into battle forces and battle groups in the standing task organization.
5. A battle force is defined as the standing operational task force organization of carriers, surface combatants, and submarines assigned to numbered Fleets. A battle force is further subdivided into battle groups.
6. Battle groups are defined as integrated task groups capable of conducting offensive operations at sea against the combined spectrum of hostile maritime threats. A battle group would be a task group consisting of one carrier, two cruisers, four surface combatants, and one or two submarines, operating together in mutual support with the task of destroying hostile submarine, surface, and air forces within the group’s assigned area of responsibility.
7. Then this same battle group, having gained control of the required sea space for maritime operations, exercises the versatility of its air wing to establish air superiority over the objective area to project power ashore to attack hostile targets with strike aircraft, long-range missiles and ships gunfire. Naval forces are now able to operate essentially free of enemy interference to accomplish other maritime tasks such as mine countermeasures, amphibious assault with Marines, or the administrative landing of Army and Air Force expeditionary units.
The battle force concept became immediately effective as the basis of the Navy’s Fleet Operational Organization. It remained such without any modification or changes for twenty-six years, until 2004, when the Presidential Transformation Project resulted in a Navy reorganization of the fleet into striking groups formed around attack carriers and Marine helicopter carriers supported by destroyers, cruisers, and submarines in response to the 2002 Quadrennial Defense Review.
The Battle Force Fleet organization was probably my most significant contribution to the U.S. Navy in my tour as CNO. It accomplished two main goals within the Navy. First, it established a fleet organization that accurately reflected the Navy’s roles and mission as established by the laws enacted by the Congress of the United States. In doing so, it used understandable nomenclature and language in the enabling governing instructions, which not only provided a succinct and common reference for all naval personnel but also clarified for Congress, the DoD, and the JCS an understanding of the Navy’s implementation of its roles and mission to further the integration of the service into effective joint strategies, plans, and operations.
Second, the Battle Force Organization specifically provided that battle force and group commanders would be unrestricted line officers of any designation, selected on the basis of those flag officers best suited by virtue of their operational experience, warfare specialty qualification, and command maturity and judgment. In this way, a submariner, surface warfare officer, or aviator would be ordered to command a battle group. No longer would the commander of a task force, which included a carrier, be required to be a naval aviator. In broadening the command opportunities to all of the unrestricted line flag officers, it enabled the flag officers of designators other than aviation to fly their flags from aircraft carriers, and through this experience and exposure, to better understand the carrier’s capabilities and better appreciate the contribution of naval aviation to the Navy’s mission.
I am fully convinced that the elimination of the parochial boundaries in the fleet operating forces has significantly expanded the support for the aircraft carrier’s position as the capital ship of today’s Navy throughout the entire professional unrestricted line corps.
NAVAL WARFARE INFORMATIONAL PUBLICATION NO. 1
In the early spring of 1978 I began to prepare myself, and the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, for my successor in the job. The appointment for CNO is a four-year tour, with no extensions except during national emergencies or in time of war. I would be relieved of the job on the last working day of June, and among other responsibilities, I felt it necessary to come forward with a candidate for my relief. This was not meddling but was expected of me by the secretary of the navy, the secretary of defense, and the president, all of whom were involved in the selection process. Early on I had made my decision to support Adm. Thomas B. Hayward, who not only had the best qualifications of any active duty officer in terms of experience but also had the informal votes of the majority of the four star admirals in the Navy, according to a private opinion poll I personally conducted.
In my own case, I was told that I was in the running for selection for chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which would also become available on the first of July 1978. The secretary of the navy was lobbying for me, and the incumbent chairman, Gen. George Brown, told me I was his first, and only, choice. The chief of staff of the Army had declined to be considered, and the commandant of the Marine Corps was not eligible. This made it a choice between Gen. David Jones, chief of staff of the Air Force, and myself. Dave was running hard for the appointment.