In the 1970s the JCS was a far different organization than it became under Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. Under Rumsfeld’s administration, the overall authority of the chiefs significantly diminished, to the point that they were no longer even in the chain of command with the National Command Authority in the decision-making process for the use of nuclear weapons and their release to the forces in the field. This very special and fundamental responsibility of the Joint Chiefs, for which they were especially well prepared and qualified through their background and around the clock staff support from the Joint Staff, was transferred in 2006 to civilians in the Department of Defense.
This comes in starkest contrast with previous years, when, for example, President Ford rejected Secretary Kissinger’s proposal for a nuclear arms — limitation agreement with the USSR in which our side would give up cruise missiles in exchange for a reduction in the number of Soviet multimegaton ICBM war heads because the JCS had recommended against it. This was in spite of unanimous support of Kissinger’s proposal from the rest of the National Security Council. Later, when President Carter planned a $9 billion cut in the 1978 defense budget, he would not move forward until a majority of the JCS was willing to agree with the president that the nation’s defense would not have its capabilities reduced by a cut of this magnitude.
During my tenure as a member of the JCS, the chiefs met three times each week in the tank. Each chief was accompanied by his OPDEP, a designated three-star flag officer from the Plans, Policy or Operations branch of his staff. If the service chief could not attend a scheduled JCS meeting, his vice chief was required to be there. During my year as vice chief of naval operations under Admiral Zumwalt, I was a frequent participant in the meetings of the JCS as his representative. This proved quite useful in getting me ready for the JCS arena from the very beginning of my tour as CNO.
At each Friday meeting, the JCS were joined in the tank by the secretary of defense, and those meetings were usually, at least in part, conducted in executive session. The SecDef would always attend unaccompanied, which provided a particularly useful forum for frank discussion. This accomplished a great deal in clearing the air and promoting truly unified action within the Department of Defense.
Generally, the JCS did not become involved in intraservice force-level issues and usually avoided the discussion of roles and missions. They were considered the law, and as such they were not questioned or contested. This greatly facilitated our ability to operate with the immediacy demanded by emergent threats and instant crises. I cannot recall a single instance, in my four years, when failure of the chiefs to agree resulted in any delay in responding to an incident or managing a crisis.
There was one document, prepared by the chiefs on an annual basis, which dealt with force levels. That was a JCS plan at the secret level, referred to as the Joint Service Operations Plan, or JSOP. This JCS paper set forth all of the forces required to carry out the approved JCS war plans without risk. In other words, cataloging the assets that were required to assure the successful execution of our war plans, even if they had to be implemented simultaneously, as would probably be the case in a general war with the Soviet Union. The JSOP was prepared by the Joint Staff and really to determine what would be the forces needed if unconstrained by budgetary limitations. In 1978, for instance, the JSOP requirements showed a need for forty-six attack carriers.
Mainly, though, the JCS were involved with supervising the readiness of the theater commanders, such as CinCEur and CinCPac and ensuring that the individual services provided the field commanders the necessary and adequate resources in manpower, equipment, and logistical support to carry out their war plans. In the case of a crisis, the chiefs formulated courses of action, advised the National Command Authority of the alternatives, and then transmitted the NCA guidance and decisions to the Unified and Specified Commanders for implementation.
The JCS, in those days, consisted of the service chiefs — chief of staff of the Army, chief of naval operations, chief of staff of the Air Force, commandant of the Marine Corps (in matters affecting the Marine Corps and, later, as a full member) — and the chairman. There was no vice chairman, and the chairman’s seniority was defined as the number one among equals. The chairman of the JCS was also a senior member of a number of allied combined military councils, such as NATO and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). These responsibilities required the chairman to attend in person many of their regular and statutory meetings. His attendance was considered essential as a demonstration of the commitment of U.S. leadership and support.
When the chairman was away participating at these meetings for several days at a time in Europe or Southeast Asia, one of the service chiefs would function as acting chairman. This was in addition to continuing his own responsibilities as a service chief. It required that the acting chairman attend the daily JCS level intelligence and operational briefings by the Joint Staff and be available for access in his Pentagon office during normal working hours and in his quarters during the rest of the time of his acting JCS tenure. With the regularly appointed chairman away about 20 percent of the time, the system of acting chairman maintained an important Washington continuity in the National Command Authority chain of command and it made each service chief much better prepared to carry out his own responsibilities as a member of the JCS.
SEIZURE OF THE SS MAYAGUEZ
On 12 May 1975 the SS Mayaguez, a container ship in the Sea Land, Inc., commercial fleet, flying the U.S. flag and crewed by American civilian mariners, was steaming in a regular shipping lane in the Gulf of Siam about sixty miles from the coast of Cambodia. This lane passes within eight miles from Poulo Wai, an island claimed by Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam.
Without warning, a number of small gunboats, including three U.S.made swift boats (PCF), headed from Poulo Wai toward the Mayaguez and fired a shot from a 76mm gun across the bow of the merchantman. The Mayaguez’s master was ordered to heave to, and heavily armed Cambodians rapidly boarded the ship. The master just had time to call out on the international distress channel that his ship was being seized by pirates before he was held at gunpoint.
At the time of the Mayaguez seizure, Gen. George Brown, the chairman of the JCS, was in Europe attending a NATO meeting. Gen. David Jones, chief of staff of the Air Force, was in the scheduled rotation to be acting chairman if an emergency arose. When the Mayaguez seizure was reported, the Joint Staff immediately scheduled a meeting of the JCS with General Jones presiding. There were many questions as to what to do and how to respond because the available intelligence was so sketchy. Jones went over to the National Security Council meeting at the White House with the limited information the JCS had available.
At that point, I left Washington to fulfill a speaking engagement at a luncheon meeting of the Commonwealth Club in Boston. I flew to Logan Airport in a Navy A-3 jet bomber converted to a VIP transport and arrived early to visit a Soviet navy destroyer that was making a port call in Boston. Upon departing the Russian ship, I was met at the shore side of the gangway by a lieutenant from the staff of commander, Second Fleet, whose flagship was also paying a port call to Boston. The lieutenant said that there was a secure telephone call for me from the secretary of defense and that I was to take the call on board the Second Fleet flagship — the nearest secure telephone location.